



CANADA-ASIA AGENDA

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Issue 28

Realizing the 'Other Half of Diplomacy' in Southeast Asia: Will Canada's Efforts Last?

Brian Job

A full-court press is now on for Ottawa to re-establish its relationship with Southeast Asia. From trade and people-to-people linkages to shared concerns over global and regional security issues - a flurry of visits and initiatives have shown that Canada has begun to attend to the 'other half of diplomacy' in Southeast Asia. If recent initiatives are sustained, author Brian Job argues that this could mark the re-establishment of a meaningful Canadian presence in Southeast Asia. However, past experience raises questions regarding Ottawa's staying power and whether the activity will coalesce around a coherent, longer-term, Asia agenda for Canada.

On July 6, Foreign Minister Baird's "fourth Asia visit" was announced with the rhetorical flourish, "Strong trade winds are swirling across the Asia-Pacific region, and Canada, as a Pacific nation, will be a major player in these exciting times."¹

Having just returned, Baird has cut a swath through Southeast Asia with attendance at key regional meetings including the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Partner meeting in Cambodia; visits to Brunei, Manila, and Shanghai;

and announcements of new initiatives, including the establishment of an embassy in Burma/Myanmar² and a pledge of C\$10 million over the next three years on projects in Southeast Asia.³

This plus the recent ministerial visits by Defence Minister MacKay, Trade Minister Fast, and the Prime Minister himself to China in February and Thailand, South Korea, and Japan in March demonstrate that Ottawa has taken to heart the admonition concerning the Asia Pacific that "half of diplomacy is showing up."



About The Author

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Indeed, the Harper government, largely driven by the economic concerns of “swirling trade winds” has made Asia a priority. Thus, a full-court press is on to establish bilateral FTAs and investment agreements and to gain seats at regional multilateral forums, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus (ADMM+).

Once Ottawa “got it” concerning the need to (re)focus on Asia⁴, much of the government’s efforts were, and continue to be, directed towards China. However, as Baird’s trip demonstrated, official attention is now being spread throughout the region. Southeast Asian officials and experts who used to be asking, “where is Canada?” are beginning to see Ottawa back on their radar screens in light of the increased ministerial trips and participation in keynote events, most notably Baird’s audience with Aung San Suu Kyi in March⁵, and Defence Minister MacKay’s plenary speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue in June⁶. These activities plus steps recently undertaken by DND and other agencies, including CIDA and the IDRC, indicates that Ottawa is beginning to attend to the “other half of diplomacy.”

This is in marked contrast to where the government was two years ago, when it signed the regional Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, but gave little indication of having any forward looking policy agenda towards Southeast Asia.⁷

This year marks the 35th anniversary of our engagement with ASEAN as a Dialogue Partner. ASEAN is necessarily the focal point for Canada’s relationship with Southeast Asia. As Foreign Minister Baird noted in his remarks to the ASEAN-Canada Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh, over the last two years Ottawa has picked up the tempo of its regional engagement, with increased ministerial visits, promotion of trade and investment agreements, attention to Burma, and appointment of an Ambassador to ASEAN.

If sustained, Ottawa’s initiatives, especially those announced by Baird during his ongoing trip, could mark the re-establishment of a meaningful Canadian presence in Southeast Asia. However, past experience raises questions regarding Ottawa’s staying power and the availability of adequate resources, and whether or

not this current flurry of activity will coalesce around a coherent, longer-term, Asia agenda for Canada. Without a sense of directions and priorities, beyond the pursuit of short-term economic pay-offs, efforts may become diffuse and diffused, ultimately again relegating us to be a largely unnoticed regional member.

