



Is Canada Ready for How Beijing Operates?

What the China Index and Taiwan's frontline experience reveal about Beijing's influence playbook

Min Hsuan Wu (TTcat)
Co-Founder & CEO, Doublethink Lab
APFC Webinar Series, Session 1



ABOUT US




**Strengthening Democracy
Through Enhancing
Digital Defenses**



**The Global Network of
Stakeholders Studying
PRC Influence Since 2019**

<https://doublethinklab.medium.com>



China Index

Measuring PRC Influence
Around the Globe.

Least Most

2024 ▾

📍 Select Country & Territory ▾

Ranking & Scores →



Overall Score ▾

Overall scores measure the PRC's overall influence in the Index countries. Click on the dropdown button to compare the PRC's influence in each of the nine Domains.

| Rank | Country | Score |
|---------|-----------|-----------|
| 1st | Pakistan | ↑ 274/380 |
| 2nd | Cambodia | ↑ 265/384 |
| 3rd | Singapore | ↑ 264/396 |
| 4th ▲10 | Nigeria | ↑ 249/396 |
| 5th ▼1 | Thailand | ↑ 242/392 |

+

-



The 2024 edition of the China Index measures PRC influence in **101** countries.

<https://china-index.io>

Domains

11 Indicators for each Domain



Media

The Media Domain evaluates how PRC entities influence public debate and media coverage about the PRC in the Index country.

[Explore →](#)



Academia

The Academia Domain measures how the PRC state attempts to restrict academic freedom by influencing or interfering with the Index country's academic and educational activities.

[Explore →](#)



Economy

The Economy Domain measures the PRC's economic leverage in the Index country, and how this is used to influence economic policy or corporate behavior in ways that favor the PRC.

[Explore →](#)



Society

The Society Domain measures the extent and effectiveness of the PRC's efforts to advance its soft power in the Index country, including its influence over the actions and views of local organizations and citizens.

[Explore →](#)



Military

The Military Domain gauges the bilateral military relationship between the PRC and the Index country, including PRC efforts to influence local military personnel.

[Explore →](#)



Law Enforcement

The Law Enforcement Domain measures law enforcement cooperation between the PRC and the Index country, as well as the nature and extent of PRC-related criminal activity in the Index country.

[Explore →](#)



Technology

The Technology Domain gauges the PRC's influence over the technology sector in the Index country, including the activity and financial leverage of PRC companies, use of PRC hardware, and bilateral research partnerships.

[Explore →](#)



Domestic Politics

The Domestic Politics Domain evaluates PRC efforts to influence the political landscape in the Index country, and the footprint of PRC security companies.

[Explore →](#)




Foreign Policy

The Foreign Policy Domain gauges PRC efforts to achieve diplomatic objectives by influencing key actors in the Index country.

[Explore →](#)

Scoring System and Indicator Types

99 indicators, three types of questions



47 Yes/No indicators

These are simple checks of whether a phenomenon is present or not. If it is observed with evidence, the score is 4; if not, the score is 0.

48 Graded indicators


These capture the degree or scale of influence. Each is scored from 0 to 4, depending on how significant or widespread the evidence is.

4 Foreign Policy indicators

These track how a country positions itself in international politics, whether it rejects or denounces Beijing's stance, stays silent, or shows explicit support.

The Making Process of China Index

The China Index covers 9 Domains: Academia, Domestic Politics, Economy, Foreign Policy, Law Enforcement, Media, Military, Society, and Technology. Each Domain comprises 11 Indicators (99 Indicators in total) devised by the Index Committee, each of which corresponds to an observable phenomenon of PRC influence.



