

CSCAP

Regional Security Outlook

A Regional Perspective
on the War in Gaza
and its Implications
for Relations in Asia



COUNCIL FOR
SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

2025



Protest in solidarity in the wake of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip after Friday prayers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 13, 2023. (Photo by Annice Lyn/Getty Images)

A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE WAR IN GAZA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS IN ASIA

Maryam N. Ismail

Analyst, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

On October 7, 2023, the political party and armed resistance movement that governs Gaza, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement—better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas—breached Israel’s southern borders. At least five other Palestinian armed factions participated in this operation (Ragad et al. 2023), which now bears the distinction of being the deadliest attack on Israel in its history. Israel retaliated by launching an intensive military campaign in Gaza that was punctuated by a week-long truce in November 2023 and a ceasefire from January to March 2025.

Both truces allowed Israel, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to exchange Palestinian prisoners for Israeli hostages on more than eight occasions. As of April 2025, 59 Israeli hostages are still held captive in Gaza while 9,900 Palestinian political prisoners remain in Israeli prisons, 3,498 of whom are detained without charges (administrative detainees) and 400 of whom are children (Addameer 2025).

The Gaza war is without question one of the most pressing security and humanitarian issues of the past two years, both regionally and globally. Following its total blockade of aid into the Gaza Strip from March 2025 (*Al Jazeera* 2025a, 2025b), Israel admitted in May that Gaza only has several weeks before it plunges into a humanitarian crisis and proposed a radical aid distribution system in which representatives of each family collect food boxes at military-controlled hubs (Fabian and Magid 2025). The United Nations Humanitarian Country Team swiftly opposed this plan (United Nations 2025), which would effectively allow the Israeli army to take over aid distribution from international organizations and expose civilians to greater risk of being targeted, disappeared, and detained.

Having already claimed a third of the Gaza Strip as a military buffer zone, Israel recently approved of their military's plan to seize even more Gaza territory (Gritten 2025). As war fatigue creeps in among Israeli army reservists (Reuters and *Times of Israel* 2025), the effects of a persistent and genocidal war (Amnesty International 2024; University Network for Human Rights et al. 2024) on international relations bear examining. This article explores the repercussions of the war in Gaza on relations within Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian Responses to the Gaza War

The Gaza war not only highlighted the varying stances of the ten ASEAN member states toward Israel and Palestine but also revealed the political utility of the Palestinian cause as a rallying issue for countries with significant Muslim populations (Rubenstein and Shannon 2024).

In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei—none of which have diplomatic ties with Israel—the dominance of Muslim pro-Palestinian sentiment means that politicians have been compelled to clearly express their condemnation of Israel and support for Palestine. Even Indonesia has intensified its censure of Israel, despite its more ambiguous position on Israel. Indonesia has managed to forge commercial, defence, and intelligence ties with Israel over the decades (Wilson 1979; Conboy 2004; Shamah 2016; Mack 2019)—leading to speculations in the wake of the 2020 Abraham Accords that it could become another Muslim country to normalise relations with Tel Aviv (Singh and Yaari 2020). The lack of diplomatic relations also did not deter Indonesian state agencies from buying and deploying cyber surveillance tools from Israeli tech firms between 2017 and 2020 (Benjakob 2024).

Meanwhile, Singapore has stayed true to its “friend to all, enemy to none” foreign policy; it has condemned Hamas for the attack, recognised Israel's right to defend itself, but also called out unilateral moves by Israel that drive Palestinians toward violent resistance. In 2022, Singapore

“ The Gaza war not only highlighted the varying stances of the ten ASEAN member states toward Israel and Palestine but also revealed the political utility of the Palestinian cause as a rallying issue for countries with significant Muslim populations.”

opened its Representative Office in Ramallah months after announcing its decision to open an embassy in Tel Aviv (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 2022; *Times of Israel* 2022). Singapore's first ambassador to Israel then presented his credentials to the Israeli president in December 2023 amid the departure of several other diplomatic missions, some of them recalled by their governments in protest of the war (Schneider 2023).