Canada’s interests and priorities concerning Southeast Asia

Our interests in Southeast Asia range across a broad spectrum from our trade and economic ties--ASEAN being Canada’s seventh-largest trading partner; our strong people to people links with approximately one million people from Southeast Asia now residing in Canada; and concern over global and regional security issues, and promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

With the OECD predicting an average real GDP growth rate of 5.6% for 2012-16 for the six major Southeast Asian economies⁸, the region has become a focal point for substantially growing Canada’s economic and commercial ties to the region. Canada’s merchandise trade with ASEAN states has increased by 28% percent since 2006, amounting to CAD \$15.5 billion in 2011. These figures, however, need to be kept in perspective; we run a significant trade deficit with our imports more than double our exports. Even our main trading partners in the region—Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore—each account for less the 0.4% of Canadian trade.⁹

| REAL GDP GROWTH (% change) | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Country | 2010 | 2015 | Average 2003-2007 | Average 2011-2015 |
| Indonesia | 6.1 | 7.1 | 5.5 | 6.6 |
| Malaysia | 6.5 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 5.5 |
| Philippines | 6.0 | 4.4 | 5.7 | 4.6 |
| Singapore | 14.0 | 4.5 | 7.5 | 4.7 |
| Thailand | 7.0 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 5.2 |
| Viet Nam | 6.8 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 7.1 |
| 6 countries average | 7.3 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.0 |

Source: OECD Development Centre
Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2010 - OECD

To bolster our commercial connections, Prime Minister Harper, Foreign Minister Baird, and Trade Minister



Fast have travelled to Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila. Although negotiations on a FTA with Singapore have languished for over a decade now, Ottawa does see prospects for bilateral deals in the region, having recently initiated study of an FTA with Thailand¹⁰ and a joint commission with the Philippines to advance economic relations—another outcome of Baird’s trip.¹¹ These steps are line with Ottawa’s broader strategy of gaining trade and investment agreements with Asia’s major players, India, Japan, and China.

However, the larger trophies on Canada’s economic agenda are seats at the tables of the ongoing multilateral forums that stand to shape the parameters of the Asia Pacific economic arrangements of the future. In particular, these are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), neither of which currently includes Canada.¹² Indeed, some years ago Ottawa declined to join the former, an effort towards achievement of an encompassing, “gold-plated” trade and investment agreement. Now, consistent with Ottawa’s renewed attention to Asia, it has reversed its position, and after intense diplomatic efforts announced its “success” at having gained “membership,” but without negotiation rights.¹³ Progress on this front is unlikely to be swift. Besides looking to gain mutually acceptable terms with TPP countries, Ottawa will need to be attentive to non-TPP members’ concerns, especially ASEAN states, as to whether the TPP meshes with their economic situations and priorities.¹⁴

| CANADA’S BILATERAL MERCHANDISE TRADE | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------------------|
| 1,000 CAN\$ | | | | | | |
| Country/Region | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Share of Exports + Imports 2011 % |
| Thailand | 2,886,319 | 3,186,226 | 2,866,184 | 3,060,605 | 3,513,649 | 0.393 |
| Indonesia | 1,982,760 | 2,545,812 | 1,979,691 | 2,325,428 | 3,073,296 | 0.344 |
| Malaysia | 3,504,960 | 3,760,100 | 3,106,168 | 3,076,829 | 2,900,549 | 0.325 |
| Singapore | 2,406,241 | 2,080,654 | 2,232,074 | 1,972,082 | 2,359,644 | 0.264 |
| Vietnam | 1,047,243 | 1,271,559 | 1,273,613 | 1,438,124 | 1,667,440 | 0.187 |
| Philippines | 1,225,005 | 1,382,257 | 1,263,766 | 1,572,574 | 1,470,563 | 0.165 |

Source: Statistics Canada, Office of the Chief Economist (BED), May 10, 2012
<http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/index.aspx>

The EAS, on the other hand, casts a wider net, both in terms of membership and scope, involving 18 countries, ASEAN +3 (China, Korea, Japan), +2 (New Zealand and Australia), +3 (India, Russia, US) and looks to be itself,

or the precursor to, the next generation of regional, institutional architecture. The Obama government, in supporting the EAS, has labeled it as the “foundational security and political institution for the region.”¹⁵ Canada is notable by its absence. Why the EAS is important for us has less to do with the organization’s current status and agenda---the latter still not clearly articulated—and more to do with having a voice in the forum that is likely to play a primary role in shaping the further parameters of Asia Pacific relationships.

