On November 13, 2025, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada hosted a fireside chat on “Charting Thailand’s Political Future” with Pita Limjaroenrat, former leader of Thailand’s now-dissolved Move Forward Party, at its Vancouver office. In discussion with APF Canada’s Vice-President, Research & Strategy, Vina Nadjibulla, Pita discussed Thailand’s political trajectory, wider regional shifts in Southeast Asia, and opportunities for deeper Canada-Thailand and Canada-ASEAN co-operation.
Thailand, Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, is entering a period of political uncertainty ahead of its expected 2026 election. The 2023 electoral victory of the Move Forward Party and the Constitutional Court’s subsequent ruling to dissolve the party and ban its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, from politics for 10 years have intensified debates about Thailand’s democratic future. For Canada, Thailand remains an important partner within the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a region of more than 680 million people and one of the world’s fastest-growing economic blocs. Canada and ASEAN have elevated their ties to a Strategic Partnership and continue to advance negotiations on an ASEAN-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Canada and Thailand have also announced they will begin negotiations towards a bilateral free trade agreement.
As Canada accelerates its Indo-Pacific Strategy, conversations with regional leaders like Pita provide crucial insights into how domestic political changes intersect with regional security, economic diversification, and long-term strategic planning. This report summarizes the key themes and insights from the event.
Event Speakers
- Pita Limjaroenrat, former leader of Thailand’s Move Forward Party; Visiting Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School
- Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President, Research & Strategy, APF Canada (Moderator)
Regional trends shaping Southeast Asia
Pita outlined three major forces—de-risking, digital sovereignty, and defence realignment—that together are reshaping Southeast Asia’s economic and political environment in ways that have implications for partners like Canada.
He described de-risking as a sustained restructuring of global supply chains. Following the recent rise of tensions between the U.S. and China, multinational firms have accelerated their investments in Southeast Asia. By 2024, ASEAN economies had collectively received more foreign direct investment from Europe than China—a major turning point. The gains, however, have been uneven. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have attracted the most investment thanks to their expanding domestic markets and business reforms. Thailand, by contrast, continues to face structural challenges and remains highly exposed to external shocks due to its export-heavy economy.
Digital sovereignty is a second defining trend. Countries such as Singapore and Malaysia are becoming regional hubs for semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and cloud services, while Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand have significant critical minerals reserves needed for electric vehicles (EVs), renewables, and advanced manufacturing. As global competition for secure digital and green energy supply chains intensifies, ASEAN states are seeking greater autonomy over infrastructure, data governance, and technology development.
The third trend, defence realignment, reflects the Indo-Pacific’s changing security landscape. Countries are strengthening partnerships selectively in response to rising maritime tensions. Pita pointed to the Philippines’ recent maritime-focused posture and expanded co-operation with the U.S. as emblematic of this shift.
De-risking, tariffs, and Thailand’s economic balancing act
When asked how the second Trump administration’s tariff announcements—widely referred to as “Liberation Day” after the sweeping April 2025 measures—have affected ASEAN economies, Pita described the impact as both a continuation of de-risking and a catalyst for rapid policy adaptation.
He explained that while the China+1 strategy began during Trump’s first term, the new tariffs intensified the urgency of relocation. South Korean and Japanese companies had been planning such moves for years; by 2025, these were finally materializing. However, ASEAN was unable to mount a unified response. Malaysia initially proposed a collective renegotiation, but the idea quickly unravelled. ASEAN economies, Pita noted, are too heterogeneous. Indonesia, with its export reliance of only about 30 per cent of GDP and with its large domestic market, can absorb tariff shocks relatively easily. Thailand and Vietnam, by contrast, are more dependent on exports, with Thailand’s international trade 120 per cent of its GDP; tariffs on key products thus function “almost like sanctions.”
Thailand was forced to develop an industry-specific strategy. Pita, highlighting Thailand’s top exports and those most dependent on the U.S. market, pointed to four that stood out: rice, shrimp, coconut juice, and rubber. These industries required immediate government focus, while others’ markets were sufficiently diversified to withstand tariff pressures. Thailand’s response, therefore, could not be uniform; it had to be targeted and sector-specific.
The tariff shocks also exposed a deeper structural problem: Chinese transshipment through Thailand. Between Trump’s first and second terms, Thailand’s trade surplus with the U.S. grew steadily, but its trade deficit with China expanded even more sharply. Much of Thailand’s recorded U.S. surplus, Pita explained, was actually Chinese goods routed through Thailand. These “zero industries”—solar panels, steel, rubber products, EV components—bring little benefit to Thai workers or firms while undermining domestic small and medium enterprises forced to compete with low-cost, overproduced Chinese goods. This dynamic, he argued, distorts Thailand’s economic profile and undermines its long-term growth.
Thailand must therefore rebalance its economy by strengthening domestic demand, reducing reliance on transshipment-heavy sectors, and building industries that generate real value. This shift, Pita suggested, opens opportunities for partners such as Canada to support sustainable, high-quality economic development.
Canada–Thailand and Canada–ASEAN co-operation
Building on these regional shifts, Pita argued, Canada and Thailand are well positioned to move beyond a traditional commodity-focused relationship toward a more substantive engagement grounded in capability building.
He highlighted three priority areas for co-operation:
- Critical minerals: An ‘ASEAN-Canada Critical Minerals Corridor’ could combine ASEAN’s resource endowments with Canada’s environmental governance, Indigenous partnership models, and transparent regulatory practices.
