The Risks of Beijing’s Muddled Middle East Calculus

China is working with Pakistan to end the conflict in the Middle East to reinforce its image as a “responsible and stable” global power, but other diplomatic manoeuvres risk undermining that goal and China’s relations with the U.S. and Gulf states.

Contradictions abound: China is Iran’s biggest trading partner and, according to Washington, “Chinese purchases account for roughly 90 per cent of Iran’s exported oil.” These purchases, worth billions of dollars, help undercut sanctions against Tehran and allow the regime to spend more on military hardware.

Beijing is working to end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which 45–50 per cent of China’s crude-oil imports transit. On Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with his Pakistani counterpart, Ishaq Dar, reiterating “China’s principled position and commending Pakistan for facilitating a temporary ceasefire.” Wang also highlighted a ‘five-point initiative’ drawn up by China and Pakistan on March 31 for “peace and stability” in the Middle East.

But Beijing also wants to preserve its lucrative relationships with embattled Gulf states (worth at least US$257 billion in trade in 2024). This tension was on full display last month, when China and Russia were the sole abstentions on a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning “egregious attacks” by Iran against Gulf states.

Beijing also doesn’t want to risk further delaying a May meeting in Beijing between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

However, CNN reported on Saturday that China was preparing to send anti-air missile systems to Iran. In response, Trump said, “If China does that, China will have big problems, OK?”

Additionally, according to The New York Times, Washington has “assessed that China is secretly [...] allowing some companies to ship chemicals, fuel, and components that can be used in military production to Iran for the war.”