Here is where attention to ASEAN is critical. Because the EAS is an ASEAN-centred institution (see Figure 1), it plays the role of gatekeeper. It controls membership, serves as chair, and manages the agenda. A consequence of our having steadily diminished our engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN states over the last decade is that they came to see Canada as no longer being a “relevant player”, and thus specifically did not invite us to join. Whether or not Baird’s mission to erase this impression and gain an invitation met with success remains to be seen; no word has been heard to date.


Security back on the radar

Ottawa’s interest in the evolution of the region’s architecture extends beyond the economic. There are encouraging signals that Ottawa is looking to re-appear on regional security radar screens, having basically disappeared over the last decade. Certainly, the rhetoric is there, per Defence Minister MacKay’s proclaiming “Canada has been working to strengthen its defence relationships throughout the region, and is committed to deliver on its role as a reliable and trusted security partner within Asia Pacific.”¹⁶

The maritime dimensions of Southeast Asia define its regional and global geostrategic importance. In the last several years heightened concern over the security of its critical sea lanes and disputes over the competing territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea have led to charged rhetorical interchange (witness the US and China), military build-ups (by China and Southeast Asian states)¹⁷, and direct confrontations (most recently between China and the Philippines). China’s “assertiveness” and challenges to its regional



Figure 1



Source: CSCAP, CSAP Regional Security Outlook, 2011, pg. 6
<http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO%202011%20-%20Revised%20Version.pdf>

neighbours have led states to adopt “hedging” strategies by reinforcing their security ties with the US.

Washington, in its “pivot to Asia,” is in turn rebalancing its force deployments in the Pacific, relocating assets towards Southeast Asian waters and associated contingencies.

Albeit distant from its shores, Canada has stakes in the security of the region. Disruption of commerce, including the critical energy flows destined for Northeast Asia, will impact the Canadian economy directly and indirectly. The presence of significant migrant and diaspora communities in Canada, focus our attention on the well-being of Southeast Asia populations both in terms of their treatment by governments (e.g. Burma) and their vulnerability to natural disasters (most recently, Canadian assistance

to Philippine flood victims.)¹⁸ Canadian Forces were deployed to the region after the 2004 Tsunami and with UNAMET in East Timor.

The porosity of land and maritime borders, the presence of extremists in the fringes of Southeast Asia societies, and the challenges of capacity and corruption confronting governments have led to the region’s fostering a variety of non-traditional security threats to states beyond the region, including Canada. While concerns of a “second front of terrorism” have largely been dispelled, attention to the illegal trafficking of persons, drugs, and small arms reaching Canadian shores remains high. In response, Ottawa has adopted proactive policies to thwart these criminal activities, before they “set sail,” through cooperative arrangements involving the RCMP, the Department of Foreign Affairs and local law enforcement agencies.

Most of these efforts are centred in Thailand. Indeed, somewhat in contrast to the economic theme of recent ministerial sojourns to Asia, the Prime Minister's visit to Bangkok in March was primarily focused on reinforcing our joint cooperation against human and drug trafficking and came with a \$12 million commitment for regional support of these endeavours.¹⁹

The challenge for DND in particular has been to how to define a level of engagement in the region in line with our interests and the expectations of regional actors. We do not have the capacity for sustained forward military deployment in the region, nor do regional states expect this. On the other hand, we do have an interest in sustaining informed and engaged participation in regional security forums and being regarded as taking steps to ensure that, if called upon, our military assets may be brought to bear in a timely fashion, be it for disaster relief, humanitarian missions, or patrol, surveillance, or peace operations.