The China Index

Measuring PRC Influence Around the Globe



Methodology Overview

OUR INDEX COMMITTEE



Bonnie S. Glaser

GMF Indo-Pacific



Charles Burton

Senior Fellow at
Sinopsis



Glenn Tiffert

Hoover Institution at
Stanford University



J. Michael Cole

Global Taiwan
Institute



Michael Mazza

American Enterprise
Institute

Our Regional Partners

| | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|
|  | <p>Emeka Umejei</p> |  | <p>Niva Yau Maryam Azwer Maiko Ichihara</p> | <p>Sriparna Pathak Bradley Jensen Murg Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat</p> |  |
|---|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|

Africa

Asia

North America

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|

Latin America

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|------------------------------|
|  |  |  |  | <p>Hernán Alberro</p> |
|---|---|--|---|------------------------------|

Europe

A Broader Lens on PRC's Global Influence

| Region | Beta Version (46 Countries) | Expanded Coverage - 2022 (82 Countries) | Latest Update - 2024 (101 Countries) |
|--|--|---|--|
| North America | Canada, USA, Mexico | | |
| Central America & Caribbean | | Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama | El Salvador |
| South America | Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela | Ecuador | |
| East & Southeast Asia | Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, The Philippines | | Myanmar, Mongolia, Timor-Leste |
| South Asia | | Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India | Nepal, Sri Lanka |
| Central Asia | Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan | Turkmenistan | |
| North Africa & West Asia | Armenia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey | Azerbaijan | Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel |
| Sub-Sahara & Africa | Ethiopia, Kenya | Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, South Africa, Ghana, Zambia*, Senegal, Tanzania | Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola |
| Europe | Germany, BiH, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Albania, Latvia, UK, Montenegro, Serbia | Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Belarus, Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Slovakia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Ukraine, France, Belgium, Romania, Spain, Lithuania, Sweden, Moldova | Russia, Ireland, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland |
| Oceania | Australia, New Zealand | | |

*Zambia excluded in 2024 update

WHERE WE ARE

The 2026 cycle, by the numbers

63

applications received

open call now closed

132

countries applied for

up from 101+ last cycle

105–110

countries we aim to cover

still being finalised



Global and Regional Perspectives

2024 China Index Top 10

| Region | Ranking | Regional Ranking | Original Score | Most Influenced Domains |
|---------------------|---------|------------------|----------------|--|
| Pakistan | 1 | 1 | 274 / 380 ↑ | Technology Military Foreign Policy |
| Cambodia | 2 | 1 | 265 / 384 ↑ | Domestic Politics Technology Law Enforcement |
| Singapore | 3 | 2 | 264 / 396 ↑ | Society Media Technology |
| Nigeria | 4 ▲10 | 1 | 249 / 396 ↑ | Foreign Policy Technology Economy |
| Thailand | 5 ▼1 | 3 | 242 / 392 ↑ | Military Technology Academia |
| Zimbabwe | 6 New! | 2 | 238 / 388 | Domestic Politics Technology Foreign Policy |
| Indonesia | 7 ▲9 | 4 | 227 / 396 ↑ | Military Economy Technology |
| Chile | 8 ▲22 | 1 | 224 / 392 ↑ | Media Society Foreign Policy |
| Algeria | 9 New! | 1 | 219 / 388 | Technology Foreign Policy Military |
| South Africa | 10 ▼5 | 3 | 218 / 392 | Technology Foreign Policy Law Enforcement |

Change in PRC Influence Score (2022–2024)


Top 10 Risers & Decliners in PRC Influence Score (2022-2024)



Change in PRC Influence Score (2022-2024)

- Chile leads the rise
- Ukraine sees biggest decline
- Canada joins the Top 10 risers
- South Korea and Philippines both had notable drops


Regional Shift Since 2022



- Global average ↑3.5
- Central America & Caribbean biggest increase (+12.1)
- Sub-Saharan Africa and South America also recorded strong growth
- Most other regions had moderate gains or stayed stable
- Small declines in South Asia, Central Asia, Oceania


Big Picture: Change Across Domains (2022–2024)

Domain Scores Comparison: 2022 and 2024




- Most domains saw a rise in PRC influence
- Biggest increases: Society (+12.2), Foreign Policy (+9.1)
- Society's rise reflects moving "Chinese social media ownership" from Technology (2022) to Society (2024), with the indicator itself up 20%
- Only Domestic Politics saw a slight drop (-2.9)


