Chery Automobile has become one of China’s most important global automakers. Less well known in North America than BYD or Geely, Chery has nevertheless spent more than two decades building an export-oriented business across emerging and developed markets.
The company’s growing interest in Canada therefore presents both an opportunity and a policy challenge. For Canadian consumers, Chery could offer more affordable vehicles across the internal-combustion, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric-vehicle (EV) spectrum. For Canada’s automotive sector, a Chery investment could make use of existing industrial capacity, create jobs, support after-sales service skills and potentially contribute to supplier development.
But Chery’s business model raises questions that go well beyond market entry. Canadian policymakers must ask not only whether Chery should be permitted to invest, but what Canada wants from such an investment: lower-cost vehicles, revived plant capacity, supplier development, after-sales skills, technology access, or a stronger position in the next automotive economy. The harder question is whether Chery is willing and able, under Chinese law and its own commercial model, to provide these benefits for Canada.
What is Chery?
Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. is a Chinese car manufacturer headquartered in Wuhu, Anhui province, with 150 subsidiaries worldwide. Founded in 1997, it was one of China’s earliest domestically owned automakers and has had global ambitions from the beginning.
Unlike BYD, which is best understood as an integrated battery, clean-technology, and mobility company, Chery is an export-led automaker moving through the transition from internal-combustion engine (ICE) vehicles to hybrids and EVs. Its exports remain heavily weighted toward internal-combustion vehicles, but through its Yaoguang 2025 strategy, Chery is investing heavily in electrification, software, artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced manufacturing.
Chery says it has been China’s largest automobile exporter for more than two decades. In 2025, it reported more than 1.3 million vehicle exports and strong growth in new-energy vehicle (NEV) sales. This export orientation distinguishes Chery from some Chinese competitors that built scale primarily in the domestic market before expanding abroad.
Chery’s relevance to Canada is therefore different from BYD’s. BYD represents the cutting edge of China’s battery-electric vehicle and battery-manufacturing ecosystem. Chery represents something more hybrid: a large-scale global exporter with experience entering difficult overseas markets, reviving or using legacy industrial capacity, and building a broader technology ecosystem that spans vehicles, software, AI, and robotics.
Who owns Chery?
Chery characterizes itself as a non-state-owned enterprise. However, its largest shareholder is Wuhu Investment Holding, which is owned almost entirely by Wuhu Prefecture's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. (1) This pattern of state-backed connections repeats across other shareholders, which include a large number of companies wholly owned by other municipal assets or financial bureaus.
For Canadian policymakers, the key issue is not simply whether Chery is “private” or “state-owned.” It is how much independence the company would have in a Canadian partnership, how decisions would be made, where intellectual property would reside, and how Chinese laws and regulatory approvals would affect technology transfer, data governance, and commercial operations.
How did Chery become an auto-manufacturing leader?
Chery’s rise reflects three interrelated factors: technology acquisition and development, an early global focus, and strategic adaptability.
- Technology acquisition and development
Since its founding, Chery has aggressively pursued technology transfer and know-how to strengthen its products. It was the first Chinese manufacturer to develop a fully domestic engine in 1999 and among the first to integrate in-car voice activation in 2001, notable at the time for a low-cost vehicle like the Chery QQ.
However, its technology ambitions were not without controversy. General Motors sued Chery in 2004 over claims that the Chery QQ copied the design of the Chevrolet Spark. One year later, the companies settled the lawsuit without disclosing the terms of their agreement.
More recently, Chery has deepened partnerships with Chinese technology companies including Huawei, ZTE, Horizon Robotics, and iFLYTEK. Chery also invests heavily in its own R&D with centres located in Brazil, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, and Spain, as well as establishing separate research institutions, such as Nextai and MOJIA Robotics.
These investments are intended to strengthen Chery’s full production stack: design, software, automation, manufacturing, and user experience. They also move Chery beyond being a conventional automaker toward a broader mobility and technology company.
- Global focus
While domestic competitors prioritized volume at home, a central tenet of Chery’s original strategy was producing domestic products for global export. Chery pursued Russia, the Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa — with first exports to Syria in 2002.
That early global footprint likely provided a meaningful cushion as the domestic market heated up in the 2010s and Chery shed assets to stay competitive, while its export revenue helped offset some of the pressure. This same global footprint likely also helps Chery accelerate its expansion efforts in the area of NEVs, which began in the early 2020s.
- Strategic adaptability
Chery has also shown an ability to regroup when strategies stop working. In the 2010s, facing domestic competition and brand-quality concerns, it consolidated its brand strategy, focused more on product quality, and brought in external investment and joint ventures to strengthen corporate governance.
