This is a written submission to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Review of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy by APF Canada’s Vice-President Research & Strategy, Vina Nadjibulla, supplementary to her appearance before the Committee on May 27, 2026.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) was a necessary step change in Canada’s engagement with one of the most consequential regions of the world. The fundamental assumption behind the strategy was sound in 2022, and it is even more relevant today: Canada’s prosperity, security, and influence require deeper and more sustained engagement with the Indo-Pacific.
This is the region driving global growth, innovation, energy demand, digital transformation, and technological competition. It is also the region where the most consequential geopolitical tensions are playing out — including China’s rise, India’s growing influence, maritime insecurity, economic coercion, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and intensifying strategic competition.
On balance, the IPS has delivered real progress. Canada is more present, more visible, and more plugged into regional networks than at any time in recent memory. New offices have opened. Ministerial and prime ministerial engagement has increased. Team Canada trade missions are bringing large delegations to the region. Canada has elevated relations with ASEAN. And the Canadian Armed Forces now operate in the region at a more sustained tempo.
These are real shifts, and they matter. In the Indo-Pacific, consistency is noticed. Showing up matters.
But presence is a means, not an end. The test now is whether Canada can turn its expanded footprint into tangible benefits for Canadian prosperity, security, and influence.
That is where the next phase of the strategy must focus. The IPS has helped Canada build a stronger platform. Now Canada needs to use that platform to deliver results: more resilient trade, deeper partnerships, stronger supply chains, greater energy and technology co-operation, more effective security contributions, and a clearer role for Canada in shaping regional outcomes.
This task has become more urgent because the world has changed significantly since the strategy was launched. The Indo-Pacific is more central, but also more contested. The United States remains Canada’s most important partner, but it is less predictable and reliable. China remains economically indispensable, but also a source of significant national and economic security risk. India’s scale and geopolitical weight have become even more important. Energy security, technology competition, cyber threats, and critical minerals supply chains have all moved closer to the centre of foreign policy.
In light of these shifts, the next phase of the IPS should move beyond simply expanding Canada’s presence. It should update the core policy settings that will determine whether Canada can be relevant, effective, and consequential in the region.
China and Taiwan
The China and Taiwan chapters of the IPS need to be updated to reflect the world as it is now.
On China, the original strategy’s diagnosis was broadly correct and remains relevant. The IPS identified China as an increasingly disruptive global power, one whose actions pose challenges to Canadian interests, regional stability, economic security, human rights, and the rules-based order. That assessment has not become less true since 2022. If anything, concerns around economic coercion, cyber operations, foreign interference, transnational repression, military pressure in the region, and supply-chain vulnerabilities have become more salient.
But while the diagnosis remains relevant, Canada’s approach to managing relations with China must evolve to reflect the broader shifts in the global order, the unreliability of the United States, Canada’s own vulnerabilities, and the urgent need to expand its room for manoeuvre. In that context, the government’s recalibration toward selective engagement with China is necessary. Canada needs functioning channels with Beijing. We have interests in stabilizing the relationship and engaging where it serves Canadian priorities, including in agriculture, energy, climate, public health, trade, and certain multilateral issues.
But selective engagement cannot become quiet accommodation. It must not mean political acquiescence, self-censorship, or a softening of Canada’s own rules. It must be interest-based, disciplined, and bounded by clear guardrails. Canada should be prepared to engage China where interests align, but it must also be equally clear about where co-operation is not appropriate and where Canadian law, values, and security interests must prevail.
That means stronger guardrails on foreign interference, transnational repression, forced labour, cyber threats, investment screening, research security, sensitive technologies, critical infrastructure, data governance, and supply-chain integrity. It also means avoiding new forms of strategic dependence on the Chinese market, particularly in sectors where Canada has already experienced the consequences of economic coercion (like canola).
A mature China policy is not one that avoids all friction with Beijing. Some friction is inevitable. The real test is whether Canada can engage China where interests align while holding the line where Canadian sovereignty, security, laws, and principles require it.