Every Region, A Different Story




Different Domains, Different Levels of Influence



Different Domains, Different Levels of Influence




Interesting Findings: Foreign Policy Domain



79.8%

Support/silence on PRC policies toward Tibet



79.8%

Support/silence on PRC territorial claims (e.g. South China Sea)



75.2%

Support/silence on PRC policies toward Hong Kong



74.7%

Parliamentary friendship groups with PRC



74.3%

Signed agreements classifying ties as a 'Strategic Partnership' or beyond



70.4%

"One China Principle" adoption

Interesting Findings: Technology Domain



83%

Affected Countries

Chinese enterprise
4G/5G adoption
agreements



78.8%

Affected Countries

Tech-related
equipment for
critical infrastructure



74.5%

Affected Countries

ISP Wi-Fi/fiber
optic agreements
with PRC firms



50.5%

Affected Countries

Smart city
contracts or
procurement

Interesting Findings: Society Domain




Cultural events involving the Chinese diaspora were reported in **72%** of countries in 2024, up from 38% in 2022.



Pro-PRC groups echoing Beijing's views on Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang were reported in **52.5%** of countries, up from 38% in 2022.

East & Southeast Asia: The Stronghold



Most Influenced Domains

 Economy

 Foreign Policy

 Technology

Average Overall
Influence Score

▲48.7%

World Average

▲36.0%


- Still the “stronghold” for PRC influence
- Trade is king: ASEAN is China’s top partner for 14 years
- Tech giants: Huawei, Alibaba, and 5G networks everywhere
- New focus: Deeper diplomatic ties with ASEAN
- Influence is a mix of business, technology, and soft power

TW Taiwan: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD
RANKING

31 / 10

1



Most Influenced Domains

 Society

 Media

 Domestic Politics

Average Overall
Influence Score

▼ 44.5%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


tw Taiwan

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 3rd | Media | 77.3% / 31.3% |
| 38th | Academia | 40.0% / 34.4% |
| 40th | Economy | 36.4% / 35.4% |
| 2nd | Society | 84.1% / 35.8% |
| 59th | Military | 20.5% / 29.5% |
| 36th | Law Enforcement | 38.6% / 31.3% |
| 76th | Technology | 25.0% / 42.5% |
| 12th | Domestic Politics | 60.0% / 34.3% |
| 95th | Foreign Policy | 17.5% / 50.1% |



North America: Shifting PRC Influence Patterns



Most Influenced Domains



Society



Domestic Politics



Academia

Average Overall
Influence Score

▲40.7%

World Average


▲36.0%

- PRC influence in the US and Canada is evolving and closely watched
- Tech presence growing: more Chinese devices and infrastructure (like at seaports)
- Debate over TikTok, Chinese apps, and media shaping public opinion
- Reports of PRC-linked lobbying and election influence, especially in Canada
- Academic and research ties under scrutiny due to IP and security concerns

CA Canada: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD
RANKING

19 / 101



Most Influenced Domains



Media



Domestic Politics



Society

Average Overall Influence Score

▲ 48.5%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


CA Canada

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 1st | Media | 90.9% / 31.3% |
| 8th | Academia | 61.4% / 34.4% |
| 68th | Economy | 18.2% / 35.4% |
| 3rd | Society | 75.0% / 35.8% |
| 69th | Military | 9.1% / 29.5% |
| 39th | Law Enforcement | 36.4% / 31.3% |
| 47th | Technology | 40.9% / 42.5% |
| 4th | Domestic Politics | 77.3% / 34.3% |
| 75th | Foreign Policy | 27.3% / 50.1% |



What Drives Alignment

The single most important finding in the 2024 data.

| Layer Relationship | 2022 | 2024 | Change |
|----------------------|-------|-------|--------|
| Alignment — Exposure | 0.72 | 0.76 | +0.04 |
| Alignment — Pressure | -0.01 | -0.07 | -0.06 |
| Exposure — Pressure | 0.36 | 0.26 | -0.10 |

Correlation coefficients, China Index 2022 and 2024 datasets.