The same adaptability is visible in its overseas strategy. Chery’s model has evolved from simply “going out” through exports to "going in" through local partners, dealer networks, assembly operations, after-sales service, and, in some cases, local manufacturing. While still in early days, this willingness to change and adapt appears to lead to positive traction in new markets.
For Canada, this strategic adaptability is both an asset and a risk. Chery may be more willing than some competitors to adapt to local requirements. But Canada would need to define those requirements clearly. Otherwise, Chery’s adaptation may serve its own market-entry strategy more than Canada’s industrial objectives.
How does Chery approach international partnerships?
Chery’s international playbook has been refined over two decades. The sequence varies by market, but several patterns are clear.
Chery often uses exports to build brand recognition and test demand. In emerging markets, it has tended to enter directly or through local distributors. In more mature markets, it often relies on established dealers, importers, or local partners before making larger commitments.
Chery also targets underutilized legacy capacity rather than relying on greenfield investment. Its Spanish joint venture with Ebro, based at a former Nissan plant, began operations in 2024. At the opening of the plant in April 2026, Chery announced it operates in 18 European markets. Chery also acquired another former Nissan plant in South Africa with production targeted for end of 2027, manufacturing ICE vehicles and potentially NEVs for African and European export. In the U.K., it plans to open an R&D centre in Liverpool and has signed a non-binding agreement with Nissan to use its Sunderland plant in northeast England.
This approach gives Chery political appeal. Governments facing plant closures, industrial underuse, or pressure to preserve automotive jobs may see Chery as a route to restarting production. But it also means the benefits depend heavily on the terms of the deal: employment guarantees, production volumes, supplier integration, local-content requirements, R&D commitments, and export-market access.
Canada appears to be following the early-stage version of this pattern. After Prime Minister Mark Carney’s agreement with China allowing a limited number of Chinese-built EVs into Canada at a reduced tariff rate, Chery moved quickly to explore dealership relationships. It has also filed Canadian trademark applications for several brands, including Omoda, Jaecoo, and Jetour. Chery executives have indicated that sales could begin in late 2026, subject to regulatory approvals. About 20 Canadian dealers attended the unveiling of the Freelander 8, an electrified SUV developed by Chery and its joint-venture partner Jaguar Land Rover.
What can Canada learn from Chery’s experience abroad?
Spain: restarting legacy capacity
Spain is the clearest example of Chery using an existing industrial asset to support its European expansion. In April 2024, Chery and Spain’s Ebro-EV Motors signed an agreement to produce vehicles at the former Nissan plant in Barcelona’s Zona Franca, a site that had become a symbol of industrial loss after Nissan ended production there. The deal was presented by Spanish authorities as a reindustrialization project: a way to bring production back, recover jobs, and position Spain as an important base for Chinese EV manufacturing in Europe.
However, early production has centred on Ebro-branded SUVs using a Chery-shared platform and technology, with initial assembly relying on semi-assembled vehicles shipped from China. Chery’s own production at the Barcelona plant has also faced delays, with commercial considerations and the EU tariff environment for Chinese-made EVs cited as factors. The project carries ambitious targets — including 50,000 vehicles by 2027, 150,000 by 2029, and roughly 1,250 jobs — but those production, employment, and localization commitments will take years to verify.
For Canada, the lesson is clear: restarting a plant could be valuable, but it is not enough. Ottawa would need to know whether a Chery-backed facility would assemble imported kits or manufacture major components; whether it would integrate Canadian suppliers or depend on Chinese inputs; whether Canadian workers would gain durable skills or only limited assembly work; and whether Canadian partners would gain any control over engineering, software, batteries, intellectual property, or export rights. Reindustrialization should mean more than putting a closed plant back into use. It should build capabilities Canada can retain.
Brazil: partnership does not guarantee durability
Brazil offers a cautionary example. In 2017, Chery entered into a partnership with CAOA, a major Brazilian automotive distribution and manufacturing group, creating CAOA Chery and presenting the venture as a Brazilian automaker with Chinese partnership. The arrangement helped strengthen Chery’s local brand presence and sales network, and the partnership produced a range of vehicles for the Brazilian market.
However, the limits of local partnership became clear at Chery’s manufacturing base in Jacareí, in São Paulo state. Originally opened by Chery in 2014 and later operated under CAOA Chery, the plant suspended production in 2022. The company said the pause was intended to modernize the facility and prepare it for hybrid and EV production by 2025. But the suspension generated significant labour uncertainty, with hundreds of workers affected and the union describing the move as effectively a closure. As of now, the promised restart has not materialized. Brazilian reporting described the plant as idle and politically contested, with local authorities pressing for a concrete plan to resume production or repurpose the site.
