Explainer: What a Canada–India CEPA Can (and Cannot) Solve

As Canada seeks to diversify its trade amid growing uncertainty in its economic relationship with the U.S., strengthening its partnership with India has taken on renewed importance. 

India offers significant opportunities for Canadian exports, investment, and co-operation in sectors such as energy, critical minerals, agriculture, and technology. Deepening these ties would expand Canada's access to a major Indo-Pacific market while supporting its broader efforts to strengthen its economic and strategic presence in the region.

Following a diplomatic rupture in 2023–24, Ottawa and New Delhi established a roadmap in 2025 for rebuilding bilateral engagement, with priorities spanning trade, security, energy, technology, mobility, and people-to-people ties. 

This roadmap was reinforced by the relaunch of negotiations towards a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in March 2026. The agreement is expected to be concluded before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Canada on December 11–12.

If the agreement is concluded on time — after just nine months of fresh negotiations — it would be one of the fastest-ever major trade deals negotiated by Canada. Trade talks were initially launched in 2010, stalled in 2017, and eventually paused in 2023. 

Beyond the relaunch of CEPA negotiations, several complementary developments have benefited from the renewed momentum, including the Strategic Energy Partnership (a framework for expanding co-operation on clean energy, critical minerals, and civil nuclear energy), trade missions by both sides, and increased high-level meetings that give this reset substance beyond trade negotiations.

As dialogue continues and trade talks reach the finish line, a crucial question emerges: can Canada and India translate this goodwill into a durable economic partnership? And how much will a CEPA bolster the partnership? 

While the agreement could lower tariffs and make market access more predictable, it likely will not resolve all regulatory hurdles or make proposed energy and resource partnerships commercially viable. The test is therefore whether parallel sector-specific initiatives can convert diplomatic momentum into practical, lasting economic outcomes.

What is CEPA supposed to deliver?

During Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to India in March 2026, both governments established a framework for negotiations, aiming to conclude an agreement by the end of 2026, and committing to increasing bilateral trade to C$70 billion annually by 2030. Negotiators have completed six rounds of talks so far, with the latest round taking place in New Delhi in early November. 

The agreement is now expected to move beyond tariff reductions in goods and services to include clauses on investment, intellectual property, rules of origin, and non-tariff barriers such as regulatory barriers.

The central challenge, however, remains balancing Canada's priorities for greater market access for agricultural and industrial exports with India's objectives of protecting sensitive domestic sectors, supporting domestic manufacturing, and preserving policy flexibility. While both sides have heralded the rapid pace of negotiations, public updates offer limited evidence of specific compromises or chapters concluded. 

Therefore, the parallel initiatives that have emerged over the last year can show where co-operation is already advancing, and can help identify what CEPA should complement, rather than be expected to address by itself.

What roadblocks could CEPA negotiations overcome?

Despite renewed diplomatic momentum and multiple negotiating rounds, a comprehensive trade agreement requires both countries to reconcile competing domestic priorities. Agriculture and industrial market access are the sectors presenting the largest challenges.

Agriculture: Why tariffs are only part of the problem

India is the second-biggest export market for Canadian pulses. But Indian tariffs on related Canadian imports have ranged from a 10 per cent levy on pulses to a 30 per cent tariff on yellow peas. While these tariffs are detrimental to trade, non-tariff barriers can also be consequential. 

Canadian exporters have raised concerns that differences in India's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards (i.e. rules governing food safety and plant and animal health, including fumigation, testing, certification, and maximum residue limits) can create unpredictability about the requirements they must meet to gain access to the Indian market. Ottawa's trade consultation report identifies the need for science-based SPS provisions, continued bilateral technical dialogue, and greater co-operation on labelling and certification to reduce uncertainty.

The treatment of Canadian yellow peas illustrates the uncertainty surrounding access to the Indian market. Despite the existing tariff burden, recent media reports offer conflicting signals about whether duties on pulses might be reduced. 

New Delhi’s frequent tariff-policy shifts likely arise from domestic crop yield patterns affecting its import demand rather than a specific negotiating impasse, and thus a trade deal might not offer lasting tariff relief to Canadian exporters. 

Instead, Ottawa might hope to secure concessions comparable to what has been obtained by its competitors, such as Australia, in this sector. 

Under the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement, the import duty on Australian lentils is five per cent, instead of the standard 10 per cent, based on a quota system of up to a certain amount of lentil supply. The Indian High Commissioner to Canada, Dinesh Patnaik, suggested a similar quota system is in the works for a Canada–India CEPA. 

Industrial trade: Market access versus domestic priorities

Industrial goods present a different challenge. Canadian exporters are seeking more reciprocal access to the Indian market, while broader differences in approaches to domestic manufacturing and industrial development may complicate negotiations.

Rules of origin will be particularly important as they determine whether a product qualifies for lower tariffs depending on its country of origin. Ottawa wants these rules to account for the integration of North American supply chains, in which production can span Canada and the U.S. If the rules do not adequately account for these integrations, some Canadian-made products could struggle to qualify for preferential tariffs when exported to India.

Unlocking sector-specific concessions is also critical and has been difficult to achieve in the past. Canadian aerospace stakeholders wish to preserve the long-standing global “zero-for-zero” tariff regime for civil aircraft and aerospace products, while automotive industry submissions to the federal government have called for reciprocal market access, robust rules of origin reflecting North American integration, recognition of Canadian and U.S. safety standards, and the removal of discriminatory taxes and regulatory barriers.

While India’s automotive market has historically been highly protected, New Delhi’s recent trade agreements show that this protection is somewhat negotiable: the U.K.–India free trade agreement provides tariff-rate quotas under which duties on eligible U.K. vehicles are phased down to 10 per cent from up to 110 per cent, while the EU–India agreement concluded in January 2026 also aims to slash duties to 30 per cent on luxury cars under an annual quota.

Besides trade, services and professional mobility could also prove contentious. India’s recent trade agreements with the U.K. and New Zealand demonstrate its growing focus on overseas market access for its IT and professional services providers, alongside more predictable temporary-entry arrangements and recognition of professional qualifications. These priorities could create friction with Canada over services regulation, labour-market protections, and the movement of professionals.

What are the parallel developments alongside CEPA? 

Aside from CEPA negotiations, Ottawa and New Delhi have made progress in various complementary sectors. These initiatives are evidence of a broader economic relationship taking shape. For example, the two countries relaunched the Ministerial Energy Dialogue in January 2026, and their March Strategic Energy Partnership explicitly identified increased Indian imports of Canadian crude and liquefied natural gas (LNG) as areas for expansion. 

During PM Carney’s visit to India in March, the two governments also established an expanded framework for co-operation across conventional and clean energy, civil nuclear energy, and critical minerals through the finalization of a joint action plan.

At the same time, a C$2.6-billion long-term uranium supply deal between Saskatchewan’s Cameco and India’s Department of Atomic Energy marks a breakthrough in bilateral ties given the turbulent bilateral history of nuclear power. 

Business engagement has also expanded. In October, Canadian International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu led a Team Canada Trade Mission of about 300 Canadian business delegates to India, securing 34 commercial agreements worth close to C$300 million. 

Participating sectors included aerospace, clean technology, energy transition, ICT, life sciences, and agri-food. Earlier, in May 2026, Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal visited Canada with a large business delegation for discussions with Canadian counterparts focused on CEPA, investment, and expanding commercial ties. These exchanges reinforce ongoing negotiations by broadening collaboration to fintech, payments modernization, cross-border remittances, pension funds, and merchant payments.

Beyond trade and energy, the diplomatic reset has also opened space for deeper security and technology co-operation. The launch of negotiations towards a General Security of Information Agreement, announced as part of the renewed bilateral engagement, would provide a framework for sharing intelligence and information across secure channels. 

Such an arrangement would be critical to support more robust forms of co-operation and create greater confidence around projects involving defence-industrial production, cyber security, maritime security, space, AI, and other sensitive technologies. The Australia–Canada–India Technology and Innovation Partnership offers a different channel for trilateral research on artificial intelligence and digital collaboration.

What gaps might remain?

Energy is one of the clearest areas of complementarity between the two economies, but it also illustrates the limits of what a trade agreement can achieve on its own due to gaps in export capabilities and commercial linkages. 

India is seeking to diversify its energy suppliers amid an ongoing geopolitical energy crisis, while Canada is looking to expand exports of its natural resources and strengthen commercial ties with major Asian markets. Canadian crude oil, LNG, uranium, and critical minerals could all feature in a broader economic partnership.

There are, however, significant practical constraints. Patnaik said in June that Canada is under active consideration as a crude supplier, noting how India's newer refineries are built to process heavy crude. 

Several factors, however, constrain that opportunity. Canada's ability to scale up production to meet India’s needs and the readiness to establish long-term offtake arrangements — that is, contracts where an Indian buyer commits to purchasing a specified volume of energy from a Canadian supplier over an extended period — could thwart or complicate such an ambitious partnership.

Shipping Canadian crude to India is also relatively costly and requires long-distance tanker routes from Canada's west coast, while Canada is still expanding its heavy-oil export capacity and LNG infrastructure.

Canada would also face competition from established suppliers such as Russia, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which account for substantial shares of India's crude imports. Venezuela presents another potential competitor, particularly as its heavy crude grades compete directly with Canadian Cold Lake crude, with recent reports suggesting that New Delhi might face greater pressure from Washington to import oil from Venezuela. 

Price, freight costs, and supply reliability will therefore be important determinants of Canada's competitiveness.

Co-operation on critical minerals offers another potential avenue, particularly as India seeks to diversify supply chains and Canada looks to attract investment in resource development and processing. These opportunities, similarly, depend on project economics, financing, infrastructure, and durable commercial demand. 

Can CEPA bridge the gaps?

CEPA’s value will depend on whether it can address specific barriers to trade. Canada needs more predictable access for agricultural exports and workable rules for industrial goods, while energy co-operation requires investment, infrastructure, and long-term supply agreements that a trade deal alone cannot deliver. 

Both governments will therefore need to pair CEPA with targeted sectoral measures to turn political commitments into practical economic gains.

Progress in energy, critical minerals, and business engagement suggests that commercial co-operation can advance even as broader negotiations continue. The question is whether CEPA can build on these sectoral gains by addressing persistent market-access barriers and providing businesses with greater predictability. 

With the year-end deadline approaching, the negotiations will test whether renewed political goodwill can translate into commercially meaningful commitments, and whether those commitments can sustain the relationship beyond its current diplomatic recovery.

Sweekriti Pathak

Sweekriti Pathak is a Researcher on the South Asia team at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and holds a master’s degree in Political Science and International Development from McGill University. Sweekriti's research interests include maritime security and grey-zone competition in the Indo-Pacific.