WHAT IT MEANS

Exposure predicts Alignment.

Sustained economic, academic, and societal partnerships are the strongest predictor of countries moving toward PRC positions.

Pressure does not.

Sanctions, threats, and hostage diplomacy show no statistical relationship with actual policy outcomes.

The implication.

The most consequential influence is built quietly, in conditions that look like normal cooperation.

The Index gives us the map. Taiwan shows the terrain.

The China Index shows where influence is building. Taiwan helps us understand what sustained influence does inside a society.

What the data gives us

- A comparable picture of PRC influence across 101 countries
- Observable indicators: economic ties, media presence, diaspora networks, technology dependency
- Trend lines showing what is deepening, what is plateauing, and where pushback is working
- A clear finding: Exposure predicts Alignment. Pressure does not.

What the data cannot show

- What happens inside a society when these indicators have been rising for a decade
- How political institutions respond, or fail to, when the pressure is sustained
- What it does to the information environment of a generation that grew up inside it
- Where the line between legitimate engagement and exploitable dependency actually sits

To answer what the data cannot show, we turn to Taiwan: not as a direct comparison to Canada, but as an early-warning case.

Taiwan Shows the Pattern Further Down the Road

The same dynamics appear across democracies, but Taiwan has lived with them longer, more intensely, and across more domains.

Same mechanisms, different stage.

PRC influence does not look identical everywhere, but the sequence often rhymes: build relationships, shape information environments, and activate politically when useful.

The patterns travel.

Narrative laundering, fake local voices, AI-enabled personas, and platform-based trust shifts are not Taiwan-only problems.

The China Index provides the cross-country frame.

What Taiwan reveals in depth, the China Index helps track across countries.

Four Common Questions

These are the questions that usually come up when we talk about PRC influence. The next cases help answer them with evidence from Taiwan.

01 How do societies recognize influence before the damage is done?

02 Where is PRC influence deepening, and where is it being pushed back?

03 What has Taiwan learned that others may still underestimate?

04 How can democracies respond without going too far?

The Network Comes Before the Message



Case 1: Commercial spam, political activation

51 inauthentic accounts on Threads impersonated Taiwanese citizens and made 7,032 posts. The vast majority promoted sex-dating websites.

The political content: 275 identical anti-DPP posts, a small fraction, activated during the recall period. The infrastructure was in place long before it was needed politically.



Case 2: Viral gossip, election-time switching

The Borderless Group operates 1,217 inauthentic news domains and 549 Threads accounts with documented ties to PRC state media. Most of 467,000+ posts were viral and non-political.

The same network has been documented switching to political content during election cycles. The infrastructure exists well before it is activated.

WHY IT MATTERS

Early warning signs often look non-political: spam, gossip, entertainment, or commercial activity. By the time the content becomes political, the infrastructure may already be ready.

DOUBLETHINK LAB

Inauthentic Accounts Impersonate Taiwanese to Attack Political Party (Jul 2025) · Assessing the Borderless Group's Activity on Threads (Apr 2026)

Recognition Depends on Small Clues

How we identified the Threads network:

Language slip-ups.

Posts claimed to be from Taiwanese citizens but contained simplified Chinese characters, the writing system used in mainland China, not Taiwan.

Infrastructure traces.

Pressing "forgot password" on the accounts revealed that one was linked to a phone number registered in Hong Kong.

Stolen identities.

Most accounts used profile photos stolen from Taiwanese or other Asian influencers, sourced from publicly available images.

Operational errors.

One account posted that it would attend an anti-DPP protest on April 26, three days after the protest had already taken place.

Influence Changes Who People Trust

The deeper shift is not always what people believe, but whose voices they treat as credible.

Why this matters

Traditional influence operations try to change what you believe.

Platform-mediated influence changes the trust environment: who people listen to, which voices feel credible, and which narratives become familiar.