Responding to public sentiment, Singapore's Ministry of Education implemented Character and Citizenship Education (CCE) lessons on the war to help students "understand the situation from Singapore's perspective, including the need to preserve cohesion and harmony" (Teng and Qing 2024). Parents' dissatisfaction over the "oversimplified" lessons was raised in parliament and again during the May 2025 general elections, with politicians and candidates debating the relevance of the Israel/Palestine issue to Singaporean politics and society (Abdullah 2025; Lay 2025; *Online Citizen* 2025). The city state's religious institutions also reinforced the state's tight control over public discourse on Israel/Palestine so that it would not tilt one way or the other, with the Mufti and Chief Rabbi expressing empathy and solidarity with one another upon hearing about October 7 (Wong 2023).

Thailand, on the other hand, has projected a more neutral stance by emphasising support for the two-state solution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 2024). Multiple Thai and Filipino workers in Israel were killed or captured by Hamas, making these two nations the only ASEAN members to be directly impacted by the October 7 attack. Since then, cross-border attacks between Israel and Hezbollah in the evacuated towns of northern Israel killed five more Thai workers. Israeli officials issued permits for foreign labourers to work in these high-risk zones despite pleas from Thai leaders to stop sending civilian workers to the front lines in the north and south (Tan and Levine 2024).



A Palestinian flag flies amidst destroyed buildings during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Al Remal district of Gaza City, northern Gaza, on Friday, Feb. 7, 2025. Photographer: Ahmad Salem/Bloomberg via Getty Images

The Philippines and Israel share flourishing trade and defence relations, which have arguably deepened since the Gaza war began (Greppi 2024; Saballa 2024). Manila's purchase of Rafael's SPYDER surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and Elbit Systems' Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are instrumental in modernising the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) (Global Defense Corp 2020; Mandal 2024). This need for Israeli arms underlies Manila's staunch support for Israel and condemnation of Hamas.

With far less skin in the game, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Gaza without assigning blame to any party. The military junta in Myanmar, meanwhile, has been occupied with regime survival (Yaacob 2023).

The Impact of the Gaza War on Relations in Southeast Asia

The *State of Southeast Asia Survey*, which captures Southeast Asians' outlooks on regional and global affairs, saw the war in Gaza becoming the region's top geopolitical concern in 2024. Tellingly, in the 2025 edition of the survey, the Israel–Hamas war dropped to fourth place, having been taken over by concern over aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, global scam operations, and the new leadership in the United States (ISEAS 2025, 18). Indonesia and Malaysia are the only states in which Israel's wars against Hamas (and Hezbollah in Lebanon) remain the top geopolitical concern for its citizens in 2025.

Recognizing Malaysia's communication channels with actors in Gaza, Thailand requested its assistance in securing the release of Thai hostages during the first truce period in November 2023 (*Malay Mail* 2023). Twenty hostages were released, for which the Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin thanked his Malaysian counterpart.

The economic impact of the war on Southeast Asia is primarily caused by maritime trade-route disruptions; Israel's unabating assault on Gaza and the West Bank has prompted the Houthi in Yemen to launch missiles toward Israel as well as attacks on Israel-linked ships passing through the Red Sea via Bab El-Mandeb. This strait is a major chokepoint connecting Southeast Asia and Europe, which is ASEAN's third-largest trading partner. As a result, 80 percent of US- and Europe-bound ships from Southeast Asian ports have been re-routed via the Cape of Good Hope around the southern tip of Africa, doubling shipping time and freight costs, which in turn hikes the price of goods (Loheswar 2025). The diversion of trade routes has additionally swelled congestion at ports in Indonesia, Singapore, and Port Klang (Kang 2024).

Luckily, ASEAN states' larger trade activity among themselves and with China has somewhat insulated the region from even bigger losses from the Houthi–Israel exchange of fire, to which US and UK missile attacks against the Houthi in Yemen has been added.

Aside from the economic impact of compromised maritime security, two facts of Asian political sociology have tempered the repercussions of Israeli military campaigns in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria in Southeast Asia: first, ASEAN countries are not the preferred destination of Middle Eastern refugees; and second, Asian countries do not have politically significant Arab,

“Tellingly, in the 2025 edition of the survey, the Israel–Hamas war dropped to fourth place, having been taken over by concern over aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, global scam operations, and the new leadership in the United States.”

