China is the second-largest importer of Canadian agricultural goods after the U.S., accounting for roughly one-tenth of Canada’s agri-food exports. Even in 2025, in the throes of a trade dispute, Canadian exports of farm, fishing, and intermediate food products to China amounted to approximately C$5.87 billion.
China’s vast market and rapid advances in agri-tech, from new ‘climate-resilient’ crop and seed varieties to AI-driven farm management, appear to align with Canada’s own food security priorities, making it a tempting partner as Canada looks to diversify beyond the U.S.
Yet Beijing’s policy direction gives reason for caution. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has prioritized self-reliance across the entire agricultural supply chain — from seed resilience to distribution efficiency (or, in the words of the CCP, “from farmland to table”). Beijing’s agricultural policy priorities could undermine the long-term prospects for Canadian agricultural exports to China and the scope for agri-tech collaboration between Canadian and Chinese partners.
A clear-eyed approach to bilateral agricultural trade requires an understanding of China’s food security strategy, and how its use of agri-tech to support self-reliance cuts both ways — imposing limits on market access but also opening new areas for collaboration.
What is China’s food security strategy?
China is among the world’s largest importers of agricultural goods.
Beijing’s policymakers see that import dependence as a vulnerability. In 2013, shortly after coming to power, Xi Jinping framed China’s dependence on imported food as a national security risk, a view codified in 2015 when “food security” was written into China’s National Security Law.
This food security strategy has evolved since 2012 into two overarching goals: self-sufficiency across as much of the agricultural chain as possible and further diversification of its suppliers.
Beijing’s approach can be grouped into five broad themes:
- Broadened scope of self-sufficiency. No longer limited to grain production, Beijing now seeks to become almost entirely self-reliant across a broad range of edible foods, most notably proteins and oilseeds, which include canola.
- Protecting land and boosting its productive capacity. A growing body of rules and policies is intended to preserve China’s limited arable land and farm it more productively and sustainably. Beijing is also investing heavily in food sources beyond traditional farmland: deserts, forests, rivers, lakes, and seas, along with indoor facilities such as greenhouses and lab-grown food.
- Seed revitalization. Described as the "chips" of the agricultural sector, Beijing has made developing a domestic supply of resilient, diverse seed stock a high priority. It is pursuing similar gains in livestock breeding.
- Supporting local producers. Income guarantees, price stabilization, insurance, and disaster mitigation measures are intended to incentivize farmers. Sustained public investment in agricultural science and technology targets efficiency gains to offset a declining rural workforce.
- Integration into global markets. Beijing is promoting Chinese agricultural exports, showcasing domestic agri-tech and systems at international trade events, deepening ties in the Global South, and cultivating multinational food enterprises capable of competing globally.
Technology runs through all five of these themes. Beijing sees innovation, from biotech seeds to intelligent machinery, as essential to producing more food on limited land with a shrinking farm workforce.
Canada’s new national security strategy likewise places technology and food security at the heart of national resilience, while emphasizing the need to build and protect these capabilities at home. That shared priority creates room for collaboration, but it must be pursued carefully and in step with Canada’s security interests.
How is China using technology in its agricultural sector?
Technology is fundamental to achieving the CCP’s food security goals. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, approved earlier this year, sets ambitious targets for agricultural modernization. This includes advancing biotechnology and gene editing, developing synthetic proteins, and establishing leading agricultural technology enterprises. The State Council’s National Smart Agriculture Action Plan sets an explicit goal of raising agricultural production informatization (the intensive use of information and communication technologies across the full agricultural chain) to over 30 per cent by the end of 2026 and to 32 per cent by the end of 2028.
China’s technology-driven approach to a more self-sufficient agricultural sector fits within the broader policy framework of New Quality Productive Forces (NQPF), a Party policy introduced by Xi in 2023 that prioritizes innovation over capital investment to drive growth.
The National Development and Reform Commission, a ministerial-level department responsible for implementing Party policies, frames NQPF development around four guiding principles: innovation-driven, reform-oriented, adaptation to local conditions (因地制宜), and building new growth drivers before phasing out old ones.
In the agriculture sector, NQPF aims to improve labour quality, upgrade production tools, expand what can be produced and where, and facilitate partnerships between research institutions and farmers, shrinking the gap between research and application.
While a relatively new concept, the effects of NQPF’s focus on technology over investment can already be seen in helping China reach the following food security goals:
- Expanded land use
In hilly and mountainous regions, where large machinery is difficult to deploy, drones are used to map and monitor crops in hard-to-reach places. The information is then transmitted to ground equipment to guide more precise field operations, such as targeted fertilization and weed control. This digital mapping of China’s vast and varied farmland will help companies and farmers tailor technology to local conditions and improve productivity in areas that are hard to farm.
