CANADA-KOREA MIDDLE POWER STRATEGIES: HISTORICAL EXAMPLES AS CLUES TO FUTURE SUCCESS

Submitted for the Korea-Canada Middle Power Strategies project

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The author thanks the Korea Foundation for its generous support of this research
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PART 1: Middle Powers: Their “Niche” and Conditions for Successful Leadership and Cooperation in International Settings

What is a Middle Power?

The most widely used definition of a “middle power” applies four approaches elaborated by Andrew F. Cooper.

The first approach is “positional,” in which a middle power is located at the middle point of a measurable capability (for example, population, economy, or military). The second approach is “geographic,” in which a middle power is located physically or ideologically between the system’s great powers. The third approach is “normative,” which views middle powers as trustworthy and responsible actors with value orientations that favor diplomatic means rather than force to contribute to the maintenance of stable global order. The fourth approach focuses on a particular pattern of “behaviour” of middle powers known as “middlepowermanship”. Middlepowermanship is the “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship”.

The concept of “middle power” is difficult to operationalize for analysis; however, scholars generally accept the classification of middle powers based on their actual international behavior (middlepowermanship) and their underlying normative/ideational orientations, rather than solely on objective measures of their power or capability, such as population or Gross National Product (GNP) figures. The reason middle powers’ behavior exhibits the characteristics of achieving multilateral solutions as good and responsible international citizens – which can be also termed “liberal internationalism” – is complex. The behavioral pattern is important, along with normative/ideational self-perception and perceptions of others, but it is also heavily influenced by their relatively

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limited power and capability. Middle powers are domestically wealthy and relatively egalitarian and stable democracies. But since their external power position is not significant compared to traditional superpowers either in their own region or in the international community, this reality inevitably leads them to exhibit an ambivalent regional orientation, and to maintain identities that are distinct from more powerful states in their regions. Using this categorization, middle powers discussed in this paper will include the Western democracies of Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The Scandinavian states in particular have been successful in “punching above their weight on international issues” in light of their limited hard capabilities, and this is because of their self-identity. Sweden, for example, has embraced the concept of neutrality with wide public support, and this ideological position has promoted the international perception of Sweden and other Scandinavian middle powers as having a neutral – or at least an objective – stance of not blindly following the lead of international hegemon or regional superpowers. This makes them reliable partners to cooperate with on multilateral issues requiring delicate compromises.

But there is now an emerging new category of middle powers wholly distinct from these small- and medium-sized stable Western democracies. This category includes Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Turkey, Malaysia, and Nigeria. The new middle powers are associated with rising prominence in international relations because of their significant market size, particularly the proportion of foreign direct investment they receive and their trade volumes. Contrary to the characteristics of traditional middle powers, they are semi-peripheral, materially inequitable, and recently democratized states that exert regional influence and self-association. Some analysts have also included the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in the same category for their substantially large share of international economic markets. However, a more conventional understanding of China, Russia, and India, especially in light of their current status in international power dynamics, is that they are clearly not mere “local” superpowers (possibly with a partial exception of India as a semi-superpower).

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5 Ibid.
6 Soderberg, Marie. Statement during the Middle Power Seminar (Balsillie School of international Affairs), 2012.
7 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers”.
9 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers”, p.165.
10 Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, *Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050* (Goldman Sachs, 2003); Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” *Asian Perspective* 31, no. 4 (2007): 7–42.
Indonesia and Mexico, on the other hand, would fit nicely into the categorization.

Where, then, would the Republic of Korea (South Korea) be placed? Until the 1990s, South Korea’s foreign policy behaviour did not reflect the liberal internationalist tendencies associated with traditional middle powers such as Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries. However, it has been changing, and South Korea’s behavioural pattern is now regarded as characteristic of a country that has evolved from an emerging middle power into a more traditional middle power.\(^\text{11}\)

**What is Unique about Middle Power Behavior and What is Their Niche?**

Gareth Evans, the former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (1988-96), first argued that middle powers conduct *niche diplomacy* by “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field.”\(^\text{12}\)

What is involved in niche diplomacy? It involves middle powers taking the initiative to incorporate new ideas into international governance. Cooper et. al. divide middle power behaviour into three patterns: catalysts, facilitators, and managers.\(^\text{13}\)

First, middle powers acting as catalysts provide new intellectual and ideational input into the international community in order to trigger an initiative they can lead and for which they can gather followers.\(^\text{14}\) Since middle powers, unlike superpowers, do not possess the capability to be influential across the policy spectrum, initiation of a proposal involves selection of the topics and specific functions through which they can take a leading role.\(^\text{15}\) For example, if a proposal is about managing conflicts, middle powers propose a limited peacekeeping mission to a specific region. If the initiative is of a humanitarian nature, middle powers proposals can be selective in banning a particular category of weapons, or methods to transfer aid more efficiently.

A popular image of a middle power is a country that is guided by ‘humane internationalist’

\(^{12}\) Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*, p.25.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., pp.25-26.
\(^{14}\) Ibid.
orientations, which feature “an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty.” Indeed, some middle powers have distinguished themselves in particular niche areas, such as Canada’s expertise in peacekeeping and Sweden on the issue of foreign aid. However, middle power initiatives in their niche areas are not solely governed by a normative backdrop; their focus of expertise is equally based on functionalism. Pragmatic evaluation of potential gain or loss, the possibility of implementation, success, and international support, are what make middle powers not just moral, but also equally pragmatic multilateralists with constructive roles to play in the international system.

Second, middle powers acting as facilitators engage in associational, collaborative, and coalitional activities to lead an initiated proposal to a concrete agenda-setting process. They maintain their intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership by technically directing cooperation- and coalition-building with like-minded states. Building coalitions that push an agenda into a concrete proposal for action among even cooperative, like-minded states requires extensive bargaining. Because middle powers lack the power to simply impose their will on others, and because they are not solely motivated by ethical principles to simply supply public goods to international society, they utilize creativity in the form of “quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork” as intellectual entrepreneurs that skillfully broker the overlapping interests of parties concerned with an issue. Middle powers have a particularly strong leadership edge in brokering because they are essentially network powers enjoying close horizontal ties with most states, as well as with many non-state-actors.

Third, middle powers acting as managers seek to create organizations or regimes in order to

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17 Refer to Hayes Geoffrey, “Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping,” in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Power after the Cold War, ed. Andrew F. Cooper (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 73–89.
formally incorporate their ideational entrepreneurship into an institutional setting that will help turn their proposals into new conventions and norms with long-term international implications.\(^\text{23}\) They can work within existing institutions, or build new institutions with coalitions of like-minded actors. However, they are not “revisionists” with an aim to disrupt existing international systems. Their priority is to support the smooth running of the existing order and encourage others to ‘play by the rules,’ and they do so by contributing new ideas with ethical dimensions backed by functional considerations. These initiatives, moreover, help strengthen peace and order at the systemic level. For most middle power initiatives, the process of working within an international framework itself is worth pursuing because it facilitates awareness and formulates new regimes. This commitment to the process of building a more orderly world system based on institutions – in contrast to a more hegemonic practice of imposing an ideologically preconceived vision of the ideal world order – is the heart of the role of middle powers in international relations.\(^\text{24}\) Of course, there are instances in which middle powers assume unilateral leadership outside any existing institutional framework, particularly when they take a mediating role between two parties in conflict.\(^\text{25}\) Even so, middle powers often follow their unilateral initiatives by inviting multilateral involvement in order to give legitimacy to international governance.

In short, the leadership pattern inherent in the international behaviour of middle powers is unique.

This niche contributes to good international governance because: 1) acting as a catalyst, middle powers initiate processes that promote awareness of specifically selected issue areas, and the selection is based on functionalist considerations as well as ethical/normative ones; 2) acting as facilitators, they seek to energize a process into a more concrete and action-driven agenda, and provide entrepreneurial and technical leadership with “quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork” to consolidate a coalition of like-minded states; and 3) acting as managers, they transform an agenda into action by implementing agreements, declarations, or conventions with the coalition, either within an existing institutional framework or in a newly created one, thus consolidating new normative principles that strengthen the rule of law, order, and fairness within the existing

\(^{23}\) Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, pp.25-26.


Effective Policy Areas for Middle Powers

Traditionally, middle powers have distinguished themselves by initiating and producing effective changes in international governance in the following four major policy areas: 1) conflict mediation; 2) peacekeeping; 3) international institutional reforms; and 4) international development aid.

Conflict mediation

Traditional middle powers, particularly Canada and the Scandinavian states, have been leading providers of 'good offices' between parties engaged in conflict or rivalry. In one of the most recognized roles played by Canada in this area, Lester Pearson, Canada's External Affairs Minister and the President of the General Assembly of the UN, mediated a resolution to the Suez Crisis in October 1956. Although Canada was – and is – not officially a non-aligned neutral state, Pearson effectively used Canada's non-stakeholder position in the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation, and Canada was accepted by both parties as an interlocutor to provide good offices during the confrontation. Canada also contributed to peacekeeping activities in the post-conflict period.26

Norway’s leadership as a mediator in a more recent Middle East confrontation is also worth noting. Norway led a process in Oslo that succeeded in reaching an accord during the confrontation between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the early 1990s. As in the case of the Suez Crisis, Norway’s mediation role in Israel-PLO negotiations was successful due to Norway’s non-aligned and neutral position in the dispute. The government of Norway’s support and commitment assured the secrecy of the process. The official signing of the 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles took place in Washington, D.C. hosted by President Bill Clinton, thereby reflecting the international importance of security in the Middle East within the world system and the hegemony of the United States. However, the Declaration would not have materialized without the Oslo process, and Norway rightly received international acknowledgement for its role.27

Success in mediation does not have to be defined as narrowly as getting rivals to sign official accords. In some cases, middle power mediation that convinces contending parties to sit at the
table is an effective symbolic gesture of bridge-building that can pressure the rivals to make greater efforts toward conciliation, even if no visible short-term result is achieved. The best example of this type of bridge-building mediation is Canada’s 1983-84 peace initiative. In September 1983, the USSR shot down a Korean airliner, and this incident in the context of the “New Cold War” led to extremely dangerous international tensions. Under the personal commitment of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, government ministers and officials set up a steering committee and convened a working group to urge the five nuclear powers (the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China) to reconvene direct talks.