Once trust shifts, beliefs can follow without one obvious moment of persuasion.

2x

Trust in influencers as news sources

Active TikTok users in Taiwan trust online influencers as information sources roughly twice as much as inactive users. Their information hierarchy has shifted away from institutional sources.

0.76

Correlation: Exposure predicts Alignment

Across 101 countries, the China Index finds that sustained Exposure (economic ties, media presence, social links) is the strongest predictor of countries moving toward PRC positions. Pressure (sanctions, coercion) shows almost no relationship with Alignment.

WHY IT MATTERS

Influence at scale often works through accumulated shifts in trust, not one dramatic incident. The China Index helps us see that buildup.

Recognition Is Not Resilience

Taiwan talks openly about PRC interference, but awareness alone does not automatically produce trust, confidence, or resilience.

Two findings show the gap:

- A Politics**
Awareness of PRC interference did not settle Taiwan's 2025 Great Recall debate or determine the outcome.
- B Digital resilience**
Taiwanese youth still showed signs of political cynicism and passivity, even in a highly open information environment.

Seeing Interference Did Not Settle the Debate



What happened

July to August 2025:

Civic groups pushed to recall 31 legislators amid disputes over defense spending, legislative obstruction, and national security concerns.

Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council publicly accused Beijing of interfering, and PRC state media echoed KMT talking points.

Result:

All recall votes failed. Public awareness of interference did not automatically translate into a different electoral result.

What this shows

Interference can shape the debate without changing the vote.

The goal is not always to swing an election. It can also be to make certain issues more divisive, more politically costly, or harder to discuss.

Beijing now speaks democratic language.

PRC officials framed the recalls as a violation of “mainstream public opinion,” using the vocabulary of democracy to attack democratic processes.

WHY IT MATTERS

Awareness of interference is not enough. Democracies also need trusted institutions and clear ways to respond while protecting legitimate political disagreement.

Information Freedom Does Not Automatically Build Resilience

Taiwan

Awareness, but uncertainty

Taiwanese adolescents recognized misinformation on TikTok, but often described feeling lost or resigned in algorithm-driven echo chambers.

Powerlessness on cross-strait issues

Many opposed unification, but also felt Taiwan would be unable to resist militarily.

Myanmar

Verification as a habit

Myanmar youth, including migrants in Thailand, more often cited trusted sources and described checking information before sharing.

Restriction shaped behavior

Living with censorship and political risk made information quality feel more urgent.

WHY IT MATTERS

Democratic openness is essential, but it is not enough. Resilience has to be built through education, platform accountability, and civic habits.

PRC's Tools Are Scaling Faster Than Democratic Responses



The GoLaxy documents

Leaked materials from a PRC tech company show an AI-assisted influence platform with modules for U.S. elections, Indo-Pacific elections, and Belt and Road corridors.

Speed advantage now sits with the attacker.

AI-assisted systems can generate and deploy content faster than democratic review processes can respond.

Geography is no longer a constraint.

The same infrastructure can be reused across countries, elections, and issue areas.

The infrastructure is already deployed.

Linked accounts were already posting about Taiwanese politics ahead of the 2026 local elections.

WHY IT MATTERS

Democratic rules are still built for case-by-case response. But the threat is becoming reusable, scalable, and cross-border.

The Hard Part Is Responding Without Overreaching

Example: The Borderless Group: where do you intervene?

1,217 domains, 549 accounts, 467,000+ posts, mostly gossip and viral content with documented CCP ties. The same infrastructure activates politically during elections. Do you intervene before the activation, when the content looks commercial? Or after, when the political damage is already done?

How Taiwan has answered so far:



Target acts, not identities.

The Anti-Infiltration Act (2020) and the 2025 17-strategy package define counter-influence narrowly: specified acts of foreign funding, recruitment, and information transfer. Not categories of speaker or opinion.



Make the evidence public.

Monitoring is only defensible when the evidence base is open. The China Index is built on this premise: the public can see what is being counted, and contest it.