In addition to expanding land use, advances in breeding technology extend beyond seeds to aquaculture, part of the push to build a “blue granary” (藍色糧倉). As of August 2026, more than 150 new aquatic varieties had been approved. China has also developed its own stock of Atlantic salmon eggs, reducing reliance on imports from Norway and Canada, and researchers in Fujian Province in China’s southeast have developed a higher-yielding variety of edible seaweed. Shrimp breeding has had similar gains: genomic selection, disease-free breeding programs have cut production costs by 50 per cent.
- Seed revitalization and strategic crops
Since 2022, several policies have prioritized expanding oilseed production, and Beijing now aims for a “reasonable level of self-sufficiency” in oilseeds such as canola (known in China as rapeseed). Advances in crop breeding have produced new strains of soybean, canola, wheat, and rice that can grow on land once considered unsuitable for farming, including soil with high levels of salt. Chinese researchers report developing salt-tolerant soybeans and canola that give farmers higher yields, along with early-maturing canola varieties that can be planted between harvests, adding an extra crop to the annual cycle.
Researchers in China are also working to make seeds more resilient. In 2026, the China National Rice Research Institute reportedly identified a gene that could extend the storage life of rice seeds. This could significantly cut waste, since an estimated 25 to 33 per cent of stored seeds lose viability each year.
- Supporting local producers
China Agricultural University’s “Shennong” large language model, trained on agricultural texts and on-farm data, supports dozens of AI agents specialized in breeding, planting, livestock, and remote sensing. One corn farmer using field sensors linked to a Shennong-based agent cut management costs from about 480 Chinese yuan to under 400 yuan per mu (0.1647 acres), saving roughly C$103 per acre in the test area. For comparison, Ontario’s 2026 budget puts the total cost of growing an acre of corn at about C$875; similar savings would be more than one-tenth of a Canadian grower’s costs.
In other pilots, AI agents based on the Shennong model have shortened lettuce-breeding cycles from five years to two and reduced pesticide use by 15 per cent at farms where new technologies are being tested. Beidahuang Group’s “Future Farm” platform, meanwhile, uses satellite sensing to give farmers real-time updates, enabling them to manage their fields remotely with greater precision than in the past.
Finally, AI, drones, and automated systems can increase the amount of land each worker can manage. These technologies make tasks such as irrigation more efficient and help farmers monitor and respond to changing field conditions, which improves crop yields. In Heilongjiang Province, crop-protection drones were used in 94.3 per cent of farm operations as of 2024, up from 3.4 per cent, carrying out seeding, fertilizing, weeding, and pest and disease control.
What are Canada’s opportunities in China’s agricultural sector?
- Short-term relief from U.S. trade war tensions
Amid the ongoing trade war with the U.S., which until recently received 61.9 per cent of Canadian agricultural exports, alternative markets are valuable.
The lifting of tariffs by Beijing on select agricultural goods in March 2026 brought immediate benefits to Canadian farmers. In the first half of 2026, exports of canola seed and peas subsequently rose 19.4 and 39.6 per cent, respectively. The two-year extension of most-favoured-nation access, announced on November 4, 2026, now offers a measure of certainty to Canadian canola, pea, and seafood producers.
However, given China’s efforts to create an agricultural industry that supports its self-reliance in feeding itself, including "reasonable self-sufficiency" in oilseeds such as canola, it is unclear how much longer China will remain a market for the types of agricultural products Canada exports.
If the publicly reported pilot projects indicate anything, it is the Party’s determination to meet its goal by the 2030 deadline. Moreover, tariffs have not been lifted in other critical agricultural areas, including pork, of which China is the world’s largest consumer.
- Responding to China’s deficit of trust in food safety
One area where China’s food security strategy has fallen short is building up consumers’ trust in the safety of food produced in China. This is despite significant CCP efforts to improve food safety standards and regulations. The opacity of China’s authoritarian governance structure, combined with ongoing concerns about corruption, makes this a difficult obstacle to overcome.
Chinese consumers are becoming increasingly discerning in their food choices, including actively scrutinizing ingredient lists and additives and generally demanding healthier products. Canada’s advantage as a food exporter is its reputation for regulatory capacity in preventive food safety management and supply-chain traceability. Its Safe Food for Canadians Regulations require hazard controls, documented traceability, and regular recall simulations, which are particularly relevant to China’s pre-made dishes sector.
Moreover, despite its drive to achieve self-sufficiency, China remains a net importer of higher-value processed foods and beverages. This offers a potentially more durable entry point for Canadian processed foods, which benefit from a well-trusted regulatory system. Made-in-Canada branding can be effective in building a consumer base in China.
