China hosted the leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party this week for the first time in a decade, sidelining Taiwan’s democratically elected government and reigniting debates in Taipei over the ‘right’ approach to China: dialogue, deterrence, or a mix of both.
Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of the Kuomintang (KMT), travelled to China on Tuesday for a six-day trip that includes a meeting with Xi Jinping, Chinese president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.
Since 2016, Beijing has refused to engage with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), first under Tsai Ing-wen and now President William Lai. In February, Beijing called Lai “a peace disruptor, crisis creator, and war instigator.” Lai has said that he is open to talks with Beijing “under the principles of equality and dignity.”
A KMT vice chairman said that Cheng’s visit is “buying time and space for Taiwan by persuading Beijing that there are still people in Taiwan who favour closer ties with China.”
Cheng, who assumed her position in October, framed her trip as a “historic journey for peace.”
In 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese President and KMT member Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore, the first meeting of Taiwanese and Chinese leaders since 1945. Pointedly, Xi and Ma agreed to split the bill for that evening’s dinner of crayfish, fried asparagus, and noodles.
Xi also hosted KMT chairperson Hung Hsiu-chu in China in 2016.
U.S. wades into debate
The DPP said the KMT was “co-operating with the Chinese communists' scheme to weaken Taiwan's defence capabilities.”
Lai and the DPP have tried to pass a special defence budget worth US$40 billion over eight years. The KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party, however, have stalled that budget, with Cheng, for one, arguing that “peace cannot possibly be achieved through defence capabilities alone.”
Last week, a bipartisan delegation of four American senators visited Taiwan. They urged lawmakers to approve Lai's spending package, warning that delays could weaken deterrence as Beijing resumes military activity around the island.
The legislative logjam comes as Taiwan is divided not just over how to handle China politically, but also over how fast (and far) it should move on defence. Complicating matters further, Xi will host U.S. President Donald Trump in May, and will likely try to push Trump away from Taiwan, using Cheng’s visit as proof that Beijing can ‘manage’ cross-strait relations.
Strait talk
Ottawa is expected to sign a Canada–Taiwan trade co-operation framework agreement — finalized in 2025 — sometime this year. In the first 10 months of 2025, bilateral trade amounted to C$5.6 billion, an increase of 6.5 per cent year-over-year.
Both Taiwan and China applied in 2021 to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a 12-member trade pact of which Canada is a member. On paper, China is unlikely to meet the mark; aspirant economies must, among other standards, show a “demonstrated pattern of complying with trade commitments.” In contrast, last year, the executive director of the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei said that “Canada believes Taiwan would make a very good addition to the CPTPP.”
Transits constitute another important element of the Canada–Taiwan relationship. In February, a Canadian defence official said that Canadian vessels would “likely” continue to sail through the Taiwan Strait. The last time a Canadian vessel transited the strait was in September 2025; HMCS Charlottetown, fresh off exercises in Australia, is currently in waters off Indonesia, likely sailing towards the Korean Peninsula for Operation NEON.