Jewish, and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) diasporas. These facts limit the impact of MENA armed conflict and mass displacement on the domestic politics of Indo-Pacific states that are not Western democracies.

Southeast Asia hosts some 2.1 million forced migrants. However, the majority of these displaced individuals are not from the MENA region, so the legal status and welfare of MENA refugees tend to be overlooked and more tenuous, and the consequences of their presence is perceived to be more limited in these countries. Refugee policy discussions in ASEAN are dominated by the Rohingya problem.

Despite Malaysia's vocal support for Palestine, the presence of Palestinian refugees in the country has, at times, prompted public unease. In one instance, critical reactions to refugees who expressed dissatisfaction with their circumstances highlighted the occasionally conditional nature of popular solidarity (Zulkifli 2024). As in Indonesia, Malaysia's geographic distance from the Middle East has enabled it to voice strong support for the Palestinian cause without being directly exposed to the security, political, or humanitarian pressures faced by countries in closer proximity to the conflict.

The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement—which aims to “withdraw... support from Israel's apartheid regime, complicit Israeli sporting, cultural, and academic institutions, and all Israeli and international companies engaged in violations of Palestinian human rights” (BDS 2025)—gained traction in Indonesia and Malaysia following the Israeli ground operations in Gaza. The Malaysian government responded to pressure from the national BDS movement by banning Israeli-based ZIM ships from docking at Malaysian ports and its containers from entering Malaysian territory (Shukry 2023; Li 2024). Still, beyond offering solidarity and symbolic support for the Palestinian people, Malaysia is under no illusion that it is in any position to mediate Israel–Palestine relations.

Coincidentally, the two loudest critics of Israel in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, have been the consecutive chairs of ASEAN throughout the Gaza war. However, it is unlikely that either of them will be able to influence or steer ASEAN into collectively adopting a united position regarding Israel or Hamas. Under Malaysia's chairmanship, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a collective statement supporting the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to their homeland (ASEAN 2025), but the regional association's safest bet is to keep to their consensus on calling for a lasting ceasefire and the two-state solution, while working on delivering humanitarian assistance to Palestinians.

ASEAN's non-interference principle has been key to keeping the peace among member states. Even when its members occupy polarized stances on Israel and Palestine, no government believes that relations with fellow ASEAN brethren are worth ruining over a distant war that is essentially a political (as opposed to a strategic or security) concern for a few of its members.



Photo by Faldi00 via Wikimedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Action_to_Defend_Palestine_in_Jakarta.jpg).

The Impact of the War on Southeast Asia–US Relations

How has the Gaza war affected Southeast Asian nations' relations with Washington, which is Israel's principal ally and has diplomatic and trade relations with all ASEAN countries?

The 2025 *State of Southeast Asia Survey* notes that ASEAN-10 respondents view the US as the second most influential political and strategic power as well as economic power in Southeast Asia, lagging only behind China on both counts. Meanwhile, Southeast Asians' wariness of Washington decreased compared to last year, with 51% welcoming US influence in the region. The Philippines topped the group that welcomes US influence (at 66 percent), while apprehension of US influence is strongest in Indonesia (75.4 percent), Thailand (65.7 percent) and Malaysia (63.8 percent) (ISEAS 2025, 34–35).

Indeed, in Malaysia, the US embassy has had to lay low with their events and engagements, especially during the first year of the Gaza war, when it became evident that President Joe Biden's administration stood faithfully behind Israel's ever-escalating operations not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. Pragmatism prevails on the government level, however. Notwithstanding Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's open and direct criticism of Washington's role in enabling Israel, to flourish as a trading nation, Malaysia needs to protect its business with the US, its second-largest trading partner.

On the other hand, the Philippines, faced with repeated aggression by China in the South China Sea, has increased incentive to maintain a secure relationship with the US, whose naval strength is sorely needed to support Manila's maritime operations in its waters.