WHY IT MATTERS

The goal is not to restrict legitimate exchange. The goal is to make covert funding, impersonation, and coordinated manipulation harder to hide.

Four Lessons for Open Societies

01

The network comes before the message.

Inauthentic accounts, commercial content, gossip sites, and platform networks can be built long before they are used politically. So if we only start paying attention when the political message appears, we are already late.

02

Influence changes who people trust, not just what they believe.

It is not only about whether someone believes one false claim. The deeper shift is about who people listen to, which voices feel credible, and which narratives become familiar over time.

03

Awareness is not the same as resilience.

Taiwan is highly aware of PRC interference. But awareness alone does not automatically produce trust, confidence, or effective response. Resilience needs institutions, civic capacity, and clear mechanisms for action.

04

The response has to match the scale of the problem.


AI-assisted influence infrastructure is becoming reusable, scalable, and cross-border. Democratic responses cannot stay purely case-by-case.

Canada does not need to copy Taiwan. But Taiwan shows why democracies should prepare before the pressure becomes harder to manage.

Thank you.


Looking forward to the discussion.

china-index.io



Backup

KH Cambodia: PRC Influence 2024



Most Influenced Domains

-  Domestic Politics
-  Technology
-  Law Enforcement

Average Overall Influence Score

▲ 69.0%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


KH Cambodia

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage


Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 10th | Media | 61.4% / 31.3% |
| 6th | Academia | 68.2% / 34.4% |
| 15th | Economy | 60.0% / 35.4% |
| 20th | Society | 50.0% / 35.8% |
| 5th | Military | 70.0% / 29.5% |
| 1st | Law Enforcement | 79.5% / 31.3% |
| 9th | Technology | 79.5% / 42.5% |
| 3rd | Domestic Politics | 80.0% / 34.3% |
| 15th | Foreign Policy | 72.7% / 50.1% |



US USA: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING **38 / 101**



Most Influenced Domains

-  Academia
-  Society
-  Law Enforcement

Average Overall Influence Score

▲ **43.3%**

World Average

▲ **36.0%**


US USA

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.


| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 27th | Media | 38.6% / 31.3% |
| 8th | Academia | 61.4% / 34.4% |
| 40th | Economy | 36.4% / 35.4% |
| 16th | Society | 52.8% / 35.8% |
| 34th | Military | 36.4% / 29.5% |
| 13th | Law Enforcement | 52.3% / 31.3% |
| 34th | Technology | 50.0% / 42.5% |
| 23rd | Domestic Politics | 45.5% / 34.3% |
| 92nd | Foreign Policy | 18.2% / 50.1% |



MX Mexico: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING

64 / 101



Most Influenced Domains

-  Technology
-  Foreign Policy
-  Society

Average Overall Influence Score

▼ 30.3%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


MX Mexico

Domain Scores


● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 80th | Media | 11.4% / 31.3% |
| 71st | Academia | 22.7% / 34.4% |
| 68th | Economy | 18.2% / 35.4% |
| 33rd | Society | 43.2% / 35.8% |
| 69th | Military | 9.1% / 29.5% |
| 39th | Law Enforcement | 36.4% / 31.3% |
| 29th | Technology | 54.5% / 42.5% |
| 62nd | Domestic Politics | 25.0% / 34.3% |
| 51st | Foreign Policy | 52.3% / 50.1% |



Europe: The Fortress



Most Influenced Domains

 Academia

 Foreign Policy

 Society

**Average Overall
Influence Score**

▲25.6%

World Average


▲36.0%

- Least influenced region by PRC
- Strong laws and institutions for protection
- Independent and skeptical media
- Strict digital security and anti-interference rules
- PRC still tries through research and student programs
- Europe responds with new laws against foreign influence

DE Germany: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING

22 / 101



Most Influenced Domains



Academia



Domestic Politics



Technology

Average Overall Influence Score

▲ 47.5%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


DE Germany

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.


| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 35th | Media | 34.1% / 31.3% |
| 2nd | Academia | 77.3% / 34.4% |
| 27th | Economy | 45.5% / 35.4% |
| 33rd | Society | 43.2% / 35.8% |
| 45th | Military | 29.5% / 29.5% |
| 36th | Law Enforcement | 38.6% / 31.3% |
| 25th | Technology | 56.8% / 42.5% |
| 5th | Domestic Politics | 75.0% / 34.3% |
| 75th | Foreign Policy | 27.3% / 50.1% |



RU Russia: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING

35 / 101



Most Influenced Domains

-  Society
-  Foreign Policy
-  Technology

Average Overall Influence Score

43.9%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


RU Russia

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 64th | Media | 22.7% / 31.3% |
| 64th | Academia | 25.0% / 34.4% |
| 27th | Economy | 45.5% / 35.4% |
| 10th | Society | 59.1% / 35.8% |
| 23rd | Military | 45.5% / 29.5% |
| 20th | Law Enforcement | 47.7% / 31.3% |
| 34th | Technology | 50.0% / 42.5% |
| 31st | Domestic Politics | 43.2% / 34.3% |
| 41st | Foreign Policy | 56.8% / 50.1% |




UA Ukraine: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING

89 / 10

1



Most Influenced Domains

 Technology

 Society

 Law Enforcement

Average Overall Influence Score

▼ 18.2%

World Average

▲ 36.0%


UA Ukraine

Domain Scores


● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 80th | Media | 11.4% / 31.3% |
| 81st | Academia | 18.2% / 34.4% |
| 89th | Economy | 9.1% / 35.4% |
| 53rd | Society | 35.0% / 35.8% |
| 85th | Military | 0.0% / 29.5% |
| 55th | Law Enforcement | 27.3% / 31.3% |
| 55th | Technology | 35.0% / 42.5% |
| 86th | Domestic Politics | 11.4% / 34.3% |
| 91st | Foreign Policy | 20.0% / 50.1% |



South Asia: Strategic Balancing



Most Influenced Domains

 Foreign Policy

 Military

 Technology

**Average Overall
Influence Score**

▲38.5%


World Average

▲36.0%

- PRC focuses on foreign policy and military influence, especially in Pakistan
- Major projects and loans in Sri Lanka
- India is pushing back, especially after recent tensions

PK Pakistan: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING **1** / 101



Most Influenced Domains

-  Technology
-  Military
-  Foreign Policy

Average Overall Influence Score

▲ **72.1%**

World Average

▲ **36.0%**


PK Pakistan

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage


Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|----------------|
| 10th | Media | 61.4% / 31.3% |
| 8th | Academia | 61.4% / 34.4% |
| 1st | Economy | 81.8% / 35.4% |
| 33rd | Society | 43.2% / 35.8% |
| 1st | Military | 100.0% / 29.5% |
| 16th | Law Enforcement | 50.0% / 31.3% |
| 1st | Technology | 100.0% / 42.5% |
| 7th | Domestic Politics | 67.5% / 34.3% |
| 2nd | Foreign Policy | 90.0% / 50.1% |



IN India: PRC Influence 2024

WORLD RANKING **93** / 101



Most Influenced Domains

 Law Enforcement

 Media

 Foreign Policy

Average Overall Influence Score

▼ **14.1%**

World Average

▲ **36.0%**

IN India

Domain Scores

● Country Percentage ● Index Average ● 2022 Percentage

Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a "completely influenced" level of 100%. The percentages express the country's score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.

| | | |
|------|-------------------|---------------|
| 59th | Media | 25.0% / 31.3% |
| 98th | Academia | 4.5% / 34.4% |
| 89th | Economy | 9.1% / 35.4% |
| 97th | Society | 6.8% / 35.8% |
| 68th | Military | 15.0% / 29.5% |
| 39th | Law Enforcement | 36.4% / 31.3% |
| 97th | Technology | 2.5% / 42.5% |
| 99th | Domestic Politics | 4.5% / 34.3% |
| 86th | Foreign Policy | 22.7% / 50.1% |

