Last Friday, Ottawa unveiled its Arctic Foreign Policy, a diplomatic strategy that looks to “assert Canada’s sovereignty” in the region, partner with untraditional non-Arctic allies such as Japan and South Korea, and monitor “potential threats,” including those posed by China and Russia in some parts of the Arctic.
Through the new policy, Ottawa will bring back the role of Arctic ambassador, set up consulates in Alaska and Greenland, and establish a security dialogue with foreign affairs ministers from "like-minded" Arctic states.
The federal government has carved out just C$34.7 million over five years in funding for the new policy, a relatively modest price tag compared to other foreign policy strategies.
The 14,000-word document is “built on, and benefits from,” the perspective of Indigenous Peoples “who call the Arctic home,” and is designed to complement the April 2024 Defence Policy Update, which set aside C$8.1 billion in defence spending over the next five years.
Yukon Premier Ranj Pillai, for one, told Yukon News this week that it will be “imperative for the Canadian government to ensure that this work is properly supported financially.” A looming federal election, scheduled for no later than October 2025, also raises questions about the political durability of the policy.
Breaking the ice with Tokyo and Seoul
The policy refers to both the Canadian Arctic and the less traditional “North American Arctic,” implying a shared responsibility between Canada and the U.S. The document also repeatedly invokes U.S.-styled rhetoric, arguing that Ottawa must work with Washington to maintain “a secure North American homeland.”
Ottawa has also pledged to pursue “pragmatic co-operation” with non-Arctic states, namely Japan and South Korea, on areas such as maritime security, science and technology, trade, and fisheries.
Japan and South Korea are two of the 13 non-Arctic ‘observer states’ on the Arctic Council — an eclectic group that includes China, India, Italy, and Spain, among others.
China as a ‘near-Arctic’ state
The policy document highlights the “potential threats” posed by Beijing and Moscow in the Arctic and cites recent joint military exercises in the Russian High North, patrols in international waters off the Aleutian Islands, and the tracking of Russian and Chinese military aircraft by NORAD in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone as examples of deepening bilateral military co-operation.
Washington’s Arctic Strategy, released earlier this year, argued that China — which formally labelled itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018 — includes the Arctic in its “long-term planning,” and promotes the region as a ‘global commons’ to shift Arctic governance in its favour, a tactic seemingly deployed by China’s embassy in Ottawa in its criticism of Canada’s Arctic policy last week.