Underpinning these developments is the security architecture and stability provided by US dominance—which is unlikely to be replaced by China or any other country in the foreseeable future—which has enabled Southeast Asian economies to conduct business as usual despite maritime route disruptions. More significantly, the war in Gaza did not transform the region’s perception of the United States—not even close; no one is surprised by Washington’s resolute backing of Israel. Ultimately, Gaza war or not, ASEAN states need US business to further grow their economies.

Conclusion

Relations between ASEAN countries and the US and Middle Eastern states are driven primarily by bilateral diplomacy, which is supported by multilateral engagements to varying degrees of effectiveness. Waning attention to the war in Gaza after eighteen months betrays the nature of Southeast Asian concern over the Israel–Palestine issue: it is political, not strategic.

Owing to the comparatively limited migration of Middle Eastern refugees to and settlement in Southeast Asian countries, the populace is typically not connected to Middle Eastern issues, including the Gaza war, on a sentimental or interpersonal level; they certainly are not invested enough to propel Middle Eastern matters to the top of their nation’s foreign policy agendas. Developments closer to home like incidents in the South China Sea are more urgent problems to address.

A more immediate strategic concern is the United States, which under President Donald Trump’s administration has imposed trade tariffs on all and sundry, friend or foe. None of the ASEAN states can afford to degrade diplomatic, defence, and trade relations with Washington. Consequently, countries that have been vocally criticizing Israel and the US role in the war will have to tone down their invective, at least until they can ascertain the security of their trade and investment deals with the US.

Finally, strategic alliances and cooperation with Israel, Palestinian political factions, and the principal mediating states between them—the United States, Egypt, and Qatar—continue to be explored and shaped by ASEAN member states in light of the war in Gaza. Yet, Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Hamas’s October 7 attack, and the ensuing war have shown that while violent conflict and mass displacement in one region can indeed be compartmentalized to a certain extent, they will remain a thorn in the side of bilateral and multilateral engagement in the long run.

“ More significantly, the war in Gaza did not transform the region’s perception of the United States—not even close; no one is surprised by Washington’s resolute backing of Israel.”

REFERENCES

Abdullah, Zhaki. 2025. "GE2025: Foreign Conflict Should Not Turn into Conflict Between Singaporeans, Says Teo Chee Hean." Straits Times, April 27. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/ge2025-foreign-conflict-should-not-turn-into-conflict-between-singaporeans-says-teo-chee-hean>.

Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association. 2025. Addameer.org. Accessed May 6, 2025. <https://www.addameer.org>.

Al Jazeera. 2025a. "Red Cross Warns Gaza Aid Effort on 'Verge of Collapse' amid Israel Blockade." May 2. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/2/red-cross-warns-gaza-aid-effort-on-verge-of-collapse-amid-israel-blockade>.

Al Jazeera. 2025b. "At Least 57 Palestinians Starved to Death Under Israel's Blockade of Gaza." May 3. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/3/57-palestinians-starved-to-death-under-israels-blockade-of-gaza>.

Amnesty International. 2024. "You Feel Like You Are Subhuman': Israel's Genocide Against Palestinians in Gaza." December 5. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/8668/2024/en/>.

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 2025. "ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Rights of Palestinians to Self-Determination." February 12. <https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-rights-of-palestinians-to-self-determination/>.

BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions). 2025. "What Are Boycotts, Divestment, and Sanctions?" <https://www.bdsmovement.net/what-bds>.

Benjakob, Omer. 2024. "Investigation: Israeli Surveillance Technology and Spyware Sold to Indonesia." Haaretz, May 2. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2024-05-02/ty-article/>.

Conboy, Ken. 2004. INTEL: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service. Equinox Publishing (Asia). Kindle.

Fabian, Emanuel, and Jacob Magid. 2025. "IDF Planning Major Shift in Gaza Aid Delivery in Bid to Thwart Hamas Diversion." Times of Israel, May 2. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-planning-major-shift-in-gaza-aid-delivery-in-bid-to-thwart-hamas-diversion/>.