What Canada can take from Brazil's experience is that local partnership language does not guarantee durable production, stable employment, or successful technology transition. If Canada were to consider a Chery-backed investment, Ottawa would need enforceable commitments on production timelines, employment retention, supplier integration, technology access, and plant-continuity obligations.
South Africa: takeover of a struggling plant
South Africa provides the most recent example of Chery taking over underused legacy capacity. Nissan announced in January 2026 that it would sell its Rosslyn manufacturing assets to Chery’s South African arm. Earlier this month, Chery formally took over the plant, committed to retaining its 692 existing employees, and said it would invest in upgrades and new machinery before beginning production in mid-2027. It has also said it wants to develop South Africa as an African hub for manufacturing, exports, R&D, and regional operations, with Rosslyn becoming a broader auto centre that includes R&D, supply-chain operations, and training. Chery has launched a localization program aimed at moving toward 40 per cent local content in the initial stage.
The deal shows how Chery can turn market entry into a deeper local presence. Four years after re-entering South Africa, Chery had become a top-10 player in local sales, with an expanding dealer network. The Rosslyn takeover gives it a manufacturing foothold to support that growth and potentially serve broader African and export markets. However, the extent to which local manufacturing will lift the broader South African component industry remains an open question. While Chery committed to 40 per cent local value-added by 2028, at the same time key EV and intelligent-system components will still be sourced from Chinese suppliers.
For Canada, this is the most relevant lesson. A Chery investment could potentially revive or repurpose existing automotive capacity, but the value would depend on whether Canada secures measurable commitments: employment retention, local-content targets, Canadian supplier integration, workforce training, R&D activity, export plans, and accountability if commitments are missed. South Africa shows what should be negotiated up front and what will still need to be verified over time.
Does Chery transfer technology to overseas partners?
The evidence to date suggests that Chery’s overseas partnerships are more likely to provide operational know-how than independent technological capability.
The Tata Motors example in India illustrates the distinction. Despite early reports suggesting the agreement would include platform-level technology transfer, both Chery and Tata moved quickly to deny this claim. This was likely a response calibrated to satisfy Chinese regulatory requirements, which in recent years have significantly tightened restrictions on outbound technology transfer across automotive and related sectors.
What Tata's team described gaining was operational rather than proprietary: factory and production-line layouts, technology roadmaps, and access to Chery's supplier network. The distinction is material — process visibility is not platform IP.
For Canada, this distinction is central. A Canadian company could be the majority owner of a local venture and still remain technologically dependent on Chery. Chery could continue to control the platform, software, battery architecture, engineering specifications, brand, and high-value components.
What could Chery investment realistically offer Canada?
Chery operates across the full ICE-to-NEV spectrum while simultaneously pursuing deployable frontier technologies. Collaboration with the company therefore presents opportunities that could expand well beyond strengthening Canada’s auto-sector. However, this breadth also creates acute risks. The technology dimensions in particular move fast and deploy into consequential domains, raising concerns that extend well beyond the EV sector and that Canadian frameworks are not yet in place to address. The four areas below map both sides of that equation.
- R&D, AI, and robotics
Chery’s technology ambitions extend well beyond automobiles. Some jokingly refer to Chery as a robotics company making cars on the side. The company is also taking AI seriously and pursuing AI integration into all levels of its operations. It is aggressively investing in AI research through its R&D centres and independent research institutes. At its January 2026 “AI Night,” Chery framed this as the inevitable extension of a unified technology base, grouping vehicle innovation and humanoid robotics together across its nine priority research domains.
That convergence is already happening through ventures such as AiMOGA Robotics — described as Chery's "secret weapon" for the future. AiMOGA deployed the first purpose-built humanoid in its policing line in Wuhu, where it acts as a traffic officer. The company frames this as the next stage in its robotics family, alongside its humanoid robot deployed in more than 30 countries. In 2025, AiMOGA began selling humanoid robots and robot dogs to consumers, built on technology shared with Chery’s vehicle platforms.
Chery’s AI and robotics ambitions show why Chinese automotive investment can no longer be treated as a narrow auto-sector question. The same data, software, sensors, and AI systems that power connected vehicles can also support robotics, public-service applications, industrial automation, and surveillance-relevant technologies.
While joint R&D could benefit Canadian researchers and help address the adoption gap identified in Canada's AI strategy, it raises critical concerns: ownership of intellectual property and research outcomes, data protection, and — most acutely — how that research is deployed. As Chery's traffic-police deployment illustrates, applications can scale quickly into domains where Canadian and Chinese regulatory values diverge sharply, compounding the already significant challenge of governing AI and emerging technologies.