The Canadian government’s initiative, published as a blue book in October 1983 titled “Proposals on East-West Relations and International Security”, proposed that that the superpowers take five actions, with Canadian mediation: 1) convene a conference of the five nuclear powers; 2) support a nuclear non-proliferation treaty; 3) participate in negotiations towards a balance of conventional forces; 4) raise the nuclear threshold in Europe; and 5) work towards progress in verification.

Canada’s bridge-building efforts to involve the five nuclear powers in serious discussions about arms reduction in the midst of the Cold War had limits, and the subsequent talks did not produce such conclusive results as in the Oslo Accord. But this shortfall does not reflect a lack of personal or national commitment on the part of Trudeau or Canada, which were largely due to this middle power’s position in an international power dynamic. Nevertheless, this initiative significantly increased the efforts of major powers to ease systemic tensions in subsequent years.28

South Korea, as a new middle power, has also started to pursue leadership in mediation, notably since the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Unlike the bridge-building activities of Canada and the Scandinavian states, South Korea’s activities are limited to Northeast Asia, particularly in the context of chronic Sino-Japanese rivalry.29 This region is becoming aware of the need to enhance its collective institutional decision-making capabilities, and that this will require endogenous regional leadership.30 As a democratic and economically-developed middle power, South Korea views

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28 Ibid., p.58.
itself as the most suitable candidate for this role. It remains to be seen whether this initiative will achieve long-lasting success. Nevertheless, South Korea has shown regional leadership in setting up a permanent secretariat for the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Cooperation Meeting in September 2011, and in other regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit and Trilateral Summit. This leadership activity is a result of South Korea’s self-perception of its unique position in the midst of Sino-Japanese rivalry, and reflects Beijing and Tokyo preference to deal with Seoul rather than directly with each other in multilateral settings.31

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations directly link to conflict mediation, and sending military resources to post-conflict zones as a follow-through process has a long history. The 1945 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, is the first international agreement to send military forces to maintain peace. “Article 43 Special Agreements”, between the Security Council and individual members or groups of members within the UN, is of particular significance.32

The first UN-endorsed use of multinational forces for peacekeeping operations occurred during another initiative by Pearson during the Suez Crisis of 1956. Following mediation, Pearson, with the active support of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, induced the UN to go beyond the role of passive dispute settlement to active peacekeeping by creating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to oversee the post-conflict transition in Suez and the Sinai after the Israeli, British, and French withdrawal. Canada offered its military personnel for the mission.33 Eventually, 1,000 Canadian soldiers joined the UNEF I in peacekeeping operations in the Sinai. This set a precedent for establishing a stand-by peacekeeping battalion in 1958.34 UNEF 1 did not become a permanent feature of the UN, but it was a building block for all subsequent UN-led peacekeeping forces. Since that time, Canada has been a major player in this field. In addition to its well-known involvement

31 Vio, “Institutionalizing East Asia: South Korea’s Regional Leadership as a Middle Power”, p.44.
32 Henrikson, “Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within, Across, and Outside Institutions”, p.54.
33 Ibid., p.62.
34 Geoffrey, “Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping”
in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the former Yugoslavia, Canada has also played a role in less-publicized regions such as Darfur (since 2009), Sudan (since 2005), the Congo (since 1999), and particularly Cyprus (between 1964 to 1993). Canada’s peacekeeping activities are also regarded as the most noteworthy examples of middle power contributions to maintaining international peace. Although the military aspects of these contributions are not unanimously considered to be successful, the development of peacekeeping as a key feature of international governance should be regarded as a primarily Canadian diplomacy triumph, particularly given Canada’s leading role in the establishment of the UNEF I.\textsuperscript{35}

Australia has also played a central role by committing military resources to UN peacekeeping operations around the world, such as its International Security Assistance Force Mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{36} Due to its geopolitical position, Australia has been particularly active in peacekeeping actions in the Asia Pacific. For example, East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 following the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the Dutch, and violence ensued. Australia urged the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to intervene to help the people of East Timor conduct a referendum in 1999 to decide their future, and Australia contributed police forces to UNAMET. When the referendum results revealed overwhelming support for East Timor’s independence, Australia also organized and led the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), and contributed over 5,500 personnel to facilitate a smooth political transition. Australia continued to play a leading role in securing Indonesia’s recognition of the referendum results, and in establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Australia’s leadership helped INTERFET become a fully multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence. Since then, Australia has participated in most major UN peacekeeping operations, contributing between 1,500 and 2,000 personnel to each deployment.\textsuperscript{37}

South Korea has also become a significant contributor of personnel to peacekeeping missions. As of June 2012, 1,463 South Korean soldiers have been dispatched to serve in missions alongside Canadians and Australians in Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates. Among these numbers, 635 South Korean soldiers are dispatched through the UN Department of

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p.77.
\textsuperscript{36} Carl Ungerer and Simon Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security,” Strategic Insights (October 2010).
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the remaining are part of multilateral peacekeeping missions led by the United States.\(^{38}\)

Although the size of a country's force contribution is an important factor, Canada’s and Australia’s leadership is appreciated not just because of the size of their personnel commitment. In fact, the top three countries in terms of force contributions are Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, contributing approximately 10,000 soldiers each. However, some have criticized large personnel commitments by developing countries as motivated by the substantial UN financial reimbursements and other economic benefits for doing so. Traditional middle powers’ contributions, on the other hand, are believed to derive from their leadership in organizing specific missions and generating new ideas for strengthening the very institution of peacekeeping as an important component of international governance.

For example, the most significant evolution in peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period came when the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) was formed under the leadership of Denmark. Urged by the Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) produced a working group report in August 1995 arguing that a group of member states combine their peacekeeping contributions to form a UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) for creating more permanent peacekeeping contingents that could be readily deployable under UN command. SHIRBRIG could be sent at short notice of 15-30 days to conduct peacekeeping operations for up to 180 days.\(^{39}\) Before it ceased operations in June 2009, SHIRBRIG conducted successful missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea under the command of Dutch general Patrick Cammaert, with force contributions from middle powers such as Canada, Austria, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

**International institutional reforms**

Middle powers have a stake in the smooth running of international institutions. In order to help these institutions better reflect the aspirations and interests of as many members as possible (and thus make the system more acceptable to a wider international society), middle powers have been active in leading a reformist agenda within existing structures. Specifically, middle powers have promoted enlarged membership in international organizations that have a powerful influence on international security and economic governance.

\(^{38}\) Lee, “South Korea as a New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy”, pp. 16-17.

\(^{39}\) Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda”, p. 313.
For traditional middle powers such as Canada and Australia, membership in the UN Security Council (SC), the most powerful committee with decision-making powers in international security, has always been regarded as a significant institutional prize. From the early days of the UN up until the early 1960s, efforts by the middle powers such as Canada had failed largely because the wartime Big Three (the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom), China, and France had no interest in sharing power with others. In order to get the SC to recognize the contributions of non-great power allies to the UN’s mandate, the middle powers, led by Canada, continuously pushed for UN charter reform to enable enlargement of the SC membership. The middle powers’ concerted efforts centred on urging permanent members to acknowledge the contributions that other UN member states make in the maintenance of international peace as a basis for consideration for a non-permanent seat on the SC. As a result, UN Charter Chapter V: Security Council Article 23 (particularly Paragraph 2) expanded total SC membership to 15 countries in 1963. 

More recently, the G20 is widely regarded as a clear example of middle powers’ ability to bolster international institutions. Among the four most ardent supporters of the G20 – Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Korea – the three middle power countries in this group (Australia, Canada and South Korea) have worked the hardest in the background to help the institution consolidate itself. Canada was the originator of the idea of the G20, and its role in the initial phase of the group’s creation was crucial. In 1998, Paul Martin, then Canada’s Finance Minister, persuaded the United States and the other G7 member states to form a larger group consisting of finance ministers, central bank governors, and leaders of developing countries to jointly participate in the international economic decision-making process. After the formation of the G20, Canada maintained its initiative by committing itself to the field of global imbalances, and became a co-chair of the Working Group for the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth. In 2005, Paul Martin called for the elevation of the G20 finance ministers’ group to the G20 Leader’s Group. At the February 2011 G20 finance ministers meeting in Paris, the Working Group led by Canada brought China and the rest of the G20 closer to this end by proposing to use several imbalance indicators, including government debt and deficits, and private savings and debt. South Korea and Australia have also contributed significantly to sustaining the momentum of the G20’s growing influence, particularly after the 2009 London Summit. That the G20 is becoming the premier annual forum for international economic cooperation largely due to the efforts of these two middle powers.

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40 Henrikson, “Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within, Across, and Outside Institutions”, pp.53-54.
International development aid

Along with peacekeeping, providing aid to developing countries, mainly in the form of official development assistance (ODA), is widely regarded as the main niche of middle power foreign policies. Japan has been a particularly significant contributor, and its overseas development assistance (ODA) policy is a centrepiece of its traditional UN diplomacy.

Canada, the Netherlands, and the three Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have also been active. There are some subtle differences in their underlying reasons for providing assistance – for example, the Dutch prioritize ODA to former colonies as a way to maintain good relations; the Danes are well-known for their balanced perspective between self-interest and altruism; and Canada provides the least commercialized assistance to the most needy poor third world countries with comparatively less “tying” of aid – but all these middle powers have distinguished themselves as injectors of “humane internationalism” into international relations. Australia has also been a generous donor, with strategic priority given to ‘near abroad’ countries such as Indonesia and nations in the South Pacific, with a specific emphasis on Melanesia. After Prime Minister Kevin Rudd indicated a new direction for aid policy in November 2007, Australian assistance has emphasized more communicative processes between the recipient and donor states.

For South Korea, development assistance is one of the main areas in which the government is consciously testing its emerging middle power role. Traditionally an aid recipient, South Korea sees its aid policy as the most visual indicator of its changing international status. In order to utilize its soft power image as a former-recipient-turned-donor, South Korea hosted the fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan (Pusan) in 2011. It tried to act as a bridge between western donors and developing countries by proposing various development agendas to help ensure aid effectiveness. The Basic Law for International Development Cooperation commits South Korea's ODA volume to

42 Japan is an interesting “outlier” in the group of traditional middle powers. Although its international economic influence (as well as its standing military) far exceeds those of other typical middle powers, Japan’s post-World War 2 constitution prohibiting it from using military or other forceful means abroad has resulted in Japanese diplomacy that closely resembles that of the Western liberal middle powers. Refer to Yoshihide Soeya, Nihonno midoru pawa gaikou (Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005).


reach 0.25 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015. This will triple its assistance budget from US$1 billion in 2009 to more than US$3 billion by 2015.45

Conditions for Effective and Successful Middle Power Leadership

Middle powers have provided examples of effective and successful leadership in all four policy areas traditionally associated with their niche. But before listing the common factors that contributed to effective and successful leadership, we must first define what effectiveness and success would look like. Middle powers’ chief contribution to international governance has been facilitating awareness of overlooked and underappreciated topics in international relations, and in leading initiatives to tackle these issues multilaterally in more formal, institutional settings, thus reframing the issues as priorities that are important enough for all the members of the international community to make the necessary efforts. This process of facilitating awareness and institutionalization is linked to long-term norm creation.

Middle powers, with their structural limitations in the international system, do not possess as much coercive power as do superpowers or even major powers. Middle power leverage to push for unanimous international compliance is therefore limited, particularly if an issue is linked to the military or economic interests of superpowers. For example, Canada’s leadership in dispatching the UNEF I peacekeeping mission during the Suez Crisis had mixed results in terms of its military success, including some embarrassment and unresolved dilemmas.46 However, the mission is still regarded as a diplomatic triumph because it institutionalized the very idea of peacekeeping, and did so at a time when superpowers were neither interested nor in a position to intervene. Similarly, Canada’s Peace Initiative of 1983-84 is regarded as a success not because the nuclear powers promptly agreed to arms reduction, but because it promoted a sense of urgency for a multilateral dialogue involving more than just the United States and the USSR.

Based on analysis of the issue areas, effective and successful leadership in a middle power country is more likely if the following seven conditions are met:

1) There is commitment by the government and its leadership;

2) There is a realistic consideration of national and other economic interests;

45 Lee, “South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy”, pp.18-19; Ungerer and Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security”.
46 Geoffrey, “Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping”, p.77.
3) There is sensitivity to sovereignty and national security concerns;
4) There is a realistic evaluation of constraints posed by international systemic dynamics;
5) Fast-track diplomacy and coalition-building can be effectively deployed when facing resistance;
6) Domestic public support is forthcoming due to national self-identity;
7) Public diplomacy can be based on soft power.

**Government and leadership commitment**

For a middle power initiative to be successful, it is crucial to have commitment by the national government and particularly its leaders (Head of State or ministers). The UNEF I mission would not have been successful without the consistent will and support of Lester Pearson. Similarly, SHIRBRIG succeeded with the leadership of the Danish Minister of Defense, Hans Hækkerup, and the G20 succeeded with the leadership of Paul Martin. Even if a state is a traditional middle power, the degree of middle power activism can vary depending on leadership. For example, Canadian middle power internationalism first declined under the Brian Mulroney government (1984-93) and then saw a revival under Jean Chrétien’s administration (1993-2003), at a time when the John Howard government in Australia was largely turning its back. These departures may be attributed to partisanship, and the interests and personalities of prime ministers and foreign ministers are particularly significant factors in a state’s active involvement in middle power initiatives.47

In South Korea, both the government and policy experts have specifically mentioned the country’s middle power role in foreign policy discourse (*junggyun-guk*) in the past decade, which is no longer the case in Canada.48 The South Korean government’s aspirations, especially those of the previous president, Lee Myung-bak, came in the form of the blueprint for “Global Korea” and were consistently communicated to the world. Therefore, even with its short history as a middle power, South Korea has been able to lead various agendas in international security.49

In the case of Sweden, the government takes a whole-of-government approach to its middle power foreign policy by developing strategy documents for its conduct and goals in international organizations. Clearly, openly, and proactively communicating the Swedish government’s goals and

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49 Ungerer and Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security.”
intentions in official writing gives weight to Sweden’s real and symbolic status as a leading middle power.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Realistic consideration of national and other economic interests}

Any middle power policy that fundamentally contradicts national or other economic interests is unlikely to succeed. By the same token, an outwardly ethical policy combined with mutually-beneficial economic opportunities is more likely to be effective. After all, as sovereign states in the international system, middle powers are ultimately no less self-interested than any other kind of state.

Australia’s shift in aid policy by Kevin Rudd’s government is notable for including a recipient state as a party in the aid decision-making process. Although the style and rhetoric of granting aid under his government changed in order to ensure greater engagement from both sides, a closer analysis shows that market forces continued to be an essential part of Australian foreign aid policy in the South Pacific. Prioritizing aid that spurred development would also create economic opportunities for Australia in the long run, while allowing Canberra to practice its ‘niche.’\textsuperscript{51} In his study of the aid policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Olav Stokke concluded that while these traditional middle powers’ assistance to developing countries constitutes an extension of their domestic socio-political values (liberal internationalism), it must not be overlooked that self-interest is also part of their motivations. This can include broader objectives of mutual benefit across borders, but also narrower private-sector interests related to employment in the donor country or an expansion of its trade and investment opportunities. Thus, economic hardship (not necessarily international recession, but domestic high unemployment) in a middle power also tends to shrink the size of the aid or increase the degree of commercialization of aid policies.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Sensitivity to sovereignty and national security concerns}

Middle power initiatives need to be sensitive and tailored to a region’s various national security concerns. If a proposal goes through norm localization – the process through which external ideas

\textsuperscript{50} Marie Söderberg, statement during Middle Power workshop (Balsillie School of International Affairs), 2012.

\textsuperscript{51} Hawksley, “Australia’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: Change and Continuity in Middle Power Foreign Policy”.

are adapted to meet local practices\textsuperscript{53} – and is accepted by concerned parties beforehand, it is more likely to be effective. On the other hand, proposals seen as undermining sovereignty or as a threat to a state’s national security (particularly that of a superpower) are less likely to win international support.

Canada’s regional diplomacy initiative to deal with the cross-border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan provides a valuable lesson. Initially known as the Dubai Process, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Cooperation Process (APCP) was the cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy in Afghanistan. In 2007 in Dubai, Canada tried to play a mediating role between the two parties that were locked in a border dispute which also involved issues such as narcotics, the movement of people, customs, and law enforcement. During the process, however, Canada is seen to have squandered diplomatic resources and effort. Instead of focusing on specific issues for which the two parties were willing to accept Canada’s mediation, Canada insisted too heavily on building trust between them as a preliminary condition, without giving sufficient consideration to the regional context. As a result, the Pakistan and Afghanistan participants concluded that the process could undermine their national security.\textsuperscript{54}

In this regard, Australia has been highly adept in incorporating sovereignty and security considerations in its involvement with its Asia Pacific neighbors. Australia’s leadership in the multilateral peacekeeping operation in East Timor was effective because it succeeded in achieving Indonesia’s agreement to the deployment,\textsuperscript{55} and its support of the South Pacific nations in the field of the environment (particularly global warming) has been effective because Australia was highly pragmatic in considering the issue’s long-term impact on the political stability of its neighbors, and its own maritime borders.\textsuperscript{56}

**Realistic evaluation of constraints posed by international systemic dynamics**

Middle powers must have a realistic understanding of the international system in which they operate. Middle powers have distinguished themselves in leadership apart from superpowers in specific niche areas by promoting awareness and organizing institutional frameworks for norm-


\textsuperscript{55} “Australian Involvement In East Timor”.

\textsuperscript{56} Hawksley, “Australia’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: Change and Continuity in Middle Power Foreign Policy”.

formation, but the very rationale for their focus is caused by their restricted capabilities to pursue leadership ambitiously in broad policy areas. Thus, middle power success is due to their distinct behavior in specific areas, but capability is nevertheless an important consideration when setting boundaries for the niche.

Middle power experts have claimed that increased systemic fluidity introduced by the end of the Cold War has provided the context for new middle power activism, even enabling them to be occasional counterfoils to the United States, but overall likeliness of middle power leadership success is still heavily influenced by overall structural power distribution in the international system in the post-Cold War period. Initiatives requiring compliance by coercion (the use of military for peacekeeping) is unlikely to succeed without superpower support (especially that of the United States) or at least their tacit agreement.

There have been instances in which the middle powers still managed to exercise leadership in the international security field during superpower rivalry, for example, Trudeau’s Peace Initiative. But Canada’s status as a middle power host was still limited to urging the superpowers to a dialogue, and thus it failed to produce immediate results. There are other instances where middle powers succeeded in institutionalizing measures despite disagreement from the United States. However, most of these successes were possible because they were limited to specific areas that did not fundamentally contradict American interests. The passing of these pieces of legislation came at the cost of compliance, as the middle powers’ leadership diminished once the institutionalization happened without effective compliance mechanism.

Usage of fast-track diplomacy and coalition-building when faced with resistance

An initiative led by a middle power is more likely to be successful if middle powers engage in fast-track diplomacy within an existing or newly-created institutional framework in which a like-minded coalition can bypass consensus-based decision-making. In the case of peacekeeping, a new proposal at the UN is often stalled by the security and sovereignty concerns of certain member states, including those of superpowers. If the initiative is deemed by like-minded middle powers to be strategically and ethically worth pursuing even at the cost of alienating a number of resisting countries, a dedicated coalition for the specific purpose can form a necessary majority and swiftly pass the proposal by

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57 Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers.
58 Geoffrey, “Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping”, p.77.
fast-tracking the internal process rather than seeking consensus. A middle power coalition led by Denmark succeeded in the SHIRBRIG case by using this method.  

**Securing domestic public support stemming from national self-identity**

An initiative led by a middle power is more likely to succeed if it is understood and supported by its domestic public, especially if it is compatible with the nation’s self-awareness of its position and mission in the world. Canada has been prominent in peacekeeping operations especially during the early years of the Cold War because it was something in which many Canadians could find common ground. It affirmed Canadian support for the UN, strengthened Canada’s associations with emerging states, and distinguished itself from the United States. This is why Pearson, when he came to power in 1963 following his leadership in establishing the UNEF I in the 1950s, was able to bring his Liberal government policy in line with supportive public opinion and make peacekeeping operations Canada’s priority. Canada’s more recent commitment to Afghanistan, in contrast, has not gained equivalent social support, despite the official government stance that emphasizes to the public that the deployment of peace and stability missions abroad is directly compatible with its own territorial defence. Even now, the majority of Canadians believe in peacekeeping, but many remain unconvinced that the goals of the Afghanistan mission are linked to national security, making the Canadian involvement a source of continuous domestic political debate.

South Korea’s emergence as a middle power in a relatively short period of time has been facilitated by the South Korean public’s self-identity. A national identity poll conducted by the East Asia Institute in 2010 shows that 76.8% of South Koreans viewed their country as a middle power. In response to the question, “What kind of role should [South] Korea take in resolving international problems?” 53.1% answered “a bridging role between advanced and developing countries”, 24.7% “a supporter role in helping countries suffering from poverty or natural disasters”, and 19.1% “a leading role in setting agendas and norms in international society,” reflecting the growing domestic support for their government’s pursuit of niche diplomacy directly associated with traditional middle powers.

**Usage of public diplomacy based on soft power**

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59 Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda”

60 Geoffrey, “Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping”, p.79.


62 Lee, “South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy”, p.20.
Middle power leadership can expect more immediate and visible results if initiatives are backed up by a state’s soft power, with public diplomacy that promotes this attraction to wider international audiences.

Scandinavian countries and Canada have been largely successful because they maintain highly positive soft power with “neutral”, or more precisely, “reliable and objective go-between” profiles. Domestically, civil society must express with a pluralistic voice that a stable liberal democracy exists. This is a necessary precondition for effective soft power-based public diplomacy. International recognition of this image in the Scandinavian states and Canada provides background support for their initiatives.

In Asia and in East Asia in particular, soft power is also starting to be perceived as strategically valuable in gaining influence and status. Asian countries meeting the same preconditions for soft power as the Western middle powers are conducting public diplomacy embedded in these values, in addition to using their distinct cultural edge to appeal to the world. For example, Indonesia – an important new middle power – has begun to project its unique image as the largest stable democracy in the Muslim world and its practice of moderate Islam as the basis of its public diplomacy. On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has achieved limited international success to expand its soft power by using both its economic and cultural resources with its aggressive “charm offensive”, because it lacks the necessary pluralistic expression from civil society. Attempts by the PRC to promote international “liking” of China with cultural/historical attractiveness is widely interpreted by many as a deliberate government tool used to overshadow the lack of natural soft power.

South Korea’s soft power capability has increased drastically in the past decade as a result of the growing international popularity of Korean pop music, movies, and dramas, and its contributions to international governance. However, there is still a noticeable gap between South Korea’s hard economic/military capability and its international recognition and soft power-based influence. In order to expand its soft power base, the government has focused on its contributions as a bridging

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power between the common interests of both developing and developed countries, as it possesses the most recent experience of development among developed countries. The South Korean experience of democratization following development provides an attainable model for developing countries, and its less-threatening middle power position constitutes South Korea’s soft power to encourage other countries to cooperate.

PART II. Middle Powers in the Emerging Fields of “Green Growth/Energy Efficiency” and “Complex Humanitarian Emergencies”

Part II evaluates the feasibility of constructive middle power diplomatic leadership in two emerging policy areas, green growth/energy efficiency and complex humanitarian emergencies.

Various empirical case studies demonstrate how middle power initiatives have fared in relation to the seven conditions for success described above, for each of the two areas. For the green growth/energy efficiency policy area, cases of international-level institution building, Asia Pacific regional institution building, cleaner fossil fuel use and alternative clean energy, and the Arctic issue are analyzed. For the complex humanitarian emergencies policy area, cases of human security, post conflict/disaster relief, the International Criminal Court, the antipersonnel landmine/cluster munitions ban, and trade control for preventing conflict-financing are analyzed. It must be noted that both green growth/energy efficiency and complex humanitarian emergencies, although analyzed separately in this paper, can both equally fall under the broader concept of “new security.” The concept of new security differs from the traditional definition of security in that it shifts the focus to the welfare of non-state actors, quality of life, and access to safe and clean energy.

Green Growth/Energy Efficiency

International-level institution building

Middle powers have played a notable leadership role in environmental issues in general and green growth in particular, promoting awareness in multilateral settings on the harmful influence of pollutants on the ecosystem as a result of industrial growth. Although the most widely publicized environmental institution – the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 – is not a good example of successful middle

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power leadership, there have been a number of instances past and present in which they effectively exerted this ideational entrepreneurship.

A better example is a Swedish initiative in 1972 that led to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) in 1979. In 1972, the Swedish government presented a study titled “Air Pollution across National Boundaries: The Impact of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation” to the UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm to start a multilateral approach to tackling issues related to the long-range transport of pollutants in general and acid rain in particular. This led to other studies by Norway, Canada, other OECD member states, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) throughout the 1970s. The significance of the Swedish leadership is that it paved the road for the first international recognition of acid rain’s harmful effects on the human environment, and prompted the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge about the threat through subsequent studies. As a result, the LRTAP was signed in 1979 by 34 states and the European Communities (EC).

Canada joined Sweden in leading the Management of the Atmosphere and Global Environment meeting at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, with Canadian businessman Maurice Strong as the Secretary-General of the meeting. Strong later organized the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Sustainable Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the “Earth Summit”), and by combining the influence of individual middle powers in a mission-oriented coalition, succeeded in pushing major polluting nations such as the United States to improve reductions.

As mentioned earlier, the most widely publicized international “agreement” is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Despite its publicity, the Protocol’s only and limited success is its role in facilitating awareness on the greenhouse gas issue by providing a legitimate institutional stage for international discussion, and the middle powers have not demonstrated their leadership as they did in the cases of LRTAP or the Earth Summit. The Kyoto case illustrates that in the field of green growth, environment, and energy, the middle powers – similar to non-middle powers – have played a leading role only to the extent that they do not face strong domestic opposition stemming from economic considerations.

The Kyoto Protocol was originally established to start an international process to meet the aim

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70 Henrikson, “Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within, Across, and Outside Institutions”, p.59.
71 Ibid., p.60.
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – “preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2) – agreed during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Under the Protocol, 38 industrialized countries agreed to reduce their collective greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by approximately 5% below 1990 levels by the end of the Protocol’s first five-year commitment period (2008–2012).\textsuperscript{72}

However, economic considerations contribute significantly to many countries’ hesitation to accept binding GHG emission targets, and the problem of compliance and coercion has been acute. It is not only the new middle powers of India, Brazil, and South Africa who have argued strongly for the right to economic development for emerging countries.\textsuperscript{73} The superpowers (the United States and China), traditional middle powers, and even the host Japan have resisted meeting compliance requirements. Canada – with its image of an environmentally-friendly state – originally pledged to reduce GHG emissions to 6% below its 1990 level by 2008-2012. Contrary to this commitment, it has taken no serious action to do so, and by 2004, Canada’s emissions were 25% above the 1990 level.\textsuperscript{74} Canada’s poor compliance record is based on domestic political and economic factors caused by the non-engagement of the resource extraction industry and the governing Conservative party.\textsuperscript{75}

In November 2012, at the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, the Protocol was extended to 2020. Some 190 nations agreed to the extension to require developed industrialized nations to lessen emissions through 2012 by an average of 5% against 1990 levels. But the future of the Protocol remains bleak and the leadership role of the middle powers is still absent, as Japan, New Zealand, and Canada, have left the process, relegating it to a weaker regime where the participant nations account for only 15% of the total emissions in the world.\textsuperscript{76} However, it would be untrue to claim that the Kyoto Protocol has achieved nothing; the significance of environmental international conventions is not solely due to the

\textsuperscript{72} Peter Christoff, “Post-Kyoto? Post-Bush? Towards an Effective ‘Climate Coalition of the Willing’”, \textit{International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)} 82, no. 5 (September 1, 2006): 831–860.


actual degree of international compliance, but to the fact that they set the stage for a long-term norm-formation by raising the issue’s priority in international governance.

South Korea, as a latecomer in the field of green growth and energy efficiency, has allocated significant effort and resources to it as part of its national strategy since the previous Lee Myung-bak administration. From 2008, the Lee administration designated green growth as crucial for a national strategy that aims for low-carbon economic growth, as the country’s energy dependence – especially on fossil fuel – stands at 96%. Even during the global financial crisis in 2008, South Korea continued to dedicate 80% of its fiscal stimulus plan to green growth projects, especially on infrastructure and transportation. In 2009, the government announced plans to invest US$85 billion in clean energy technologies. Between 2008-2013, as a part of its Five-Year Plan, Korea committed 2% of its GDP to create a knowledge and technological foundation to sustain a green growth economy and to catch up with other developed countries.

South Korea has extended its commitment to green growth into the international arena by playing a bridging role between advanced and emerging countries for the expansion of post-industrial means of producing wealth and reducing poverty. The country has quadrupled its foreign assistance budget since 2000, to US$800 million in 2009, and it has pledged to boost financing of green energy, conservation and development projects to 30% of the total aid budget by 2020. The most prominent example of South Korea’s commitment and new leadership as a middle power in the green growth field is the United Nations’ decision to locate its Green Climate Fund (GCF) – a UN fund designed to channel money to developing states to help them cope with global warming, greenhouse gas emissions, floods, droughts, and heat waves - in the Songdo International Business District in Incheon from 2013.

**Asia Pacific regional institution building**

The most prominent example of middle powers in Asia Pacific playing an active role in region-specific environmental issues is the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP was an initiative set up in July 2005 by Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States. It ended in April 2011.

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77 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
The APP addressed issues related to energy needs and security, air pollution, and climate change with the private sector. It focused on expanding investment and trade in cleaner energy technologies, goods, and services in key market sectors. The APP’s main goal was to spread the use of more energy efficient and cleaner technologies to help realize sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in the two biggest markets in the world (China and India) without undermining their economic development.  

At the APP, the regional middle powers – Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea – did not necessarily exercise continuous leadership, as the goals of the institution were directly linked to the national interests of the greater powers in the region, and the interests of the developing and the developed countries did not always converge. However, the middle powers took active leadership roles in specific subfields in which they enjoyed comparative technological advantage and a degree of commitment. For example, among the eight approved public-private sector task forces within the APP, Australia chaired the “Aluminum” and “Cleaner Fossil Energy” sectors, Canada led the “Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation” sector, and Korea led the “Buildings and Appliances” sector.

In addition, South Korea and Japan have a significant role in fighting economic and health damages caused by sandstorms originating from China and Mongolia. South Korea and Japan have a strong interest in assisting China and Mongolia to combat the land degradation and desertification that cause the annual trans-border sandstorms in Northeast Asia. At the Second Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meeting in Beijing in 2000, the middle powers managed to reach a trilateral agreement with China to hold workshops consisting of experts, government officials, and relevant NGOs to specifically tackle the problem of dust and sandstorms.  

Cleaner fossil fuel use and alternative clean energy

Innovation in more efficient and cleaner extraction and processing of fossil fuels is currently regarded as of the highest priority in the green energy field, along with the development of alternative technologies such as solar or wind. Among the middle powers, the Canadian government and many national governments were active in the area of cleaner fossil fuel use.  

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large private firms in the country are committed to innovation in fossil fuel extraction and processing. How well Canada will be able to export and spread its technology at the official level (particularly to the Asia Pacific) is still to be seen, but it is already happening in “accidental” fashion by individual firms.84

In the field of alternative clean energy, nuclear is increasingly seen as the most realistic carbon-free energy source in East Asia. All major states in the region rely on nuclear energy for civilian usage, and their heavy import of fossil fuels from abroad and subsequent greenhouse gas emissions have led these governments to link “green” to nuclear in this context. Although the Fukushima disaster has certainly undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy generation in Japan and in the international society, the region is most likely to continue with the development and implementation of civilian nuclear technology as the main source of cheap and reliable energy.

Among the middle powers, this trend is well illustrated in the case of South Korea. Nuclear power has been an important aspect of South Korea’s national energy strategy, as it improves energy independence while mitigating carbon emissions. The Lee Myung-bak administration actively pursued strategies to expand nuclear power at home and promote it abroad, and plans to increase nuclear power’s share of the country’s electricity generation from 33% to 59% by 2030 are currently under way.85 The Lee government also established the Framework Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth and the Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances to pursue nuclear power as clean renewable energy.86

The Arctic

The current multilateral engagement concerning the Arctic addresses a complex mix of energy, security, environment/sustainable development, and waterway transportation (the sea lane) issues. Along with the civilian nuclear field, the Arctic issue is especially closely linked to the emerging “energy security” (part of the “new security”) concept.

The Arctic Council deals with all of these issues, but concerned middle powers such as Canada and the Nordic states can play a particularly central role in the establishment of an international

84 Michael Roberts (Assistant Professor, International Management and Strategy, MacEwan University), Online interview on Canada’s commitment on green energy and technological export, August 9, 2013.
86 Kim, Ji-soo, “Green Growth - President Lee’s Signature Feat”.
regime concerning the safe and stable transportation of energy and goods through the two Arctic sea
lanes that are expected to be fully operational in the near future. In the field of energy security, land
transportation (pipelines) are equally significant, but middle powers cannot play a leadership role as
the issue is tightly linked to territorial sovereignty issues, especially those of the energy superpowers.

The Arctic region was never expected to become a navigable waterway, but global warming and
subsequent ice melt have now led to expectations that two shipping shortcuts, the Northern Sea Route
(over Eurasia) and the Northwest Passage (over North America), will soon be opened, cutting oceanic
transit times by days with significant international economic and security implications.87

Canada led the foundation of the Arctic Council with the 1996 Ottawa Declaration and has been an
active champion of the inter-governmental circumpolar forum for promoting cooperation, coordination,
and interaction among the Arctic states.88 The Chairmanship of the Council has been in the hands of
the northern middle powers except during 1998-2000 (the United States) and 2004-2006 (Russia),
but Canada has assumed another term of chairmanship from 2013.

Currently, there is some concern that Canada has made a position-shift away from an internationalist/
multilateralist stance, mainly stemming from the disagreement between Canada and the United States
regarding the international use of the Northwest Passage. Canada’s 2007 Northern Strategy proposed
an increase in military and civilian control capabilities with an emphasis on sovereignty, and possible
unilateralist action to safeguard its national interests. But Canada’s commitment to the Arctic Council, at
this point, remains stable because there is broad agreement that the issue is where Canada, as a middle
power, can play a significant multilateral leadership role based on mutually-beneficial functionalist
solutions for all the members.89

Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Human Security

The idea of human “security” is a recent development in international governance; it has facilitated
a new thinking on security by shifting the focus from the state to the well-being of the individual.

87 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”, Foreign Affairs 87,
88 Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp, “Canada’s Arctic Policy: Transcending the Middle-Power Model?”, in Canada’s Foreign &
89 Ibid., pp.270-271.
Hampson et. al. defines human security as follows: (1) that the individual is one of the referent points (or in some formulations the referent point) for security; (2) that the security of the individual or the group is subject to a variety of threats of which military threats from outside the state are only one and usually not the most significant; and (3) that there is a possible tension between the security of the individual and that of the nation, the state, and the regime. The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report by the Commission on Human Security and the Human Security Fund define it as “the vital core of human lives” and the “protection of fundamental freedoms.” Human security as a humanitarian concept was first formally incorporated into an international institutional setting by the establishment of the Commission for Human Security in January 2001, in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear.” Based on this mandate, Co-Chairs of the commission, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, presented its detailed final report, “Human Security Now” to the Secretary-General.

Once human security became one of the priority agendas at the UN, Canada took a leading role in operationalizing the concept in the form of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” by establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Although the idea of human security is regarded by the whole international community as universally acceptable, the potential for undermining state sovereignty in the implementation of the principle led to half-hearted commitments from many developing and non-democratic countries. It was to address the gap between prioritizing the norm of humanitarianism (and the legitimacy of intervention based on the principle) and that of state sovereignty that the Canadian government founded the ICISS in September 2000, co-headed by Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff, and consisting of members of the UN General Assembly.

R2P is based on three pillars. The first pillar states that it is the responsibility of each state to use appropriate and necessary means to protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This commitment is universal and permanent. In order to convince nation states of the benefits of observing this principle, R2P argues that by effectively exercising this primary responsibility, states strengthen their sovereignty. The second pillar refers

to the commitment of the international community to encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility. This includes specific commitments to help states build the capacity to protect their populations and to assist those that are under stress before crises and conflicts erupt. The third pillar refers to the international community’s responsibility to respond through the United Nations in a timely and decisive manner, using Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace), and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter as appropriate, when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations. The R2P principle was formally endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, and unanimously reaffirmed in 2006 by the UN Security Council Resolution 1674. Furthermore, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2007 pointed at the challenge of translating R2P “from words to deeds” as one of the cornerstones of his term of office.

Following Canadian leadership in promoting the R2P, the Asia Pacific middle powers of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan have been advocates of the principle in the region. Australia, South Korea, and Singapore, in particular, are members of the “Friends of R2P” group that was also established by Canada to provide a forum for supporters to caucus and share information at the level of the permanent missions to the UN. Thanks to the joint commitment of these Asia Pacific middle powers, there is now a subtle shift among sovereignty-sensitive Asian countries toward accepting this specific understanding of human security as embodied by the R2P.

Post-conflict/disaster relief

The new and emerging field of international relief focuses on the reconstruction and stabilization of a specific area that has been affected by either man-made or natural disasters. Post-conflict/disaster relief operations are often packaged with traditional peacekeeping missions, since full and sustainable management of conflicts and disasters is only possible if followed by stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Canada’s leadership in the UN’s stabilization operations in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation HALO in 2004, Australia’s active role in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, and South Korea’s deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team to the Afghan province of Parwan in 2010 belong in this category.

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95 Ibid., pp.547-548.
96 Ibid., p.552.
Although relief missions are currently conducted across the globe, the need for this particular kind of operation is most acute in the Asia Pacific region. The regional middle powers of Australia, South Korea, and Japan are becoming more active in promoting such functions in cases of regional contingencies. Ironically, their middle power leadership in this field is pushed by their broader strategic relationship vis-à-vis the United States in the “hub-and-spoke” alliance system. These three middle powers are currently moving toward closer security cooperation while maintaining their alliances with the United States. The main reason for the rising need for intra-spoke cooperation is that the United States is demanding that the provision of extended deterrence and continuous military presence in the region – a “public good” for the maintenance of regional security – be shared. To ensure continued American engagement, it is essential that the spokes coordinate to enhance their regional functions and complement the alliance by providing their own regional public goods in the form of peacekeeping and post-conflict/disaster relief in low-level situations. Japan and Australia already have a strong track record of shared peace-building and reconstruction efforts in this regard, in Cambodia, East Timor; and after the Boxing Day tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004. Another key middle power success in relief operations conducted by Australia is Operation Pacific Assist, in which Australian Defence Forces and Emergency Management Australia supported Japan by establishing an emergency support task force after the 3.11 Greater East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.

International Criminal Court

Human security as spearheaded by the R2P is a middle power initiative to protect individuals from violence by urging the state-actors to respect their responsibility. The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute (Rome Statute) is a protection mechanism that legitimizes the international persecution of individuals who have committed crimes against humanity.

The establishment of the ICC is another significant example of Canada’s entrepreneurial leadership in conducting effective, fast-track diplomacy with a coalition of like-minded countries and supporting NGOs. Prior to the 1998 Rome Conference, the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) was already advocating the need for the ICC, and it knew that the outcome at Rome would largely depend on the leadership and negotiating capabilities of supportive, like-minded countries. These states, including Canada, and the CICC had already reached a consensus on six main principles for establishing the ICC: 1) the ICC should not be subject to oversight by the UN Security Council; 2) the ICC prosecutor

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98 Ungerer and Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security”.
99 Statement during Middle Power workshop at Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 2012.
100 Ungerer and Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security”.

