U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s hazy foreign policy vision — clouded and contradicted by campaign-trail sound bites, platform pledges, and past policy — began to crystallize this week as he tapped China hawks and ‘America First’ protectionists for key roles in his administration, presaging more confrontation with Beijing, more pressure on Canada, and more work for Asian allies.
During Trump's first administration, European allies — especially “delinquent” NATO members — bore the brunt of his criticisms. Asian partners fared slightly better.
But past performance is no guarantee of future policy: Trump is seen by some as “unpredictable” and “transactional” in crafting policy and prefers one-on-one dealmaking to traditional diplomacy, rendering leader-level talks especially important.
His return to the White House will likely push more Indo-Pacific states towards a ‘hedging’ strategy, balancing influence from Beijing and Washington to blunt the impacts of a more erratic U.S. president.
Ottawa braces for tariffs
Trump suggested on the campaign trail that he would impose a 10 to 20 per cent tariff on all goods flowing into the U.S. — including from Canada — and a 60 per cent tariff on all Chinese goods.
Canada’s trading relationship with the U.S. would likely come under strain if Trump follows through with his heightened China tariffs. Ottawa has largely matched U.S. President Joe Biden’s tariffs on Chinese aluminum, steel, and electric vehicles to “protect” Canadian workers. But matching any broader ‘China tariff’ would likely elicit retaliation by Beijing and raise costs for Canadian consumers and businesses.
Ottawa will have to weigh its desire to stay aligned with the U.S. — the destination for 77.4 per cent of all Canadian exports in 2023 — with upholding rules-based trade and deepening trade relations with Asian states, especially in Southeast Asia.
The day after the U.S. election, Canadian Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland said that, on China, she was “very strongly in agreement” with Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s ex-trade chief, and said she shares U.S. concerns over Beijing’s “intentional overcapacity.”
Lighthizer is expected to play a central role in Trump’s next administration and is reportedly preparing an “aggressive” tariff plan. Trump’s fixation on resolving trade deficits, however, could cause headaches for Asian partners such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Vietnam, all of which boast ever-widening trade surpluses with the U.S.
Trump assembles foreign policy team
On Tuesday, Trump nominated Rep. Michael Waltz, a vocal China hawk who’s likely to pressure Ottawa to boost defence spending, as his national security adviser. Waltz wrote last year that “the [Chinese Communist Party] is in a new cold war with the U.S.,” echoing comments by Sen. Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for secretary of state.
Trump’s defence secretary pick, 44-year-old Fox News host Pete Hegseth, said on a YouTube show that aired last week that “China is building an army specifically dedicated to defeating the U.S.,” and that NATO has been “totally corrupted.”
Waltz appears bullish on India, arguing in 2021 that the U.S. should “form an alliance” with the country, partly to offset China’s influence in Asia. Ottawa, which has relied on Washington’s support in its ongoing diplomatic dispute with New Delhi, could be disadvantaged if Trump is more lenient with his “tremendous friend” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Countering transnational repression and promoting human rights abroad generally are likely to take a back seat under Trump.
The fate of ‘minilateral,’ multilateral groupings
Trump may pay less attention to ASEAN than his predecessor. He may also scuttle Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.
The ‘Quad’ alliance, revived in 2017, appears to have more lasting power, with Trump speaking highly of the initiative in 2020. National security adviser Waltz, meanwhile, appears to support AUKUS, the defence partnership between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.