Global Defense Corp. 2020. "The Philippines Air Force Receives Israeli Hermes 900 UAS." January 21. <https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2020/01/21/the-philippines-air-force-receives-israeli-hermes-900-uas/>.

Greppi. 2024. "Israel and the Philippines, Strategic Interests and Common Values." Ynetnews, September 21. <https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/hkjjwz3pc>.

Gritten, David. 2025. "Israel Security Cabinet Approves Plan to 'Capture' Gaza, Official Says." BBC News, May 7. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy04km1zk00>.

ISEAS (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute). 2025. The State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey Report. April. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg>.

Kang, Siew Li. 2024. "Short-Lived Relief for Shippers as Shipping Costs Surge amid Red Sea Crisis." The Edge, June 19. <https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/714828>.

Lay, Belmont. 2025. "Singapore Matters Facebook Page's Fake Quote Attributed to Workers' Party Alia Mattar Fact-Checked." Mothership, May 6. <https://mothership.sg/2025/05/alia-mattar-fake-quote/>.

Li, Martina. 2024. "ZIM Container Denied Entry in Malaysia." Container News, June 5. <https://container-news.com/zim-container-denied-entry-in-malaysia/>.

Loheswar, R. 2025. "Red Sea Crisis: Malaysia's Shipping Industry Weathers Immediate Impact, but Eyes Long-Term Consequences." Malay Mail, January 18. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2024/01/18/red-sea-crisis-malaysias-shipping-industry-weathers-immediate-impact-but-eyes-long-term-consequences/112859>.

Mack, Eitay. 2019. "How Israel Helped Whitewash Indonesia's Anti-Leftist Massacres." +972 Magazine, September 9. <https://www.972mag.com/israel-whitewash-indonesia-anti-communist-massacres/>.

Malay Mail. 2023. "Thai PM Thanks Malaysia for Assisting in Release of Thai Nationals in Gaza, Says PM Anwar." November 27. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2023/11/27/thai-pm-thanks-malaysia-for-assisting-in-release-of-thai-nationals-in-gaza-says-pm-anwar/104510>.

Mandal, Sohini. 2024. "Philippines Takes Delivery of Last On-Order Spyder Battery." Janes, December 4. <https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/industry/philippines-takes-delivery-of-last-on-order-spyder-battery>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. 2024. "Thailand's Statement on the Situation in the Middle East." October 31. <https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/statement31102024-2?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683c>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 2022. “Opening of the Singapore Representative Office in Ramallah.” October 18. <https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/10/SRO>.

Online Citizen. 2025. “Singapore’s Ruling Party Under Scrutiny for Ties with Israel amid Gaza War and Upcoming Elections.” March 14. <https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2025/03/14/singapores-ruling-party-under-scrutiny-for-ties-with-israel-amid-gaza-war-and-upcoming-elections/>.

Ragad, Abdelali, Richard Irvine-Brown, Benedict Garman, and Sean Seddon. 2023. “How Hamas Built a Force to Attack Israel on 7 October 2023.” BBC News, November 28, 2023. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67480680>.

Reuters and Times of Israel. 2025. “As Fighting in Gaza Resumes, Israel Needs to Combat Reservist Burnout, War Weariness.” Times of Israel, March 21. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-fighting-in-gaza-resumes-israel-needs-to-combat-reservist-burnout-war-weariness/>.

Rubenstein, Colin, and Michael Shannon. 2024. “The Gaza War as Seen from Southeast Asia.” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, January. <https://jstribune.com/rubenstein-shannon-the-gaza-war-as-seen-from-southeast-asia/>.

Saballa, Joe. 2024. “Philippines Eyes More Israeli Weapons as China Tensions Grow.” Defense Post, April 24.

Schneider, Tal. 2023. “In First, Singapore Ambassador to Israel Presents Credentials to Herzog.” Times of Israel, December 19. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/in-first-singapore-ambassador-to-israel-presents-credentials-to-herzog/.

Shamah, David. 2016. “Worst-Kept Secret: Israel, Indonesia Do Business Together.” Times of Israel, January 13. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/worst-kept-secret-israel-indonesia-do-business-together/>.

