United States President Donald Trump’s national security strategy, released on Dec. 4, places new constraints on Canada’s China policy at the very moment Ottawa is attempting to stabilize relations with Beijing. It marks a decisive shift in how Washington, D.C., sees China, its allies, and its own neighbourhood—and for a country as economically and strategically tied to the U.S. as Canada, it will shape the boundaries of what is possible in our China policy and engagement with the Indo-Pacific.
The strategy is striking not only in tone, but also in substance. It discards the familiar language of democracy promotion and universal values in favour of a foreign policy rooted in national interest, economic statecraft, and spheres of influence. It lays out five core U.S. priorities—from securing the Western Hemisphere to ensuring American technological dominance—that together reflect a worldview defined by geopolitical competition, industrial strategy, and “flexible realism.” It is a marked departure from a universalist, values-based foreign policy toward a framework that prioritizes competition over co-operation, sovereignty over multilateralism, and strategic advantage over normative goals.
For Canada, these shifts matter. They redefine the strategic environment in which Prime Minister Mark Carney is attempting to recalibrate Canada’s relationship with China and diversify partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
The first implication is that the space for stabilizing relations with China has narrowed considerably. Ottawa’s recent signals—seeking greater predictability in the relationship, expanding trade where feasible, and pursuing co-operation in areas such as climate and agri-food—now run up against a White House that views Chinese influence anywhere in the hemisphere as a strategic risk. Even modest Canadian engagement with China may be judged less on its merits than on how it is interpreted in the U.S. within a framework designed to “wind down adversarial outside influence.”
Trump’s strategy goes further, outlining a U.S. government effort to map Chinese involvement in strategic assets across the hemisphere, including ports, energy infrastructure, and critical supply chains. Decisions Canada once viewed through domestic or commercial lenses will increasingly be assessed for their geopolitical implications—especially as Canada seeks a renewed Canada–U.S.–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and faces intensifying pressure to align with American industrial and security priorities.
The second implication is the centrality of economic and technological security in a U.S. grand strategy. China is framed not primarily as an ideological adversary, but as an economic and technological competitor. The strategy calls on partners to align with U.S. economic-security policies, from reshaping supply chains and countering Chinese industrial overcapacity to harmonizing export controls and technology standards.
For Canada, the implications are immediate. Several sectors where Ottawa sees opportunity with Beijing—clean technology, agri-food, natural resources, and inbound investment—intersect with areas Washington now views as strategically sensitive. Even commercially rational engagement with China could be interpreted as strategic divergence unless carefully calibrated.
The third implication concerns Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement more broadly. Washington now sees the region as the decisive arena for shaping the balance of power with China, and it expects its allies—including Canada—to play a more active role in that effort. In short, the U.S. wants a co-ordinated front in the Indo-Pacific, not a patchwork of national approaches. Whether Washington can build and sustain such a coalition while simultaneously imposing tariffs on allied economies remains uncertain.
For Canada, this means that our regional engagement will increasingly be read in geopolitical terms. Many of our existing initiatives—maritime domain awareness with the Philippines, cyber collaboration with Malaysia, deeper ties with Japan and South Korea, and critical minerals partnerships—now carry added strategic weight. They remain firmly in Canada’s interest, but they may also serve as visible signals of alignment at a moment when Washington is watching closely. And they could help strengthen Canada’s hand in broader negotiations with the U.S., including over CUSMA and cross-border industrial policy.
Moving forward, Ottawa must balance three objectives: manage an increasingly complex relationship with the U.S., stabilize ties with China where feasible, and support an open trading system while safeguarding national and economic security. Achieving this balance will require a more deliberate form of statecraft—anticipating pressure from both Washington and Beijing, protecting policy autonomy, and strengthening partnerships that broaden Canada’s strategic options. The path is narrower, but thoughtful choices can still shape our place in a more contested world.
This article first appeared in The Hill Times on December 11, 2025.
