The extent of Taiwan’s expertise, teaching, and resources for research on the Sinosphere—here, referring to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan—is not widely known in Canada. There are compelling reasons for Canadians to consider Taiwan as a destination for developing this expertise, including the need to better understand geopolitics, geo-economics, and security in both regional and global contexts.
This need is all the more pressing given Canada’s intention to recalibrate its relations with China, as announced by Canadian Prime Minister Carney after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 31, 2025. “Developing a coherent China strategy,” as Professor Reza Hasmath at the University of Alberta recently noted, “requires investment in expertise, institutions and diplomatic capacity.” Developing a nuanced understanding of the Sinosphere can help us better navigate the polarized public discourse, media landscape, and many global issues on which China has significant influence, from global trade and supply chains to technology and artificial intelligence, security, climate change, and development co-operation.
Taiwan’s Strengths in China Studies
The PRC has become increasingly difficult for academics, researchers, and those seeking to develop China competencies to access. Wang Hsin-Hsien, a leading scholar on cross-Strait relations, has noted that Taiwan’s prominence in international China Studies has increased as a result of the PRC’s restrictions on information and academic engagement, at the same time as academic freedom has decreased in Hong Kong. Recognizing the inherent political dimension of China Studies in Taiwan, Wang encourages assessments of economic and political developments in the PRC based on empirical evidence, balancing methodological rigour with the practical policy implications of such research. Taiwan provides a rich environment for serious research and language training, bolstered by its strong academic institutions, access to extensive data, and deep regional expertise without the political pressures that exist in the PRC.
In the first half of 2025, the author held discussions with over 100 university interlocutors to better understand Taiwan’s strengths in research, language instruction, and policy engagement. Because these conversations were held in confidence and because of the sensitive nature of the subject, individuals are not identified by name here. Many of these interviewees view Taiwan as a vital hub for China Studies, particularly as regional and global conditions shift, underscoring Taiwan’s strategic role in fostering interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research.
The advantages they noted include the following:
- Instruction in the Chinese language and an immersion environment in Mandarin.
- A cultural affinity with China, rooted in shared history and customs, religious beliefs, and folk traditions.
- An open intellectual environment, with media and publication freedoms enabling unfettered academic and public discourse, whether in Chinese, English, or other languages.
- The ability to interpret mainland Chinese sources within their ideological and historical context.
- Regional academic and policy networks that offer diverse, non-Western perspectives.
- Increasing international recognition of Taiwan’s expertise, especially as direct access to mainland scholars declines.
- Access to research funding, including fellowships and scholarships.
- Shared academic paradigms for social science research with the West in terms of subject matters of interest, methodology, and theoretical perspective.
- A growing catalogue of English-language courses at Taiwan’s universities.
Because of these strengths, international interest in Taiwan’s academic resources—including archives, surveys, and public opinion data—has grown over the last decade. Analysts also see Taiwan as offering valuable insights into regional perceptions of China, especially given that the PRC poses a significant strategic challenge to Taiwan. As one historian put it, “The Chinese Communist Party justifies its legitimacy by taking control of the narratives of Chinese history, posing an existential threat to Taiwan. Historians [outside the PRC] can make a contribution by re-establishing the historical record…. We need to articulate effectively how history can transform identity.”
The Limitations of China Studies in Taiwan
Despite these strengths, China Studies in Taiwan face significant hurdles, including the sharp decline in economic and academic cross-Strait engagement. Although some Taiwan-based China scholars still attend conferences in the PRC, many no longer do so, and fieldwork there has virtually ceased. This has led to a greater reliance on alternative methodologies, especially quantitative research. Some scholars have shifted the focus of their research, for example, from domestic issues in the PRC to China’s role in international affairs. Given that political bias may affect Taiwan-based analysis of the PRC, researchers and analysts must remain vigilant about not letting ideology colour their conclusions on these issues.
Another challenge is the declining interest among young people in Taiwan, who tend to see the PRC as foreign and politically unappealing. There is also a talent gap: the younger generation often views the PRC through a social science lens, comparing it to other authoritarian regimes, rather than seeking to understand the PRC’s internal politics on their own terms. As a result, the field has become increasingly “securitized.”
Some political scientists now see China Studies as increasingly intertwined with Taiwan’s domestic politics, especially on issues like fake news, sharp power, and societal vulnerabilities. While significant resources are being invested in studying the PRC’s impact on Taiwan, some scholars argue that this is not the same as genuine China Studies. The recent lack of on-the-ground fieldwork in the PRC, for example, has pushed scholars toward methods like data mining and artificial intelligence.
Ongoing Need for China Competencies
China’s global behaviour, ambitions, and tactics have had a negative impact—especially in democratic countries—on perceptions of China, but this has not lessened the need for a deep understanding of the PRC, its leadership, and why it behaves the way it does. This is especially the case for the search for solutions to global issues such as climate change and global health.
While there is a wealth of resources available in Taiwan for those interested in sharpening their China competencies, as elsewhere, there has been a polarization of views on China, with domestic political factors in Taiwan directly affecting the rhetoric for and against cross-Strait academic engagement. Similar polarization is evident in Canada, dominating the media landscape, affecting public opinion, and influencing policy decisions in ways that are not necessarily based on clear evidence or that carefully assess national interests in relation to the PRC’s bilateral, regional, and global impact.
This is not to suggest that China experts in Taiwan are more objective than those elsewhere, or untainted by the existential threat the PRC poses to Taiwan. But they bring valuable cultural background and recent experience that those outside the Sinosphere often lack. Astute international observers, seasoned China watchers, and budding Sinosphere students alike should use their own judgment to assess the quality of analysis by Taiwan experts, and determine if the evidence supports the conclusions drawn.
A senior China scholar in Taiwan has observed that one of the advantages of pursuing China Studies in Taiwan is the profusion of perspectives on China, thanks to Taiwan’s more liberal and pluralistic environment compared to the PRC. “A healthy public debate is needed to let people decide for themselves, based on empirical evidence... Understanding where China stands today is important—we should not let the spectre of demonization of China prevent understanding of what is actually going on in China.”
With a recalibration of Canada-China relations in the offing, Canada will benefit from having more people who understand what is actually going on in China, are proficient in Mandarin, and understand the perspectives of the Sinosphere on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. China competencies can be developed in the PRC and in Taiwan; for those hesitant to pursue this in the mainland, there are many persuasive reasons to consider Taiwan as a springboard for this endeavour.
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Julia G. Bentley is a former career diplomat and a Distinguished Fellow with the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. She is affiliated with York University’s Centre for Asian Research, University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, and National Taiwan University’s Centre for China Studies.
Julia was based at National Taiwan University’s Centre for China Studies for three months in spring 2025, supported by a Taiwan Fellowship and a grant from York University’s China Insights Fund. The views expressed here are her own. While this research was grounded in reimagining China Studies for Canadians, much of the information is equally relevant to those from anywhere outside the Sinosphere with an interest in developing or deepening China expertise.
Her findings can be found here, including a narrative report, an inventory of academic resources on Sinosphere studies in Taiwan, and a matrix of Canada-Taiwan academic exchanges.
• Edited by Erin Williams, Director, Programs, APF Canada