Shukry, Anisah. 2023. “Malaysia Bans Israeli-Based ZIM from Anchoring in Its Waters.” Bloomberg, December 20. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-20/malaysia-bans-israeli-based-zim-from-anchoring-in-nation-s-ports?embedded-checkout=true>.

Singh, Michael, and Ehud Yaari. 2020. “How Does Indonesia View the Prospect of Normalization with Israel?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 28. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-does-indonesia-view-prospect-normalization-israel>.

Tan, Rebecca and Levine, Heidi. 2024. "Asian Farmworkers Are Being Killed in Israel's Embattled Border Regions." Washington Post, December 7. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/07/israel-migrant-workers-war-casualties/>.

Teng, Amelia and Qing, Ang. 2024. "MOE Responds to Parents' Criticisms over Israel-Hamas Lesson Material." Straits Times, February 24. <https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/moe-clears-the-air-over-israel-hamas-lesson-material-after-some-parents-express-unhappiness>.

Times of Israel. 2022. "After 53 Years of Ties with Israel, Singapore to Open Embassy in Tel Aviv." March 21. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-53-years-of-ties-with-israel-singapore-to-open-embassy-in-tel-aviv/>.

United Nations. 2025. "UN Warns of Growing Humanitarian Catastrophe in Gaza." United Nations News, May 4. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1162886>.

University Network for Human Rights, International Human Rights Clinic at Boston University School of Law, International Human Rights Clinic at Cornell Law School, Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, and Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School. 2024. Genocide in Gaza: Analysis of International Law and Its Application to Israel's Military Actions Since October 7, 2023. May 15. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/66a134337e960f229da81434/t/66fb05bbo497da4726e125d8/1727727037094/Genocide+in+Gaza+-+Final+version+051524.pdf>.

Wilson, George C. 1979. "U.S. Is Fronting Israeli Sale of Jets to Indonesia." Washington Post, October 5. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/10/05/us-is-fronting-israeli-sale-of-jets-to-indonesia/971f7335-8911-4189-bc33-af75f6f364fa/>.

Wong, Lawrence. 2023. "DPM Lawrence Wong on the Israel-Hamas Conflict." Prime Minister's Office, Singapore, November 6. <https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/DPM-Lawrence-Wong-on-the-Israel-Hamas-Conflict-November-2023>.

Yaacob, Rahman. 2023. "History and Domestic Dynamics: How ASEAN Members See the Hamas-Israeli Conflict." Lowy Institute, October 20. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/history-domestic-dynamics-how-asean-members-see-hamas-israeli-conflict>.

Zulkifli, Adie. 2024. "Illogical to Deport Palestinians Under Treatment Due to an Isolated Incident." New Straits Times, October 4. <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/10/1115007/illogical-deport-palestinians-under-treatment-due-isolated-incident>.

COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Track Two organisation in the Asia Pacific region and counterpart to the Track One processes dealing with security issues, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Forum. It provides an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It provides policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation. www.cscap.org

This is an individual paper of the 2025 Regional Security Outlook.

You can access the full version [here](#).

Editors

Vina Nadjibulla – CSCAP Canada

Charles Labrecque – CSCAP Canada

Editorial Panel

Vina Nadjibulla – CSCAP Canada

Datuk Prof Dr Faiz Abdullah – CSCAP Malaysia

Charles Labrecque – CSCAP Canada

LETTER FROM THE CO-EDITORS

On behalf of CSCAP, we are pleased to present the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) 2025. Inaugurated in 2007, the CRSO volume is now in its nineteenth year. The CRSO brings expert analysis to bear on critical security issues facing the region and points to policy-relevant alternatives for Track One (official) and Track Two (non-official) to advance multilateral regional security cooperation. The views in the CRSO 2025 do not represent those of any Member committee or other institutions and are the responsibility of the individual authors and the Editors. Charts and images in the CRSO 2025 do not necessarily reflect the views of the chapter authors.

Credits

Design: Prueksachat Kongthong

Cover and back image: Photo by Hartono Creative Studio via Unsplash

ISBN: 978-1-0694173-0-5



COUNCIL FOR
SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC