




China and the Rules Based International Order: Globalized Populism and Crisis Response



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**CHINA AND THE
RULES-BASED
INTERNATIONAL
ORDER**

GLOBALIZED POPULISM AND CRISIS RESPONSE

PITMAN B. POTTER



1. Introduction

- Greetings and Thanks.
- Significance of populism as rhetoric and policy.
- Significance for China.
- Significance for global crises: public health, climate, migration.
- Populism analysis as complement to national interest // rational actor models.



2. Populism Overview

- Foundations.
 - Inequality and Resentment.
 - Complexity and Alienation.
- Locations.
 - Societies and Regimes.
 - Globalized Populism
- Ideologies
 - Regressive: Sunk Cost
 - Progressive: Opportunity Cost.



3. Features of Populism

- Anti-elitism.
- Grievance Ideologies.
- Practical Resistance.
- Implications for Resilience.



- Examining Practical Resistance.

- Accountability in Political Relations.
- Prosperity in Economic Relations.
- Community in Social Relations.
- Comparison With International Standards.



Policy Practice: Accountability (Covid-19).

- Outcome: Aspirational / Empirical.
- Process: Instrumentalism / Universalism.
- Information: Propaganda / Transparency.



Policy Practice: Prosperity (Climate Change).

- Measurement: Macro/Micro Data.
- Distribution: Firms / Individuals.
- Autonomy: From Market / From State.




Policy Practice: Community (Involuntary Migration).

- Identity: Inherent / Acquired.
- Diversity: Segregation / Integration
- Mobility: Threat / Opportunity.



4. Examining China's Globalized Populism

- History of PRC Populism.
 - From “serve the people” to “common prosperity.”
 - Challenge local and int'l elites (class struggle, “three worlds,” self determination).
 - Repress social populism (labour, environment, BXL).
 - Shift to “Globalized Populism.”

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- Inequality and Resentment: Conditions of int'l socio-econ and institutional inequality.
 - Complexity and Alienation: Conditions of int'l socio-econ and institutional complexity
 - Anti-Elitism, Grievance, Practical Resistance.
 - XJP at 100th Anniversary July 1, 2021: "we will never allow any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us."
 - XJP at CPC 20th Congress 2022: "We have ... unswervingly opposed any unilateralism, protectionism and bullying."
 - "Core Socialist Values" (2014): Appropriation and resistance.



- Rhetorical Markers of PRC Populism (XJP at CPC 100):

- **Sovereignty:** “No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
- **Development:** “We must deepen reform and opening up across the board, ground our work in this new stage of development, fully and faithfully apply the new development philosophy, and foster a new pattern of development.”
- **Human Rights:** “The Party will continue to work with all peace-loving countries and peoples to promote the shared human values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom.”



5. China's Response to Covid-19: Antagonistic Populism

- Inequality and Complexity in China's relationship with global health system.
 - Modernization and Colonialism.
 - "Western" medicine and TCM.
 - Missionary legacy, Yale-in-China etc.
 - WHO
 - 13th General Program of Work (2019-2023). Data access, MDGs.
 - WHO Donor Community.
 - WHO Leadership.
 - Margaret Chan (2006 - 2017).
 - Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (2017 -).



China's Pandemic Response

- *Containment and Control.*

- **Outbreak and lockdown.**

- January 1, 2020: Huanan Food Market closed.
- January 23, 2020: Wuhan lockdown.
- 2020-2022: "Zero Covid policy."

- **Information suppression**

- Local officials' dilemma.
- Official Media.
- Doctors etc. (Li Wenliang, et al.)
- Citizen reporters (e.g., Zhang Zhan, Li Zehua).
- Establishment commentators (Ren Zhiqiang, Xu Zhangrun, Xu Zhiyong).



- *Partial Disclosure and Cooperation.*

- January 7, 2020: PSC meeting.
- January 9: WHO announcement re China's preliminary determination on novel coronavirus.
- January 10, 11: Provide genetic sequencing.
- January 20: NHC – human-to-human transmission.
- January 21: RMRB, LSG (Li Keqiang).
- January 28: XJP meets with Tedros.
- February 28, 2020: WHO Joint Mission Report.
 - Origins: Zoonotic transfer.
 - Praise and criticism re China transparency and cooperation.



- *Conflicts with Int'l Engagement.*

- 2021 WHO Mission (Jan. 10 - Feb. 14).
 - "laboratory origin of the pandemic was considered to be extremely unlikely."
 - Observer criticism re data access, transparency, lab leak.
- May 2021: US Investigation (Report, Update).
 - Inconclusive re Zoonotic transfer or lab leak.
 - China response: Look to other countries (incl. US) for origins.
- July 2021: Tedros - Conclusions discounting possible laboratory origins of the virus were premature, proposes further investigation.
 - China rejects as political and not based on science.



- Anti-Elitism, Grievance.

- Continued resistance re data access, lab audits, case files.
 - Note: China not ranked on Global Covid Performance Index (GCPI) due to lack of data (Taiwan ranked 3d).
- Critique US, EU on origins tracing.
- Champion superiority of authoritarian governance.
- Vaccine diplomacy as resistance.
- Prod WHO, WHA to focus on control not origins. Resist new investigations.




Practical Resistance: Political Accountability

- Contexts for Accountability in China.
 - Patrimonial Sovereignty (neo-Confucianism + Leninism).
 - CPC Supremacy.
 - Instrumentalist rule by law.

- Key Covid Documents
 - MOJ Law Enforcement Opinion (Feb. 24, 2020).
 - SCIO White Paper (June 2020).

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- Rhetorical Markers of China's Globalized Populism in Response to Covid-19.
 - Sovereignty: Safeguarding China's Management and Reporting on Covid-19.
 - Development: Justifying China's Covid Response.
 - Human Rights: Conflicting Priorities in China's Pandemic Response.

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- Accountability in China's Covid-19 Response.
 - Performance Accountability: Aspiration / Empiricism.
 - Process Accountability: Instrumentalism / Impartiality.
 - Information Accountability: Propaganda / Transparency.

Accountability: China / RBIO Standards

	Performance Accountability	Procedure Accountability	Information Accountability	Covid Security Ranking
RBIO Standards	Empirical	Impartial	Transparency	N/A
China Standards	Aspirational	Instrumentalist	Propaganda	52/195

- Global Health Security Index, "China Country Profile," 2021, <https://ghsindex.org/country/china/>.



6. *China's Response to Climate Change: Participatory Populism*

- Inequality and Complexity in China's relationship with global climate system.
 - 1993 Ratification of FCCC: "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities."
 - Kyoto Protocol (signed 1998, ratified 2002).
 - 2009 Copenhagen climate summit.



- 2011 White Paper.


- “China is the world’s largest developing country, with a large population, insufficient energy resources, complex climate and fragile eco-environment.
- China is one of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Climate change generates many negative effects on China’s economic and social development, posing a major challenge to the country’s sustainable development.”



- Anti-Elitism, Grievance.

- MEE 2019: China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change.

- President Xi Jinping emphasized for many times, addressing climate change should not be done at others' requests, but on our own initiative.”
- “We will promote international cooperation of climate change on the basis of principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, equity, and respective capabilities.”

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- Glasgow COP26 (2021).
 - Resist revision of Paris temp targets from “well below” 2° C and ideally 1.5° C, to firm 1.5°.
 - Methane Pledge.
 - Coal (from “phase out” to “phase down”).
 - Finance: Loss and Damage (facility or dialogue), Clean energy for poor nations (\$100b/annum), Adaptation support (\$20b annum, 2x by 2025).

Practical Resistance: Economic Prosperity



- Contexts for China's Prosperity Policies.
 - Political economy. Ideology (4CPs re socialist road).
 - Economic policy: Accumulation / Distribution.
 - Maoist precedent (Imperial as well) re state dominance.
 - Deng reforms (3d Plenum of 11th CPC CC, 1978)
 - Balance accumulation and distribution – forces and relations of production.
 - Evolving priorities.
 - Socialist market economy.
 - Moderately prosperous.
 - Common prosperity.

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- Rhetorical Markers of China's Globalized Populism in Response to Climate Change.
 - Sovereignty: Safeguarding China's Climate Change Policies.
 - Development: Justifying China's Climate Change Response.
 - Human Rights: Conflicting Priorities on People and Development.



- Prosperity in China's Climate Change Response.

- Measurement of Prosperity: Macro / Micro Data.
- Distribution of Prosperity: Firms / Individuals.
- Autonomy of Prosperity: From Market / From State .

Prosperity: China / RBIO Standards

	Measurement of Prosperity	Distribution of Prosperity	Autonomy of Prosperity	Climate Change Performance Ranking
RBIO Standards	Local disaggregated indicators	Civic individuals and groups	From State controls and from market discipline.	N/A
China Standards	Macro - Indicators with recent attention to Micro-data	Business Enterprises and Social Benefit	From Market discipline and State controls.	55/63+EU

- Germanwatch and New Climate Institute, *Climate Change Performance Index, China Profile (2025)*, <https://ccpi.org/country/chn/>.



7. China's Migration Response: Passive Populism

- Inequality and Complexity in China's relationship with global migration system.
 - 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, 1987 Protocol.
 - UNGA: New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016) Global Compacts: Refugees (2018); Migrants (2019).
 - "Good" relations with UNHCR (MFA 2004).
 - Refugee Flows to China.
 - SE Asia (1970s-80s).
 - Korea (1990s).
 - Rohingya (2000s).



- Anti-elitism and Grievance.

- Professional vs. “irregular” migration (China on GCM 2018).
- Involuntary migration as result of “unbalanced development” in source countries (China 2020 UN Position Paper).
- Resist pressure on destination countries to naturalize migrants (Qin Huasheng 2001).

Practical Resistance: Community in Society

- Contexts for China's Policies on Community
 - *Identity.*
 - From class struggle to citizenship:
 - *Gongmin* (公民), *Guoji* (国籍) and *Minzu* (民族) .
 - PRC Constitution (rev. 2018) :
 - Article 33: "All persons holding the nationality (国籍) of the People's Republic of China are citizens (公民) of the People's Republic of China."



- PRC Nationality Law (1980):

- Article 2 The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state; persons belonging to any of the nationalities (*minzu* // 民族) in China shall have Chinese nationality (*guoji* // 国籍).
- Article 4 Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality.



- *Diversity.*

- Nationality Region Autonomy Law (“NRAL”) (1984, 2001)
- 2009 SCIO White Paper on “China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups.”
- Policy on minority nationality “allegiance to the central government and their identification with Chinese culture” pursuant to ideals of “unification and diversity.” XJP 2016: “Sinicization” (*Zhongguohua* // 中国化) .



- *Mobility.*


- Household registration (*hukou* // 户口) system.
- Social credit (*shehui xinyong tixi* // 社会信用体系) system.
- Foreigners - *shewai* (涉外) system.

- Absence of regulatory framework for migrants (UNHCR's 2013 report to UNHRC UPR; G-20 2016 Hangzhou Summit).
 - PRC 2013 Entry and Exit Law Article 46 on residence rights for refugee applicants, but lacks further specifics on voluntary return, integration and resettlement.



- Rhetorical Markers of China's Globalized Populism in Response to Migration.

- Sovereignty: Safeguarding PRC Policy Choices on Migration. (e.g., GCR 2018, GCM 2020).
- Development: Conditions for Accepting Migrants. (Qiao Zhonghuai at 2000 UNHCR ExComm; 2020 position paper – “common but differentiated responsibilities”).
- Human Rights: Contrary Treatment of Refugees. (Li Keqiang 2016 UNGA summit on refugees and migration - focus on right to development in source countries; UNHRC 2009, 2013, 2018 UPR critique of forced repatriation from China).

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- Community in China's Involuntary Migration Response.
 - Identity: Inherent / Acquired.
 - Diversity: Segregation / Integration.
 - Mobility: Threat/ Opportunity.



Community: China / RBIO Standards

	Identity	Diversity	Mobility	Migration Integration Policy Index Score
RBIO Standards	Acquired	Integration	Opportunity	N/A
China Standards	Inherent	Segregation	Threat	32/100

- Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020
<https://www.mipex.eu/key-findings>





Recommendations

- China's engagement with world systems on public health, climate, migration is affected by China's globalized populism. Policy responses require an appreciation for the foundations and features of China's Globalized Populism.

- **General Responses**

1. Pro-active efforts to build PRC confidence that the equality and complexity dimensions of the rules-based international order do not threaten China but instead offer opportunities for greater participation and influence.
2. As well, efforts to respond to rhetorical markers of China's globalized populism will be essential.

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- Dialogue revisiting limits on state *sovereignty* in light of the transnational reach of global policy crises of pandemic control, climate change, and involuntary migration. The International Law Commission (ILC) can play an important role on these issues.
 - The marker of *development* (and associated grievances) can be addressed by reviewing China's status as a developing country and pursuing efforts to build greater nuance and diversity into measures of development. Accepting the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" should be tempered by careful and rigorous assessment of what should be China's differentiated responsibilities in light of its already considerable national capacity. UNDP can be useful in preparing measures of development that account for such differences.

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- The rhetorical marker of *human rights* can be addressed by acknowledging diversity in international human rights standards – particularly among civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. Equally importantly, noting China's ratification and/or signing of multiple international human rights agreements, China's human rights policy practice should be treated as a matter of treaty compliance. UNHRC's UPR process can be useful in such efforts.



Crisis-Specific Responses

- *Covid-19: Accountability*
 - Outcome Accountability: Demonstrate effectiveness of empirical over aspirational depictions of policy outcomes.
 - Process Accountability: Promote reliance on rule-of-law over rule-by-law procedures.
 - Information Accountability: Promote reliance on transparency principles over propaganda practices.



- *Climate Change: Prosperity*

- Measurement of Prosperity: Demonstrate effectiveness of localized micro data over broad-based macro data in measuring prosperity.
- Distribution of Prosperity: Demonstrate effectiveness of distributing climate benefits/incentives directly to individuals and groups in society.
- Autonomy of Prosperity: Promote best practices on balancing state control and market discipline.




- *Involuntary Migration: Community.*

- Identity: Publicize links between ethnic essentialism and social instability. Promote expansion of identity norms to include acquired identity.
- Diversity: Publicize links between community integration and social cohesion. Promote expansion of diversity norms.
- Mobility: Promote appreciation for opportunities in mobility (domestic and international).



Summary

- Understand and respond to underlying causes of China's globalized populism.
- Develop policy/political responses to inequality/resentment; complexity/alienation.
- Respond to China's rhetorical markers of populism (A-E/S, G/D, PR/HR).
- Support RBIO standards for accountability; prosperity; community.
- Patience: Support change from within. Long-term commitment.

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- Thank you!
 - Q & A