Taiwan should be addressed separately and explicitly in the next phase of the IPS.
Canada’s substantive relationship with Taiwan should not be reduced, slowed, or treated as a bargaining chip in the recalibration with Beijing. Canada’s One China policy provides ample room for practical engagement with Taiwan, and that space should be used confidently.
Taiwan is a major economy, a critical technology partner, a vibrant democracy, and an essential actor in semiconductor, cyber, and supply-chain resilience. It is also a partner with which Canada has already built meaningful momentum under the IPS. That progress should continue.
Canada should move forward with practical co-operation with Taiwan in trade, investment, technology, education, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, health security, democratic resilience, and supply-chain security. This should include the early signing of the long-negotiated trade facilitation arrangement and continued support for parliamentary, academic, business, and Track 1.5 engagement. Canada should continue transits through the Taiwan Strait with allies and partners as part of a broader commitment to international law, freedom of navigation, and regional stability.
The point is not to provoke China. The point is to ensure that Canada’s Taiwan policy is guided by Canadian interests, not by anticipatory self-restraint. Reducing engagement with Taiwan will not produce stability in Canada-China relations. It will only narrow Canada’s own room for manoeuvre and risk signalling that pressure works.
A revised IPS should therefore do two things at once: support a pragmatic, interest-based China policy with enforceable guardrails, and deepen substantive engagement with Taiwan in ways that are consistent with Canada’s existing policy and clearly aligned with Canadian interests.
India, Energy, Digital Trade and Services
On India, Canada needs to move beyond crisis management and episodic engagement. India’s scale, growth, energy needs, technological capacity, and geopolitical weight make it indispensable to any serious Indo-Pacific strategy. But turning the current reset into a durable partnership will require much deeper India competence across government, business, universities, provinces, and civil society.
The IPS also needs a much stronger energy dimension. Canada can be more relevant to the Indo-Pacific if it is seen as a reliable provider of both conventional and clean energy. LNG, LPG uranium, critical minerals, hydrogen, clean technology, and energy services should be treated not only as commercial opportunities, but as strategic assets. Energy security can be a lever of Canadian relevance in the region.
The strategy should also elevate digital trade and services, as well as universities, innovation, and technology partnerships. Too much of Canada’s Indo-Pacific economic conversation still focuses on goods exports. Those are essential, but the fastest-growing opportunities are also in services, digital infrastructure, AI, quantum, education, research partnerships, and talent mobility. Canada’s universities and colleges are strategic assets in the region and should be treated that way.
On security, Canada will not be a major military actor in the Indo-Pacific. But we can be a useful, trusted, and capable security partner. Canada should focus on areas where we bring niche value: maritime domain awareness, Dark Vessel Detection, cyber resilience, sanctions enforcement, training, defence diplomacy, and regular participation in regional exercises.
Linking Indo-Pacific Strategy to Broader Canadian Foreign Policy and Domestic Economic Resilience
The next phase of the IPS must also be linked to a broader Canadian foreign policy strategy. Canada’s regional and thematic strategies cannot sit in separate boxes. The Indo-Pacific Strategy must connect to Arctic policy, Euro-Atlantic engagement, development policy, defence policy, and economic security strategy. The Arctic connects to North Pacific security.
Finally, the IPS must be linked directly to Canada’s domestic economic resilience agenda. Critical minerals, energy infrastructure, major projects, defence industrial strategy, AI, quantum, cyber resilience, investment attraction, and export diversification are not separate from Indo-Pacific policy. They are central to it. The Indo-Pacific is one of the main arenas where Canada’s domestic economic strategy will either succeed or fall short.
Recommendations for the Committee
1. Launch an Indo-Pacific Strategy Phase Two — evolution, not reinvention.
Canada should not discard the current Indo-Pacific strategy or start from scratch. That would risk losing momentum and signalling inconsistency to partners. But the government should launch a sharper second phase as soon as possible, and no later than early 2027, with fewer priorities, additional dedicated resources, and measurable outcomes.