Canadian firms specializing in niche products illustrate what success in China can look like. Quebec-based Citadelle Cooperative, one of the world’s largest suppliers of all-natural maple syrup and organic dried fruits, targets health-conscious consumers in China. Ontario’s Pillitteri Estates Winery, a leading producer and exporter of VQA ice wine, has sold in China since the late 1990s. Pillitteri markets its ice wine as a luxury gift, works with Chinese importers on customized and private-label products that help them compete in a crowded premium market, and lets Chinese tourists visiting Ontario ship wine directly home. Both companies make niche products in which Canada is a leading producer. Their experience shows that even smaller firms that keep their operations in Canada can, with a clear strategy and long-term investment in partnerships, succeed.
- Agri-tech collaboration
Canada, like China, sees technology as key to its food security. Canada’s National Food Security Strategy, released in June 2026, relies on technology to make agriculture more productive and resilient, offsetting a shrinking pool of farmers and reducing dependence on imported food. China’s work on resilient, higher-yielding seeds addresses Canadian concerns about projected risks to grain yields, while its advances in greenhouses and lab-grown food are relevant to Canada’s reliance on imported fruits and vegetables.
Collaboration is already underway. Several applied research programs and graduate students in Canadian biotechnology are funded by Syngenta, which is owned by Sinochem Holdings, a Chinese state-owned enterprise.
But this is sensitive territory. Canada’s national security strategy, The Plan for a Stronger Canada, released in October 2026, names emerging technologies, biotechnology, and food security among eight sectors where Canada must build its own strategic capabilities. Agri-tech collaboration with China touches all three, and both governments regulate it closely.
On the Chinese side, food security is treated as a national security matter, so partnerships face heavy state oversight. Under China’s Seed Law, sharing germplasm resources abroad, or researching them jointly with foreign institutions, requires government approval and a benefit-sharing plan. Partners may have to file detailed information with Chinese regulators. Where the underlying technology is Chinese-owned and only licensed to Canadian users, access could also be cut off during a trade dispute.
Satellites, sensors, and other farm equipment collect vast amounts of data, so any deployment of Chinese-affiliated agri-tech in Canada must be carefully structured. While Canada’s Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern requires heightened scrutiny of biotechnology research, these restrictions apply only to federally funded university research.
Similar standards should apply to public- and private-sector collaborations, requiring the disclosure of partners and funding as well as safeguards against sensitive research being shared or diverted to military use. Oversight should continue at every stage rather than a one-time check, since the data collected grows as projects move from research to testing and commercial use. Protected data should also remain on Canadian servers, and licensing terms should ensure Canadian users cannot be cut off for political reasons.
What comes next in Canada–China agricultural trade?
Beijing’s suspension of tariffs on select Canadian agricultural goods in March 2026 was part of a broader commitment negotiated by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his January 2026 visit to Beijing, the first by a Canadian prime minister in eight years and framed as a recalibration of the bilateral relationship.
The two-year extension of that access, announced through the ministerial-level Joint Economic and Trade Commission on November 4, 2026, now offers Canadian canola, pea, and seafood producers a degree of certainty. Yet the structure of China’s food import strategy means that certainty has limits.
China’s push to diversify food imports it cannot produce at home is a double-edged sword. While this policy keeps the Chinese market open to foreign producers, it caps how much any one of them can supply, so that China never becomes dependent on a single source. That lack of dependence makes it easier for Beijing to cut off imports during trade negotiations or political disputes.
In 2025, China imposed a 100 per cent tariff on canola oil, meal, and peas and a nearly 80 per cent anti-dumping tariff on canola seeds, widely seen as retaliation for Canada following the U.S. in imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Beijing then turned to Australia and India for canola. Similarly, during its trade dispute with Australia, triggered by Canberra’s call for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, China replaced Australian beef, barley, and coal with supplies from other countries, such as the U.S.
The Plan for a Stronger Canada makes diversifying Canada’s economic and security ties a priority. That means finding more markets for Canadian exports and reducing reliance on any single source of imports. Diversification is one side of the coin. The other is what Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-tank, calls collective resilience. Countries that lack dominant control over a good can “band together to send a credible deterrent signal.” If China uses a product as leverage, other countries would refuse to sell to China or would step in to buy from the targeted country.
Canada needs both diversification and collective resilience to limit the potential for, and impact of, economic coercion. While this requires exporters to accept short-term commercial costs, it leads to greater stability and resilience in export chains overall.
• Edited by Erin Williams, Acting Vice-President, Research, and Ted Fraser, Managing Editor, APF Canada.