Defence Minister MacKay's participation at this year's Shangri-la Dialogue was an important symbolic step towards demonstrating our attention and presence in the region. Failure to attend this highly visible forum of the region's key defence ministers in eight of the last ten years sent a strong signal that Ottawa's priorities were elsewhere.²⁰ Gaining an invitation to the ADMM-Plus meeting (see Figure 2), another recently established regional institution to which Canada was not an initial invitee, will be contingent on our showing up at the Shangri-la Dialogue in future and bolstering our representation in the region wide ASEAN Regional Forum. It is relevant to note that the ADMM-Plus membership is coincident with that of the EAS—both as ASEAN-centred institutions.

DND is moving on other fronts as well. Its participation in this year's RIMPAC exercise, for instance, sees Canada's largest commitment to date of Canadian assets (notably one of Canada's submarines) and higher-level command positions for Canadian officers. RIMPAC is the world's largest international maritime exercise, with component forces across the region, including Russia. Held on a biennial basis, Canadian participation facilitates its bilateral engagement with regional navies beyond the overall multilateral aspects of the exercises.²¹



Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Thailand Defence Minister, Air Chief Marshal Sukumpol Suwanatat, inspect Thai troops during a bilateral visit to Bangkok, Thailand.

Photo Credit: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister-ministre/gal/photos-eng.asp?id=156>

Of particular note, and indicative of how Southeast Asia may fit into Canada's overall, transformed security strategy post-Afghanistan, is DND's initiative to establish an "operational support hub" in Singapore.²² What this may entail remains to be negotiated and expectations need to be carefully qualified; indeed Defence Minister MacKay himself got a bit ahead of his briefing book in his public statements in Singapore. What is envisaged is achieving agreement with another country, in this case Singapore, for pre-crisis or pre-disaster arrangements to facilitate the rapid stand up of Canadian Forces, as they may be required in the region. While this might involve prepositioning of equipment in the future, in its initial form it is likely only to entail agreement for access to facilities (warehouses not bases) and on so-called "cross-services agreements" to facilitate supplies and logistics when the need arises. Note that Ottawa has already established such arrangements with Germany and Jamaica, and recently concluded a cross-services agreement with Japan.

Enhancing relationships and advancing Canadian values

From Thailand to Indonesia, Southeast Asia presents a remarkable diversity of geography, cultures, governance, and economies. Relationships with Canada, at official, unofficial, and societal levels, have historically been

congenial, involving substantial flows of development assistance through CIDA²³; bilateral and multilateral Track 1 (official) and Track 2 (unofficial) engagement, including with Canadian universities; and significant flows of migrants to Canada. The largest numbers are from the Philippines, with over 500,000 residents in Canada, many occupying roles in our health care and home service sectors. Thus, it was not surprising to see Foreign Minister Baird stopping in Manila to reaffirm our mutual relationships and look to possibilities of extending them to business and trade areas.

Opening a New Chapter with Burma

Certainly, one of the most dramatic shifts in Canadian policy, and the subject of the greatest Canadian popular attention regarding Southeast Asia, has concerned Burma. In response to the series of steps taken by the regime towards a more open and “democratic” society, political and business leaders of Western states have flocked to Naypyidaw (the recently-established capital city) with generous offers of official development programs and in search of investment opportunities, respectively. Foreign Minister Baird’s visit in March put him near the end of this queue. We are the last country in the OECD to engage with Burma, Ottawa presumably having been reticent to back away from its rigid stance against the military regime. However, shortly after his trip--one involving the obligatory, celebratory visit with Aung San Suu Kyi--Ottawa announced the suspension of most all of its touted “toughest in the world” sanctions.²⁴ And, in conjunction with his attendance at the ASEAN meetings in Cambodia this month, Baird declared that Canada would establish an embassy in Burma. (Myanmar maintains an embassy in Ottawa).