2. Make economic resilience the organizing logic of the next phase.
The IPS should be explicitly framed around Canada’s prosperity, security, and sovereignty. Diversification should not simply mean more trade; it should mean deeper and more resilient positions in strategic sectors such as energy, critical minerals, agri-food, clean technology, AI, quantum, cyber, digital trade, education, and services.
3. Link the IPS to an overarching Canadian foreign policy strategy and national security strategy.
The Indo-Pacific cannot be treated as a stand-alone regional policy. It should be connected to Canada’s Arctic, Euro-Atlantic, development, defence, technology, and economic security agendas. Canada needs an integrated foreign policy framework that explains how these regional and thematic strategies fit together.
4. Build an Indo-Pacific track into Canada’s domestic economic strategies.
Every major domestic economic strategy should have an Indo-Pacific component. Canada’s critical minerals strategy should identify Indo-Pacific investors, customers, processing partners, and supply-chain opportunities. Canada’s defence industrial strategy should include Indo-Pacific co-development and procurement opportunities. Canada’s energy strategy should identify practical pathways into Asian markets. Canada’s AI, quantum, and cyber strategies should identify priority Indo-Pacific partners.
5. Strengthen the energy security pillar.
Canada should position itself as a reliable energy partner for the Indo-Pacific, across both conventional and clean energy. LNG, LPG, uranium, hydrogen, critical minerals, clean technology, and energy infrastructure should be treated as strategic tools for deepening Canada’s relevance in the region.
6. Update the China chapter with enforceable guardrails.
Canada should engage China where interests align, but with much greater clarity on limits. The next phase should include guardrails on foreign interference, forced labour, cyber threats, investment screening, research security, sensitive technologies, critical infrastructure, and supply-chain integrity.
7. Protect and expand substantive engagement with Taiwan.
Canada should not allow a more pragmatic China policy to come at the expense of Taiwan. Within Canada’s One China policy, there is significant room to deepen practical co-operation with Taiwan in trade, technology, education, cyber security, democratic resilience, people-to-people exchanges, semiconductors, and supply chains.
8. Rebuild the India chapter around scale, realism, and competence.
India needs a much more substantial place in the IPS. Canada should focus on energy, agriculture, education, innovation, digital infrastructure, critical minerals, AI governance, and trade. But this requires more India competence across government, business, universities, provinces, and civil society.
9. Move from broad regional engagement to anchor partnerships.
Canada should prioritize a smaller number of partners where interests, trust, and political will are strongest: Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan, and ASEAN as an institution. Each partnership should have a clear purpose and a small number of practical deliverables.
10. Elevate digital trade, services, universities, and innovation partnerships.
Canada’s next-phase economic agenda should go beyond goods exports. Services, digital trade, education, talent mobility, research partnerships, AI, quantum, and innovation ecosystems should be central to the IPS.
11. Deliver focused security value where Canada has comparative advantage.
Canada should sustain its regional security presence, including defence diplomacy and Taiwan Strait transits, but focus on niche capabilities partners actually need: maritime domain awareness, Dark Vessel Detection, cyber resilience, sanctions enforcement, training, critical infrastructure protection, and participation in regional exercises.
12. Build a whole-of-society Indo-Pacific effort.
The IPS cannot be implemented by the federal government alone. Provinces, cities, universities, colleges, businesses, civil society, diaspora communities, and young professionals all need to be part of the effort. Canada needs deeper Asia competence: language skills, regulatory knowledge, business networks, regional expertise, and sustained people-to-people ties.
13. Measure outcomes, not activity.
The government should publish an annual IPS scorecard. It should measure market access secured, investments attracted, supply chains strengthened, security capabilities delivered, students and talent retained, partnerships institutionalized, and regulatory barriers removed. Meetings, missions, and announcements matter only if they produce results.