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should be independent; 3) the ICC jurisdiction should be extended to cover crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression; 4) states should cooperate fully with the ICC; 5) the ICC should make the final decision on issues of admissibility; and 6) a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries should be convened in Rome in 1998.\textsuperscript{101}

During the Rome Conference, with leadership provided by the Canadian government and support from the CICC, like-minded countries campaigned for the establishment of the ICC based on the six principles by engaging in fast-track diplomatic negotiations instead of relying on consensus-based diplomacy. In particular, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, used his bilateral and multilateral contacts as well as public statements to spread the word on the necessity of an ICC to the international audience. Throughout the process, the draft statute was revised, behind closed doors, by a small number of delegates, most from the like-minded group. These delegates eventually succeeded in brokering deals with holdout governments and convinced them to support the draft on the last day of the conference.\textsuperscript{102}

**Antipersonnel landmine/cluster munitions ban**

The anti-personnel landmine (APL) ban is included under humanitarian emergencies, even though the Ottawa Treaty at the Ottawa Convention of 1997 appears to place it in the category of traditional security and arms control. As an arms control regime, however, it has fatal weaknesses, because the core target countries never signed it and there is no verification and compliance machinery in place.\textsuperscript{103} But from the perspective of international humanitarian law and of the advancement of the idea “freedom from fear,” the treaty is one of the most successful cases of middle power leadership because it promoted awareness about grave human consequences caused by a specific category of weapons, and urged the world to ameliorate the circumstances that combatants and non-combatants would confront should war break out.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1993, an NGO called the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was formed. Together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it launched a continuous global public

\textsuperscript{101} Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda”, pp.322-323.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp.322-323,325.
awareness campaign, conducted research, and adeptly invited media attention. The ICBL/ICRC campaign then got state endorsements by middle powers such as Canada, South Africa, Austria, New Zealand, and Norway. Under the Canadian initiative, these states upgraded what was formerly an NGO campaign into a completely new disarmament game, and Canada led the creation of the “Ottawa Process” from 1996, in which the committed NGOs and like-minded countries involved themselves in negotiations for a treaty draft.\(^{105}\)

The Ottawa Process started with a conference titled “Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines” in October 1996, cohosted by the Canadian government along with another NGO, Mine Actions Canada.\(^{106}\) Fifty states that pledged support for a draft titled the “Ottawa Declaration” were invited to attend the conference, as well as 24 observer countries.\(^{107}\) Initially, France, the United Kingdom, and even the United States agreed to sign this declaration. It was short of a total ban of APLs, but all invited members were expected to make a commitment to cooperate to ensure that a legally-binding international agreement wholly banning these weapons would come into force sometime in the future.\(^{108}\)

It looked as if the 1996 conference would end with a declaration in which most UN Security Council member states agreed to become signatories. But the Canadian government then decided to drastically change the nature of the meeting on the last day of the conference to push for a swift total ban. In his final speech, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy invited the conference participants to work with Canada to negotiate and sign a total APL ban treaty by December 1997, within 14 months after the conference. Furthermore, Axworthy called on the participants to implement the ban by the year 2000.\(^{109}\) This was the point when the United States shifted its stance, but the Ottawa Process continued into 1997 among the like-minded anti-landmine states, culminating in the enhanced Ottawa Treaty draft (as separate from the previous Ottawa Declaration) in September. This final treaty was finally signed on December 3, 1997 at the Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines.

\(^{108}\) David Antony. Lenarcic, Knight-errant?: Canada and the Crusade to Ban Anti-Personnel Land Mines (Toronto: CIIA, 1998).
As mentioned earlier, the APL campaign was only a half-success for Canada in terms of arms control, since all major landmine producer/user superpowers – not only the United States, but Russia and China as well – opposed the final Ottawa Treaty, and the United States in particular argued for the negative effect the treaty might have on its overall military policy (for example, the safety of American forces in the Demilitarized Zone in South Korea). However, the APL ban, as a diplomatic initiative for facilitating awareness of a particular type of weapon as a humanitarian emergency is a major middle power diplomatic triumph for Canada and the like-minded countries, as well as a successful case of government-NGO collaboration.

Norway played almost an identical leadership role in banning another category of weapons – cluster munitions – following a similar process. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry became pessimistic about the prospect of any progress on the cluster munitions issue within the existing framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). It thus announced in November 2006, shortly after the war in Lebanon, that it would create an Ottawa-like process outside the CCW for states interested in a complete ban. Without this move from Norway to form a coalition, it is likely that the negotiations would have stalled in the tightly controlled proceedings of the CCW, where all states had an effective veto and compromises tended to adopt the lowest common denominator. As a result, the Oslo Process took place in 2007 to launch a new global effort to prohibit cluster munitions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was then swiftly adopted in Dublin in 2008, and was signed in December of that year as a result of the continuous commitment by the Norwegian government and the coalition. The ban now has 156 signatory states, and by stigmatizing the weapon, the coalition has consistently pushed even non-signatory great powers to avoid using them.

**Trade control for preventing conflict-financing**

Another significant example of middle power leadership in the new field of human security is Canada's role in the Kimberley Process restricting the trade in diamonds used for financing conflicts. As in many international regimes lacking coercive compliance mechanism, the real contribution made by the process is still debatable. However, it is an undeniable success as a middle power's promotion of awareness in an often overlooked cause of civil wars and instability in the developing world.

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112 Ibid., p.177.
During its term on the UN Security Council (1999–2000), Canada played a key role as the Chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee pressing for measures to strengthen the implementation of sanctions to prohibit the import of rough diamonds from Angola to the world market to finance rebel movements. Investigators led by Robert Fowler (Canadian diplomat and the special envoy of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Niger) presented the Fowler Report to the UN in March 2000, detailing how the sale of diamonds on the international market was financing war efforts, and naming the countries, companies, government, and individuals involved. This led to a meeting of Southern African diamond-producing states in Kimberley, Northern Cape in May 2000. A culminating ministerial meeting followed during September in Pretoria, resulting in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The KPCS was also backed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 following recommendations in the Fowler Report, and an international process was then set up to ensure that diamond purchases do not finance violence by rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments.\(^{113}\)

### How Likely is Middle Power Success in New Policy Areas?

In this conclusion, seven conditions for success are applied to middle power leadership cases in the two new fields of green growth/energy efficiency and complex human emergencies:

1) Government and leadership commitment;
2) Realistic consideration of national and other economic interest;
3) Sensitivity to sovereignty and national security concerns;
4) Realistic evaluation of constraints posed by international systemic dynamics;
5) Usage of fast-track diplomacy and coalition-building when faced with resistance;
6) Securing domestic public support stemming from national self-identity;
7) Usage of public diplomacy based on soft power

#### Government and leadership commitment

Particularly in the humanitarian field, the state still plays a crucial role in either reducing or exacerbating the underlying causes of threats to human security. Strong political commitment by a government to exercise democratic governance is thus a prerequisite to protecting people’s security.\(^{114}\)

The Canadian government’s R2P commitment and leadership provided by notable individuals


(Axworthy in the anti-personnel mine and the ICC cases, and Robert Fowler in the Kimberley Process) is crucial for successful humanitarian initiatives, partly because there are few short- or mid-term expected economic incentives linked to this field.

In the green growth/energy efficiency field, comparatively speaking, both official and private sectors play an equally significant role in the development and promotion (through export) of necessary innovative technologies. However, it is often governmental initiatives in the first place that provide momentum for long-term engagement by public and corporations. In the case of Korea, the Lee administration’s launching of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 2010 and the establishment of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the private sector demonstrated the country’s commitment to become a leading middle power in the promotion of green growth in a relatively short period of time to the citizens and the international community.\(^{115}\)

**Realistic consideration of national and other economic interest, and sensitivity to sovereignty and national security concerns**

Middle power initiatives that enhance the international community’s ability to cope with complex humanitarian emergences provide examples of effective entrepreneurial leadership in establishing international regimes based on new awareness. These initiatives would have been more successful with superpower support, absent due to superpower concern about these initiatives’ negative impact on their security. For example, China did not sign the ICC Rome Statute, while Russia signed but failed to ratify.

The United States is likely to oppose a human security initiative that is led by a middle power if it challenges a core national interest such as the security of American territory, institutions, and the rights of American citizens as protected under the United States Constitution. Washington also opposed the ICC and the final Ottawa treaty because an American citizen acting as a state agent could be prosecuted by an external party.\(^{116}\)

\(^{115}\) Presidential Committee on Green Growth, “UN Green Climate Fund to Be Based in Korea”; Kim, Ji-soo, “Green Growth - President Lee’s Signature Feat”.

The APL and cluster munitions ban nevertheless succeeded in becoming an international regime without superpower support. During the same period, there was another less-known middle power initiative to impose stricter regulations on the legal trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Contrary to the APL and the cluster munitions schemes, the middle power like-minded coalition pushing for SALW restrictions failed to gather support even among many non-superpower states because the SALW issue is more directly linked to national security than the other two categories of weapons. In other words, an instance of a state acquiring SALW because it perceives the action to be necessary for the purpose of national security could be seen as a destabilizing accumulation of weaponry by another state. Such divisive aspects of the SALW scheme stemming from its direct linkage to national security for many countries – and in the case of the United States, its potential challenge to specific constitutional rights of American citizens to bear arms prevented agreement.\footnote{Ibid.}

The R2P principle has been accepted by states in the Asia Pacific region because it successfully addressed the dilemma between the need for an international humanitarian regime and the protection of sovereignty. R2P is firmly embedded in existing international law and the principle does not expand the scope for coercive interference in domestic affairs beyond the UN Charter, nor does it expand the definition of human security, a significant concern to a number of authoritarian and semi-democratic transitional states in the region. R2P, in other words, has succeeded in gaining the consent of the states as far as possible by accommodating and internalizing local concerns (“localizing”), while still strengthening the global norm.\footnote{Bellamy and Davies, “The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia Pacific Region”.}

In the emerging field of green growth and energy, sovereignty and economic considerations often merge. In the Arctic Council case, resolving the differences between Canada and the rest of the member states over how to define the Northwest Passage and demarcating maritime borders between Canada and the United States on the Beaufort Sea is a complex process, because these factors have significant implications for the concerned parties on sovereignty as well as on long-term economic consequences.\footnote{Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”, p.72.} Resistance from states like India, Brazil, China and other developing nations during the process leading to the Kyoto Protocol is also the result of what they regarded as international interference with their sovereign right to develop. Although the promise of economic benefit – such as transfers of technology and wealth in the forms of carbon credits and taxes – could
arguably function as negotiating leverage points, convinced a developing state, particularly a post-colonial state with historic experiences of foreign domination, to yield a portion of its sovereign right for an international cause is not an easy task.

If a middle power initiative in green growth/energy efficiency does not undermine any state’s sovereignty and can be approached purely in economic terms, it is always advisable to openly link the initiative to mutually-beneficial incentives in order to convince both the target countries and domestic audiences. After joining the APP in October 2007, the Government of Canada, between 2008 and 2011, invested in 35 APP projects within the energy-intensive and energy supply sectors, including CAD$13 million invested by the government in energy-intensive projects, and an investment of almost CAD$100 million from the public and private sectors. Substantial investment from both the public and private sectors is motivated by Canada’s national economic ambition to become a major energy supplier in the Asia Pacific region. Likewise, Korea’s investment of US$85 billion in clean energy technologies since 2009 has been justified by the argument that it will create more than one million new jobs and bolster a clean-tech export industry. Korea’s hosting of the GCF Secretariat, according to the Korea Development Institute’s estimate, will have an effect worth 380 billion KRW per year in the domestic economy.

**Realistic evaluation of constraints posed by international systemic dynamics**

As mentioned earlier, superpowers (US, Russia, China) did not support either the cluster munitions ban or the final Ottawa Treaty on APL. Middle power initiatives on these cases as well as on the ICC still succeeded without superpower participation, but any ambitious proposal aiming for a “visibly real” result at the international level requires superpower support or at the least, acquiescence.