- Cybersecurity: Thailand’s growing exposure to cyber threats creates strong demand for partners with credible technical expertise. Canada’s reputation for neutrality and high standards makes it a suitable collaborator in early-warning systems and the development of cyber architecture.
- Maritime and coastal capability: Canada’s strengths in ocean science, fisheries management, coastal monitoring, and blue-economy innovation could support Thailand’s efforts to build environmentally sustainable maritime sectors.
Pita emphasized Canada’s competitive advantage in high governance standards differentiates it from other major powers. He noted that Thai officials and civil society actors value partners who uphold labour rights, environmental protections, and Indigenous rights.
Thailand’s domestic political landscape
APF Canada’s Vina Nadjibulla shifted the discussion to Thailand’s internal political trajectory, noting that the country has experienced 13 military coups over the last century and an even larger number of judicial interventions. She asked Pita to explain the principal dynamics shaping Thai politics today.
Pita described Thailand as a “competitive autocracy” in which elections are held, but their outcomes do not necessarily translate into political power. He outlined the systemic weaponization of law, noting that the Constitutional Court and other oversight bodies were appointed under the military junta following the 2014 coup. These institutions have repeatedly intervened in electoral processes, dissolving more than 35 political parties.
He explained that his own party’s experience illustrates this system. The Move Forward Party won the most parliamentary seats in 2023, yet was blocked from forming government by the military-appointed Senate. Although the Senate’s mandate to vote on the prime minister expired in 2024, constitutional mechanisms continue to allow unelected institutions to override electoral outcomes.
When asked about the prospects for the upcoming 2026 election, Pita said he remains optimistic but underscored the risk of voter fatigue. The 2023 election saw a record 77 per cent turnout, including high participation from the Thai diaspora. However, repeated interventions have led some voters to question the value of participation, particularly those who must travel long distances or lose daily wages to vote. Lower turnout would advantage actors with highly organized voting networks and disproportionately disadvantage reform-oriented parties.
Implications for Canadian policy and engagement
Nadjibulla then asked how Canadian policymakers and businesses should interpret Thailand’s political instability when considering diplomatic or commercial engagement. Pita replied that Canada should balance values-based engagement with practical co-operation, reinforcing its longstanding commitment to labour and Indigenous rights and environmental standards.
He highlighted Canada’s historic contributions to Thailand through development assistance and human rights programming, noting that Thai civil society actors view Canada as a credible and trustworthy partner. He further noted that Canada’s approach to Southeast Asia—combining ASEAN-wide initiatives with targeted bilateral strategies—has been well received. He cited Canada’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia, its Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in the Philippines, and the opening of an Export Development Canada office in Bangkok as examples of effective and tailored engagement.
Audience discussion and key concerns
Participants raised questions about how regional trade rules, the rule of law, and democratic resilience relate to Canada’s future role in Thailand and ASEAN. On trade, audience members asked how U.S. agreements that require tariff alignment by partners, such as the U.S.-Malaysia arrangement, might constrain ASEAN’s policy space and affect Canada’s prospective agreements with the region. These concerns were situated within the broader proliferation of mini-lateral and issue-based arrangements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and emerging Indo-Pacific corridors, which ASEAN states use to avoid being locked into binary alignments.
The questions also touched on investors’ concerns about contract enforcement and legal security, including the reliability of Thai courts in handling foreign commercial disputes. Pita acknowledged that arbitration in Singapore has become the norm in major deals involving Thailand due to concerns about corruption, discretion, and the weak rule of law. He underscored the need for a “regulatory guillotine” to streamline outdated permits and reduce opportunities for rent-seeking, while noting that meaningful improvements in the rule of law will likely require a generational shift among legal and judicial professionals.
Other audience members asked about democratic backsliding and future reforms, including how Thailand might break the cycle of judicial and military interventions. Pita argued that reformist forces must broaden their electoral base – “win more and win deeper” at the national, provincial, and local levels – and reshape public norms so that coups and judicial overrides are no longer accepted as routine. He cited Thailand’s strong support for reform parties in military-dense constituencies and the engagement of younger generations as encouraging signals, while cautioning that this will be a long-term process.
On regional security issues, Pita cautioned that rising nationalist rhetoric around the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute could escalate if not carefully managed. He urged policymakers to prioritize diplomacy, rule-of-law processes, and clear public communication.
Finally, addressing audience questions about energy, low-carbon transitions, and regional risk, Pita underscored how Canada might contribute responsibly to ASEAN’s energy security and climate objectives. He pointed to climate finance, carbon pricing, and robust carbon accounting as areas where Canadian standards could add particular value.
Looking ahead: Implications for Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement
The dialogue with Pita highlighted both the opportunities and constraints shaping Canada’s engagement with Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia. While Thailand faces political uncertainty and structural economic challenges, public demand for democratic reform remains strong, and the country’s strategic importance within ASEAN continues to grow.
For Canada, Southeast Asia represents a critical arena for economic diversification, supply chain resilience, and principled international engagement. Pita’s insights underscore the potential for Canada to play a constructive role in emerging sectors such as critical minerals, digital governance, and maritime security, while supporting inclusive growth and good governance.
As Canada advances its Indo-Pacific Strategy, sustained and informed engagement will be essential to building durable and mutually beneficial partnerships in the region.