So with the door ajar, the question now is how is Ottawa going to capitalize on this opportunity (indeed, one could argue “responsibility”) to “advance Canadian values” with policies to promote positive change for the people of Burma. Little movement can be discerned to date. The result of our isolation from Burma over the last years is that we find ourselves with few connections within Burmese society and a relative lack of knowledge as to whom to work with and where to commit our limited resources. Our policies have



Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi

Photo credit: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

to develop beyond focusing on a single individual and beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Building a relationship will require nuanced dealings with the regime, its elected opposition, and the ethnic groups that struggle on the countries geographic and economic peripheries. Capacity building in health care, education, and environmental management is desperately needed; these are areas where Canadian expertise and developmental assistance could be effective, if carefully targeted and delivered over a sustained period. Ottawa is interested in opportunities for Canadian businesses, Trade Minister Fast just announcing a visit to Burma in September.²⁵ However, following in the footsteps of many others, including China and Japan, and entering a business culture plagued by corruption²⁶ and inattention to environmental and societal impacts, presents serious challenges. On the other hand, by bringing Canadian standards of corporate social responsibility and environmental best practices, Canadian investors, with many others, may have a broader positive impact on local economic development.

In this context, the role for CIDA is obvious and should be kick-started. At present, the agency does not have a bilateral aid program for Burma, nor is Burma a “country of focus.” However, it does provide substantial funding (CAD \$16 million, 2010-2016) through the

NGO *InterPares* to support the Burmese refugee and exile communities in Thailand. Other Canadian-based institutions can and should be engaged, including universities. IDRC, for instance, is apparently poised to fund partnership projects involving Canadian and Burmese environmental experts.

In various ways, Burma becomes an important test for Canada's engagement in the region as a whole. Setting aside our sanctions policy now places us onside with the members of ASEAN and with major regional players—the US, Japan, the UK, Germany, France and Korea. Our capacity, and presumed willingness, to commit resources is minimal compared to many others, (including Australia), which necessitates adopting priorities, and a willingness to stay the course over the long term. Ottawa can be notoriously slow to move. While caution is necessary, and suspension of sanctions remains contingent on the regime's behaviour, having proclaimed our support for change, the Burmese and regional states are awaiting decisions on follow-on, substantive engagement.



Singapore Skyline

Photo Credit: chensiyuan

Investing Long-Term in Canada-ASEAN relations

As noted earlier, Canada has looked to increase the profile of its relations with ASEAN. With his announcement of a CAD \$10-million funding commitment to ASEAN-related projects over the next three years, Baird took the next step that regional states were looking for, namely resource commitment. Specifics as to where and how funding would be

targeted are not yet available; in line with ASEAN priorities, promoting “connectivity” is likely to be emphasized. One project, launched earlier to celebrate the 35th anniversary of Canada-ASEAN ties, is the Canada-ASEAN Research Partnership²⁸, funded by IDRC and organized through UBC and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. As Canada's bilateral ASEAN country partner moves from Thailand to Singapore for the next three years, links through Singapore are likely to increase.

While inter-state relations among ASEAN members can be at times fraught—witness the recent failure to achieve agreement over a communiqué from their foreign ministers' meeting²⁹—the Association's voice and role as the chair and gatekeeper to membership in regional institutions remains unified.

In this regard, re-building and sustaining our relationships with ASEAN are critical to Ottawa's overall Asia Pacific agenda. Showing up in the region and cultivating bilateral relationships, largely focused on promotion of trade and investment, are relevant components of this agenda. These, however, are insufficient by themselves. Sustained attention over the longer-term, across the spectrum of official, unofficial (Track 2), and civil society relationships is essential. So too is cultivated engagement on the multilateral institutional front—a dimension of foreign relations that the Harper government to date has tended to shy away from. However, the realization has dawned that positioning Canada within the Asia Pacific requires a longer-term vision and engagement strategy. Defence Minister's MacKay's statement to the Shangri-la Dialogue that “well-coordinated multilateralism is critical to global security and stability in the 21st century,³⁰” resonates beyond security to include advancement of Canada's economic, political, and societal interests in the region.

Canada needs a clearly articulated Asia strategy. The stakes are high, as are the potential pay-offs if we get it right. Our “presence” in Southeast Asia, and in the Asia Pacific as a whole, needs to go beyond the first steps of visits and announcements – important and laudable as they are—to target resources and to engage the combined energies of business, academic, civil society, and official communities for the longer haul.