- Industrial development
Chery’s willingness to use underutilized plants could be attractive to Canada. It may offer a way to preserve automotive employment, use existing facilities, and attract new production at a time when Canada’s automotive sector faces intense competitive pressures. However, the quality of that industrial development would depend on the scope of the operation.
Chery's overseas operations have delivered some production line improvements, which could benefit Canada’s auto industry. But job creation has been much more mixed. In proposals to Australia, Chery has indicated that any manufacturing plant it might establish would be largely robotics-driven, which significantly limits employment upside.
Chery's express commitment to localize supply chains could benefit Canadian suppliers — but two decades of overseas operations offer limited evidence it happens in practice.
The bar set by others in the same market makes the gap more striking. Chery entered Egypt in 2005 — a gateway to African markets — and opened two manufacturing plants in the mid-2010s, yet its own website still describes vehicles like the Tiggo 4 Pro as being "assembled" in Egypt, pointing to continued reliance on imported parts. Other manufacturers operating in Egypt have reported achieved localization rates of up to 50 per cent.
Production presence does not automatically mean supply chain integration, and supply chain integration does not automatically mean jobs at scale.
- After-sales service
While Chery's playbook does not include any substantive technology transfer, after-sales service is one potential area for knowledge-sharing that is in Chery's interest. It is a priority on two levels: commercially, as part of Chery's effort to build its brand image by improving servicing of its vehicles; and politically as Beijing has recognized after-sales servicing as a key risk for Chinese EV companies.
The scarcity of EV servicing skills is a challenge shared across China and overseas markets. Despite leading the world in EV sales, China faces a talent shortfall of over one million EV service workers, with 80 per cent of the gap in after-sales services. Chery is already training overseas technicians and in 2026 launched its 5th Global After-Sales Skills Competition, running technicians through national, regional, and global rounds culminating at the Chery Super Factory in Wuhu.
Canada has a leapfrog opportunity — building EV servicing capacity alongside Chinese workers at a moment when both countries are figuring this out together.
- Affordability and product-market fit
Chery could offer Canadian consumers more affordable vehicles across a range of propulsion systems, including hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and EVs. Chery's position in the ICE-to-NEV transition may be better aligned with Canadian infrastructure realities than NEV-first competitors like BYD. ICE vehicles still account for 58.1 per cent of Chery's revenue, and its expanding hybrid lineup offers a credible on-ramp for consumers in markets where charging infrastructure remains underdeveloped.
What safeguards must be in place before considering Chery investment?
The four safeguards identified in our previous analysis of BYD remain the baseline for any Chinese automotive investment in Canada: business structure and market viability, labour standards, privacy and data protection, and civil-rights protections. Chery’s model adds further considerations around legacy plant use, after-sales service and frontier technologies.
- R&D and data governance
Chery’s business model, operating across the full technology stack — from vehicle platforms to deployable frontier AI — illustrates how EV collaborations could have consequences well beyond the automotive sector, necessitating additional safeguards that should be considered for any collaboration. In particular, Chery’s strategy of sharing technology across vehicles and frontier AI applications, in particular robotics, presents potential challenges extending beyond the EV sector.
Two issues demand particular attention:
- Digital sovereignty: Ensuring Canadian data is stored in Canada and governed in accordance with Canadian values and laws.
- Deployment risk: Canada's AI Strategy currently focuses on tracking emerging risks and evaluating models; it must move faster and further to grapple with technologies already in the field. Chery's Xiaoqi assistant, for instance, is designed with interactive, human-like memory frameworks capable of reading human emotions. The volume of data it will collect, and the inferences it could draw, raise questions about use that go well beyond what existing frameworks were built to answer.
- After-sales services
Servicing vehicles requires access to how they are built and the data they generate — an opening for Canadian job creation and skills development that maps directly onto the shared challenge identified above. But that access may not come voluntarily. Australia had to compel Chinese EV companies — including BYD, Zeekr, XPeng, Smart, and Leapmotor — to comply with its Motor Vehicle Service and Repair Information Sharing Scheme Act 2021 before independent repair shops could access the technical information they needed.
Canada's 2024 Copyright Act amendments are a start but fall well short of Australia's comprehensive framework on after-sales servicing. Closing that gap — through specifications on information access standards, pricing parity, and bundling prohibitions — is the regulatory condition Canada would need to turn the leapfrog opportunity into reality.
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(1) According to Chery’s 2025 IPO filings, Wuhu Investment Holding is 95.59 per cent owned by Wuhu SASAC and 4.41 per cent owned by the Anhui Provincial Department of Finance. SASACs were established in the early 2000s to oversee and manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China and represent the government on their boards.
• Edited by: Ted Fraser, Senior Editor, APF Canada