In order to achieve this, middle powers need to realistically consider the superpowers’ heavy political, economic, and military involvement at the systemic level and how their initiatives would affect inter-hegemonic power dynamics. During the Ottawa Process, the United States insisted on exemptions for the American APLs because, according to the United States Department of Defense, it requires APLs for the protection of American forces in Korea and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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121 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Action on Climate Change”.
122 “Korea’s Global Commitment to Green Growth”.
123 Presidential Committee on Green Growth, “UN Green Climate Fund to Be Based in Korea”.
In the Asia Pacific region, the currently proposed trajectory for intra-spoke cooperation between Australia, Japan, and South Korea is to complement the United States’ commitment to the region, while making sure that it is not perceived as a threat by China. The regional middle powers have a strong potential for the provision of public goods in crisis/disaster management, but they understand that any serious stress in the regional security environment that requires a superpower commitment will depend on existing alliances with the United States. By focusing their initiatives specifically to the public goods provision and the management of low-key contingencies, the middle powers are framing their roles in a way that is acceptable to China as well.

Usage of fast-track diplomacy and coalition-building when faced with resistance

The APL (Ottawa Treaty), the Cluster Munitions Ban, and the ICC became international agreements with middle power leadership. However, SALW, as mentioned earlier, failed largely because of the nature of the problem. But more than that, the SALW demonstrated the importance of fast-track diplomacy among like-minded coalitions for effectively turning an initiative into a formal regime. When the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York in July 2001, middle powers were unable to achieve their objective because, unlike other successful human security initiatives, they neglected to employ fast-track diplomacy to circumvent the consensus-based decision-making procedures of the UN conference, when the issue was already highly divisive from the beginning.

In the field of green growth, Canada and Sweden, although not strong enough to make fundamental differences in the environmental regime individually, were able to place major powers, including the United States, on the defensive and push them to improve their records during the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro (the Earth Summit) in 1992 because they combined their influence to become a formidable coalition.

Securing domestic public support stemming from national self-identity, and usage of public diplomacy based on soft power

Public support and public diplomacy based on soft power are equally crucial for middle power leadership in the two new policy fields, and empirical cases have demonstrated that governmental cooperation with NGOs has become an especially effective means of reaching out to both domestic and international citizens to achieve this end.

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125 Ungerer and Smith, “Australia and South Korea: Middle Power Cooperation and Asian Security”.
127 Henrikson, “Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within, Across, and Outside Institutions”, p.60.
By joining forces with NGOs, middle powers have succeeded in strengthening their ability to project their interests into the international arena. Of course, NGO cooperation comes with a price – policy changes, donor funding, and diplomatic support – but many governments consider their expanded global profile and power worth the cost. Middle powers have been adept at this networked form of global policy making, using the comparative advantages of both state and non-state actors in synergistic partnerships.\textsuperscript{128} Contrary to popular belief, reliance on NGOs does not mean that they are the main decision-making actors putting pressure on the governments; governments are still central and they choose – or create – the NGOs they want to work with.\textsuperscript{129} In East Asia too, there has been a growing call to launch major public diplomacy to enlist full support and cooperation from the public and private sectors (NGO, NPOs), if the region is to ensure the success of policies and measures, particularly in the field of human security.\textsuperscript{130}

It is also important that governments get support and cooperation not only from organized citizen groups (NGO, NPOs) but from larger society. Domestic communities must support middle power governments’ projects, and acquiring such “social license to operate” – mitigating the environmental impacts of development in a transparent way, for example – is crucial if governments are to build positive relations with the public in the long run.\textsuperscript{131} For example, the South Korean government and public both recognize the necessity of nuclear power generation as the country’s cheapest source of electricity. However, recent reports of safety and quality-control problems and the issue of new storage sites for radioactive waste from spent nuclear fuel have undermined public trust. Hence, despite overall social acceptance of the use of nuclear energy as inevitable necessity, these issues are compromising the government’s ability to earn “social license to operate” and convince society that nuclear power is “green”.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Lee, Promoting Human Security in East Asia, p.105.
PART III. Policy Advice for Canada-South Korea Cooperation in the Fields of Green Growth/Energy Efficiency and Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

The following recommendations for Canada-South Korea cooperation in the two new policy areas are based on the seven pre-conditions for success presented in Part I. None of the recommendations undermine the two countries’ or other concerned parties’ economic interests, their sovereignty, or other national security concerns. With a possible exception of the recommendation, “the establishment of a new non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific to ensure sustainable and safe use of civilian nuclear energy”, all the proposals are within realistic boundaries posed by systemic power dynamics, and are unlikely to face resistance from regional superpowers. Therefore, none of these recommendations require fast-track diplomacy to bypass decision-making processes in any existing multilateral institutions.

Green Growth/Energy Efficiency

Canada-South Korea cooperation in the Arctic Council for the development of the Northern Sea Lane and new types of Arctic-navigable vessels

Canada is a permanent member state in the Arctic Council with its overall national interest directly linked to the future of the region. In the case of South Korea, President Park Geun-hye’s recent statement emphasizing as her policy priority Korea’s involvement in the development of the Northern route demonstrates the country’s growing interest in Arctic issues. South Korea became a permanent observer state of the Arctic Council in May, 2013. Canada’s national interests center on its claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, which include both the use of the waterway and its energy potential. The current Canadian government’s emphasis on strengthening renewed claims of territorial sovereignty in the Far North is related to the realization of the Northwest Passage and Canada’s resolution to monitor shipping in the area. Canada is also aware of the region’s potential contributions to its strategy to export energy to Asia, and maintaining a strong Canadian presence at the Arctic Council is an integral part of achieving that

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135 Yuen Pao Woo, “A Canadian Conversation about Asia”.
national interest. Canada already possesses a significant energy-linked industry footprint worldwide, as well as technology for clean extraction of light natural gas and oil.\textsuperscript{136} It is clear that Canada will utilize this edge on the issues surrounding the Arctic.

South Korea’s interests also lie in both the energy and sea lane areas. For energy, South Korea and Canada could start cooperating in the use of clean technology to mitigate the harm of extraction and make it more ecologically responsible.\textsuperscript{137} However, despite the technological edge, large-scale export of Canadian gas to Asian markets is likely to face the challenge of high price – whether extracted from the Arctic or from other parts of the country, – since export depends on an infrastructure that is inadequate at this point.\textsuperscript{138}

For this reason, it would be more attractive for both countries – and particularly South Korea – to place emphasis on bilateral cooperation concerning the potential use of the Arctic’s sea lanes. South Korea relies too heavily on a politically unstable region, the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, for most of its energy imports. Although South Korea would mainly use the Northeastern route over Eurasia, the development of the Northwest Passage would be equally beneficial, since the opening of the two Arctic routes will increase competition with Panama and the Suez Canal, thereby reducing overall canal tolls around the world.\textsuperscript{139}

As part of Canada-South Korea cooperation in the Arctic Council, the two countries can launch a joint-development initiative to design ice-capable ships for Arctic navigation. In order to navigate northern sea lanes and transport oil and natural gas more cheaply, ice-capable ships are indispensable. Already, the world’s leading shipyards and the private sector are investing in the development of Arctic tankers.\textsuperscript{140} Bilateral cooperation in developing technologically-innovative, ice-capable ships, particularly large tankers, makes economic sense, as both states already have the necessary know-how for building scientific research/coast guard/navy ice-breakers, and rank among the world’s leading ship-building nations.

\textsuperscript{136} Kincaide, Heather (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada), August 6, 2013.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Forging Trans-Pacific Cooperation for a New Energy Era, pp.4-5.
\textsuperscript{140} Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown”, p.71.
Canada-South Korea cooperation for establishing a new non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific to ensure sustainable and safe use of civilian nuclear energy

South Korea heavily depends on nuclear power. Canada’s overall reliance on nuclear power is stable at around 15% (with the exception of the Province of Ontario), but it is the largest exporter of uranium as well as one of the major providers of civilian nuclear technology. At present, there are discussions concerning the possibility of establishing a new type of non-proliferation regime in the Asia Pacific region involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea, that would meet the increasing energy demand while finding a positive solution to the issue of accumulating nuclear waste products. Unlike Canada and Japan, South Korea’s plan to build its own re-processing facility to address this issue has not been realized, due to the disapproval of the United States based on the United States-South Korea bilateral nuclear agreement. This year, the United States and South Korea extended the agreement for two additional years, but the ongoing negotiations are already facing political difficulties again because of the nuclear waste reprocessing issue. Meanwhile, South Korea’s capacity to store its spent fuels is expected to be exhausted by 2020.141

Canada and South Korea, along with Japan, can lead multilateral discussions for a regional non-proliferation regime that will ensure a stable supply of safe civilian nuclear energy for the democracies in the region. Whether the new regime will support South Korea’s indigenous reprocessing facility or a regional arrangement for shared-processing, Canada could take the leadership role in the process with South Korean support. Admittedly, this recommendation is much more difficult to realize, due to its direct link to American security interests in international non-proliferation. However, Canada is a major developer of safe reprocessing facilities as well as an exporter of civilian reactor technologies (one of its customers being South Korea). Its involvement in atomic issues in the Asia Pacific region will also have benefits for Canadian industries.

Initiative to fight flood, drought, and sandstorms in East Asia

Canada and South Korea can propose a regional institution focused on multilaterally fighting the environmental consequences of flood, drought, and sandstorms in the Asia Pacific region. This is not purely an environmental issue, as the lack of adequate infrastructure in many Asian countries to manage these issues has resulted in human consequences, particularly famine, spread of disease, and the lack of drinkable water. As in the case of North Korea, massive deforestation from a primitive

mode of energy production leads to chronic flood and drought, and annual sandstorms originating from China and Mongolia are causing severe health problems to citizens in East Asia.