Figure 2

BOX 1: EMERGING INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC**EAST ASIA SUMMIT (EAS)**

The EAS is broadly conceived as a forum for dialogue across the spectrum of strategic, political and economic issues. Its membership has expanded beyond the ASEAN + 3 states to include Australia, New Zealand, and India. It held its first meeting in late 2005, and is gaining momentum as a regional forum with the US and Russia having accepted invitations to join in the coming year. Whether or not it eclipses APEC and/or the ARF—the membership of both seen as too large and geographically over-stretched—remains to be seen in next several years.

TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)

The TPP is a multilateral, comprehensive free trade agreement aimed at integrating economies across the Pacific. Its first agreement in 2005 was modest in its reach, with Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore as its only members. However, Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the US and Vietnam are currently negotiating to join the TPP, and Canada and Japan have observer status.

ASEAN DEFENSE MINISTERS (ADMM-PLUS)

The extension of the ADMM beyond ASEAN to include the defense ministers of China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, the US and Russia, i.e., ADMM+8, has been described as a “milestone” in regional security multilateralism. Whether or not this forum will transcend regional norms to take up sensitive topics such as great power rivalry and sovereignty disputes remains in question.¹ Thus, the South China Sea was kept off the agenda for the recent 2010 inaugural meeting. Furthermore, the ADMM+8 is to meet only every 3rd-year, perhaps in deference to the annual Shangri-la Dialogue hosted in Singapore.²

ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (AICHR)

Created in 2008, the AICHR commits each of ASEAN’s ten member states to “further develop cooperation to promote and protect human rights in the region.” Many of Southeast Asia’s leading intellectuals have questioned the AICHR’s ability to be a true force for change, as its mandate excludes investigation, let alone sanctioning of, individuals or governments.

LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE (LMI)

The US launched the LMI in July 2009 to enhance cooperation with Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam on issues related to health, education, and infrastructure development. The US is placing particular emphasis on the LMI’s environmental program by assisting Lower Mekong countries in coping with climate change and related issues of water and food security.

G20

The presence of nine Asia Pacific countries on the G20 (Australia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States) gives the region a heightened prominence in global economic management. There have been calls for a more coordinated form of Asian regional representation at both the G20 and other important global bodies.³

¹ Barry Desker, “ASEAN Plus Eight Defence Cooperation: Rise of a New Player,” RSIS Commentary, No. 132, 15 October 2010.

² Ron Huisken, “ADMM + 8: An Acronym to Watch,” East Asia Forum, 8 October 2010, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/10/08/admm8-an-acronym-to-watch/>.

³ Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill, “Asian and Global Financial Crises: Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” RSIS Commentary, No. 112, 14 September 2010, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1122010.pdf>; Pradumna B. Rana, “G20 Summit: How Asia Can Strengthen Its Voice,” RSIS Commentary, 17 June 2010.

Source: CSCAP, *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook, 2011*, pg. 8

<http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/CRSO/CRSO%202011%20-%20Revised%20Version.pdf>