A multilateral institution specifically addressing these problems with a policy-advice function fits with the middle powers emphasis on human consequences of environmental degradation which undermine green growth. For Canada, the initiative is an opportunity to reinforce its image as a “green country” and harmonize its prestige with practice. By taking the initiative in the Asia Pacific region, the Canadian government can take a leading role while facing less domestic political demands that have often prevented the country from fully implementing international ideals of sustainable use of the environment.142

South Korea already has a wide footprint in assisting other Asian states in fighting weather-related disasters, and knowledge accumulation in this field can function as a long-term preparation for the environmental recovery of North Korea in the case of reunification. For example, the South Korean government recently finalized the installation of a COMS (Communications, Ocean and Meteorological Satellite) system to help Sri Lanka with weather forecasting after it was ravaged by flooding, tsunami, and landslides.143 The Korea International Cooperation Agency is also sharing water management technology, and constructing reservoirs, water treatment facilities, dams, and irrigation channels needed to sustain agricultural production and provide clean, piped water in the drought-hit Philippines and Azerbaijan.144

Promotion of “green” building in the Asia Pacific region

In order to achieve energy efficiency, stringent building codes are now seen as important.145 Canada and South Korea can jointly promote “green” building standards in the Asia Pacific region. Canadian corporations are already engaged in building energy-efficient skins for condos in China,146 and Canada also regards its engagement in various Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) projects as a platform to showcase Canadian innovations in countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea while achieving economic benefits for Canadians.147 South Korea also sees the development of green building technology as crucial for the country’s green growth plan, as the

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143 Ibid.
144 Forging Trans-Pacific Cooperation for a New Energy Era, p.5.
145 Ibid.
146 Kincaide, Heather (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada), interview.
147 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Action on Climate Change”.

government’s announcement in 2009 about its plans to build one million “green homes” by 2020.\textsuperscript{148} South Korea’s interest is also shown by its chairmanship of the “Building and Appliances” task force within the APP.\textsuperscript{149}

\textbf{Complex Humanitarian Emergencies}

\textbf{Establishment of multilateral military or civilian groups for post-conflict/disaster reconstruction missions in the Asia Pacific region}

South Korea and Canada already have experience working together in Haiti. The two countries can propose an Asia Pacific institution for the establishment of a multilateral military detachment specifically earmarked for reconstruction efforts in future post-conflict/disaster areas in the region, as Asia Pacific still lacks any stable and permanent assistance-mechanism. As the 3.11 Greater East Japan Earthquake/Fukushima nuclear disaster demonstrated, unilateral responses for helping Japan were impressive, especially the immediate disaster relief measures provided by the United States. However, the G20 and the UN were comparatively slow and ineffective at the top level in coordinating multilateral missions in Asia.\textsuperscript{150}

The detachment will be a permanent organization that will be called in to offer service only at the request of a host state. This will ensure that the detachment’s purely non-political reconstruction efforts do not cause any concerns about sovereignty issues. The main purpose of the proposal is for Canada and South Korea to lead the establishment of a permanent infrastructure for regional stability that is acceptable to all the states in the Asia Pacific region. Although the proposal can be applied to missions outside the region, it would help both Canada and South Korea to focus first on Asia Pacific, the region in which they are both aiming to increase their international status (soft-power). Despite Canada’s prestige as a top-tier nation in peacekeeping and post-conflict/disaster reliefs, currently Canadian armed forces cannot keep up with the growing international demand.\textsuperscript{151} Cooperating with the South Korean military for small-scale missions geared toward specific types of reconstruction (particularly for building infrastructure for communications and clean water) would enable Canada to

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\textsuperscript{148}“Korea’s Global Commitment to Green Growth”.
\textsuperscript{149}Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, “Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate”.\textsuperscript{150}John Kirton, Japan Futures Initiative (JFI) Energy Security Spring Symposium Event Report (Balsille School of International Affairs), 2012.
\end{footnotesize}
strengthen its middle power position in the region, as well as maintain its international commitments in disaster reliefs.

The detachment can also provide training support for the region's military forces. Australia has already declared its willingness to support South Korea by offering training to Korean military personnel in the areas of peacekeeping, civil-military coordination, international police deployment, and disaster management, as mentioned in the 2009 bilateral Joint Statement. Canada can engage in a similar commitment to the region by sharing its know-how through the newly-established group.

If the establishment of a permanent military detachment is considered to be too high-stake at this point, Canada and South Korea can alternatively propose a civilian volunteer group under governmental supervision for the same purpose. This permanent civilian working group could be dispatched to disaster areas for building similar infrastructures for communications and clean water in post conflict/disaster areas. Canada and South Korea are already world leaders in IT technologies. Focusing their reconstruction efforts on building communication infrastructure in regions hit by disaster will enhance information exchange among local populations and facilitate a country's fast recovery and re-integration into international society. Admittedly, spreading communication infrastructure might not be welcomed by all. Building infrastructure for clean water could then be given priority.

Initiative for promoting peaceful and stable multiculturalism in the Asia Pacific region

Asia Pacific is experiencing an increased movement of people across borders. The most obvious cause of the migration is the increasing demand for low-wage foreign laborers by developed countries such as Japan and South Korea. But the cross-border movement in Asia is a more widespread trend, and it will continue to grow, particularly in the Northeast.

But the countries of East Asia and the region as a whole have dealt with migrant workers inadequately. Regional hearings for Asia and the Pacific organized by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in May 2004 described the situation of migrant workers in many parts of Asia as “benign neglect.” Moreover, there is no single institutional arrangement for the management and protection of migrant workers. In particular, the absence of regional frameworks and bodies to address the needs of migrant workers has been highlighted as a significant shortcoming.

The situation of migrant workers in East Asia is complex and multifaceted, with different countries and regions facing unique challenges. While some countries have made progress in facilitating the rights and welfare of migrant workers, there is still a long way to go to ensure that all workers are treated fairly and with dignity.

Furthermore, the issue of migration in the Asia Pacific region is closely linked to issues of development and economic growth. As countries in the region strive to maintain and improve their economies, they will need to address the needs of migrant workers in a way that is sustainable and inclusive.

In conclusion, while progress has been made in the area of migrant workers in the Asia Pacific region, there is still much work to be done. By focusing on the needs of migrant workers, countries in the region can build a more equitable and prosperous future for all its citizens.

154 Ibid., p.348.
of people moving across borders even at the global level. The International Labour Organization has a mandate to protect migrant workers; the International Organization for Migration facilitates the orderly movement of people at the requests of member states. The international community has made some efforts, such as the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families that came into force in 2002. However, only 19 migrant-sending countries have ratified the convention and the effectiveness of its implementation in receiving countries remains doubtful at best.\textsuperscript{155}

Although South Korea is still predominantly homogenous in its ethnicity, it is currently undergoing a rapid demographic transformation. In addition to migrant workers, a large proportion of immigration is made up of “foreign brides” in rural areas. The central and provincial governments’ attempts to accommodate this multicultural trend have been a series of trial and error initiatives with mixed results, largely because social acceptance of multiculturalism is still low, and there is a lack of know-how and experience in multiculturalism.

Canada, as the most exemplary multicultural state in the Asia Pacific region, can lead the establishment of a regional organization supporting the region’s smooth transition into a more multicultural environment, with South Korea’s support. The organization would conduct comparative studies of the countries in the region as well as provide policy support for multicultural initiatives. Since most of the region’s countries that are undergoing demographic changes do not share the same cultural values as those of the western states that are more open to immigration, nor the context in which migrations are occurring, the main purpose of the organization is not to pressure sovereign states to take a certain policy direction concerning migrant workers or other foreigners. Rather, the organization will focus on finding win-win solutions for both the government and the society of the host country on one hand, and the immigrants on the other. Guiding the regional states to strengthen the rights of migrant workers as declared by international conventions is important, but equal attention must be paid to developing effective strategies for educating newcomers to adapt to new environments as good citizens, so that the accommodation and acculturation occurs in both directions in balance.

**Re-education and settlement support for North Korean refugees**

Although this recommendation can be proposed in a multilateral setting, it would be more realistic to start as a bilateral cooperation scheme. The purpose of this recommendation is not to facilitate North

Korean defection; it is to support the refugees who have already fled and have been accepted as asylum seekers by host states. Although most North Korean refugees end up in South Korea, Canada and other Western countries have also accepted a large number. Each country has its own system and policies for educating and supporting refugees to adapt to their new environment, but Canada and South Korea would benefit from establishing a framework for sharing knowledge about their experiences in supporting North Korean refugees.

**Establishment of a regional agreement for evacuation support for foreign nationals**

In the aftermath of Japan’s 3.11 Earthquake in 2011, some major countries evacuated those of their resident nationals who wanted to leave Japan, while most other countries had no capabilities or any previous arrangement with the government of Japan to do so. Canada and South Korea can lead the formation of a regional agreement for pre-arranging the orderly evacuation of foreign nationals in the Asia Pacific countries in cases of natural/man-made disasters. Since accepting foreign military for the purpose could be disagreeable to certain countries, the new regime should be a non-military, multilateral institutional agreement that will assist a member state at its request. Signatories of the agreement can work to establish contingency plans for the use of infrastructures of all the member states of the agreement to assist the disaster-hit country. The regime’s branch in the disaster-hit country assists the foreign nationals who want to leave the country regardless of their nationalities through pre-arranged operating procedures, while transportation and emergency evacuation points can be offered by other member states.

**“DMZ Peace Park”**

In May 2013, South Korean President Park Geun-hye officially proposed to North Korea during her speech at the United States Congress – as well as during the Liberation Day speech on August 15 – a “DMZ Peace Park” at the heavily-armed border between the two countries. Considering the current North-South tension, the proposal is unlikely to be accepted by North Korea, and will not materialize in the foreseeable future.156

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However, the plan is still seriously considered by the government of South Korea, and it has approached the United States and the UN to participate, with positive replies. Canada, as a major participant in the Korean War and a member of the United Nations Military Armistice Commission, can also take an active part in the scheme. The actual realization of the plan in the near future is less of a concern than the fact that Canada can strengthen its presence as an integral part of the Armistice Committee, and that the Peace Park has a highly symbolic meaning as a peace-building initiative in a volatile region. The plan will involve demilitarizing the designated area, meaning the removal of landmines. As the world’s leading advocate of anti-landmine campaigns, Canada’s participation in the Peace Park scheme will strengthen the symbolic legitimacy of the Ottawa Treaty, which South Korea has not signed due to its concern over the DMZ. The park will also require schemes for wildlife preservation, and thus it is also linked to the “green” agenda.

Moreover, the know-how gained by Canada-South Korea cooperation in developing an action plan for the demilitarized park can be applied to other conflict areas. Since no short-term visible achievement is to be expected at the DMZ Peace Park in South Korea, this recommendation, although low-key and low-risk, will require a consistent, long-term political commitment from both sides. In the beginning, Canada can simply start with an official statement of support for the scheme.

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