- ¹ See “Baird to Make Fourth Asia Visit,” at <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiqués/2012/07/06b.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>
- ² Use of the terms Burma and Myanmar remains in debate. The US Department of State continues to refer to Burma, referring to rejection of the 1990 election as a rationale. Ottawa and FM Baird utilize Burma in public statements, without stated reasons, but perhaps in deference to the Lady (who continues with “Burma”, despite her government’s criticism) and in accord with the various diaspora and related groups in Canada. The author refers to the country as Burma in the rest of this piece, consistent with terminology used by Ottawa.
- ³ See “Address by Minister Baird to ASEAN-Canada Ministerial Meeting” at <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2012/07/11a.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>
- ⁴ Baird quoted in Tara Perkins and Andy Hoffman, “Tories shift towards much stronger trade ties with China,” *The Globe and Mail*, July 12, 2011.
- ⁵ See “Minister Baird Delivers Certificate of Honourary Canadian Citizenship to Aung San Suu Kyi” at <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/photos/2012/03/08b.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>
- ⁶ See MacKay’s speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue at <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/peter-gordon-mackay/>
- ⁷ See Brian Job, “Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC gives us a ticket...but do we have a destination?” *Canada Asia Agenda*, August 25, 2010, at <http://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/revitalizing-canada-southeast-asia-relations-tac-gives-us-ti>
- ⁸ See OECD, “Southeast Asia Economic Outlook,” at http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_37413_48965544_1_1_1_37413,00.html
- ⁹ Data from the Office of the Chief Economist, at <http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/statistics-statistiques/merchandise-marchandises.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>
- ¹⁰ See Murray Brewster, “Harper sets Canada, Thailand on path to free-trade agreement,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 23, 2012 at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-sets-canada-thailand-on-path-to-free-trade-agreement/article534105/>
- ¹¹ See “Canadian foreign minister in PH to broaden political, economic interests” at <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/44559/canadian-foreign-minister-in-ph-to-broaden-political-economic-interests>
- ¹² See Amitav Acharya, “Canada and the Asia-Pacific: Joining EAS should be top priority” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/31/canada-and-the-asia-pacific-joining-eas-should-be-top-priority/>
- ¹³ See Tim Shufelt, “Canada joins TPP free trade talks” at <http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/90375--canada-joins-tpp-free-trade-talks>
- ¹⁴ See Wendy Dobson, “Canada, China, and Rising Asia: A Strategic Appraisal,” Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Canada-China Business Council, 2011, pp. 24-25, at <http://www.ceocouncil.ca/publication/canada-china-and-rising-asia-a-strategic-proposal>
- ¹⁵ See Amitav Acharya, “Canada’s role in the Asia Pacific region,” *The Star*, November 17, 2011 at <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/1088619--canada-s-role-in-the-asia-pacific-region>
- ¹⁶ “Minister MacKay to attend RIMPAC exercise in the Pacific Region.” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4311>
- ¹⁷ For further discussion, see CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2012 available at <http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=CSCAP-regional-security-outlook>
- ¹⁸ See “Canada supports flood victims in the Philippines,” <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/CAR-13165624-TQT>
- ¹⁹ Canadian and Thai business leaders were apparently upset by the amount of attention they did not receive in this visit. See Eric Reguly, “Trade Took Back Seat on Harper’s Thailand Trip,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 30, 2012 at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/trade-took-back-seat-on-harpers-thailand-trip/article627630/>
- ²⁰ The US Secretary of Defence and Japanese, Indian, and South Korea, as well as Southeast Asian counterparts are almost always present.
- ²¹ Lee Berthiaume, “Strong RIMPAC 2012 Presence Signals Increased Canadian Interest in Pacific Region,” *Ottawa Citizen*, July 16, 2012.
- ²² See Campbell Clark, “Canada seeks Asian military hub,” *The Globe and Mail*, June 4, 2012 at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-seeks-asian-military-hub/article4231097/>
- ²³ Canada has provided C\$2.8b in foreign assistance to the region since 1977. See http://www.international.gc.ca/asia_pacific-asie_pacifique/asean-anase_Info.aspx?view=d
- ²⁴ “Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma ...”, <http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiqués/2012/04/24a.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>
- ²⁵ Adam Miller, “Canadian companies eye trade with Burma,” *The Canadian Press*, at <http://ckom.com/content/canadian-companies-make-inroads-myanmar-0>
- ²⁶ Transparency International ranks Burma 180 of 182 countries on its corruption index. See <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>
- ²⁷ See Centre for the Non-Traditional Security Studies at <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/system.asp?sid=202>
- ²⁸ See <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/system.asp?sid=202>
- ²⁹ Don Emmerson, “ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh,” *PacNet*, No. 45, July 19, 2012.
- ³⁰ See MacKay’s speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue at <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/fourth-plenary-session/peter-gordon-mackay/>

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