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The Cambodia-Thailand relationship has deteriorated since a border clash broke out on May 28 and has led to the death of one Cambodian soldier. The conflict, not the first between the two countries, stems from a longstanding dispute over the lines of demarcation, dating back to early 20th century negotiations between Thailand (then Siam) and the French colonial authorities in what is present-day Cambodia. For several weeks, the two countries have engaged in tit-for-tat actions, closing land borders and reinforcing their troop presence. In addition, on June 23, the Thai government banned tourists, both Thai and foreign, from travelling to Cambodia via Thailand. For its part, the Cambodian government has banned imports of Thai oil, gas, fruits, and vegetables, as well as Thai films from movie theatres.
A related and more extraordinary event – and one now threatening Thailand’s political stability – was a leaked June 15 phone call between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is widely believed to wield significant influence over the government of his son, Hun Manet. Paetongtarn claimed the purpose of the call was to try to defuse the conflict. However, the tone of the conversation told a different tale: in speaking with Hun Sen, she referred to a Thai military general involved in the dispute as belonging to “the opposite side” of the Thai political divide and, after deferentially referring to Hun Sen as “uncle,” told him she would “take care” of his concerns.
This revelation led to a torrent of calls and petitions for Paetongtarn to resign, with some demanding fresh elections, and the anti-Shinawatra “yellow shirt” protesters returning to the streets for the first time in over a decade. These royalist protesters, wearing yellow to signify their loyalty to the monarchy, have helped destabilize Thailand and pave the way for military intervention twice in the last 20 years. A 2006 coup saw Paetongtarn’s father, Thaksin Shinawatra, forced out of the prime minister’s office, and a 2014 coup removed Paetongtarn’s aunt, Yingluck Shinawatra. For opponents of the Shinawatra dynasty, Paetongtarn’s perceived anti-national actions run in the family. One spark for the first anti-Shinawatra protests in 2006 was Thaksin’s sale of Thai-based telecommunications assets to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings.
On July 1, the Constitutional Court accepted one of the petitions, suspending Paetongtarn from office for the duration of a court case that will now proceed. Paetongtarn is being tried for lacking integrity and breaching ethical standards in her call with Hun Sen. The case to determine whether Paetongtarn is disqualified from office is expected to take one to two months to conclude. In the meantime, she will remain in the cabinet as culture minister, a position she was strategically assigned in a cabinet reshuffle not long before the Constitutional Court made its decision. Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Jungrungruangkit, Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai Party colleague, will serve as caretaker prime minister.
Pheu Thai has been leading a tenuous coalition government, formed in 2023 as a “grand reconciliation” between the Thaksin-led Shinawatra camp and royalist conservatives, to keep the progressive – and now-banned – Move Forward Party out of office. That coalition is now in serious jeopardy, especially after a major coalition partner, Bhumjaithai, pulled out of the government on June 18, leaving Paetongtarn’s parliamentary support at only 254 of the 495 members of Thailand’s lower house. Bhumjaithai had vowed to try to bring down the government through a no-confidence vote when the Thai parliament reconvened this week. However, this can no longer proceed with the prime minister suspended.
Given the emphasis in the Indo-Pacific Strategy on engaging Southeast Asia, as well as recent trade missions and current discussions of a free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it is important to better understand the dynamics between Cambodia and Thailand and the implications for political stability in Thailand.
Elite Actors in Intra-ASEAN Politics
Unsurprisingly – and justifiably – there has been much criticism of Paetongtarn seeming to side with a foreign leader over her own nation’s interests. However, her phone call with Hun Sen also revealed a less explored element of Southeast Asian politics: Paetongtarn’s friendliness and deference to Hun Sen is an example of how, on a personal level, many Southeast Asian leaders are not as confrontational with each other as these border disputes and other occasional conflicts over sovereignty might otherwise suggest. This friendliness goes beyond the polite diplomacy on display at the frequent multilateral ASEAN forums, which have allowed the bloc’s governments to become more familiar with each other’s interests, both shared and divergent.
Thailand’s Shinawatra family exemplifies this type of inter-elite networking and shows that Southeast Asia’s political elite are not opposed to working together for common interests, including interests that are more personal than policy oriented. Over the past 25 years, Thaksin Shinawatra built a network of elite friends and allies across the region, first during his time as prime minister (2001-2006), then in exile after he was ousted in 2006. These friendships and alliances, including with Hun Sen and with players on various sides of Myanmar’s political divide, remained active since he returned to Thailand as a free man after serving time for corruption offences.
Similarly, Yingluck Shinawatra was long rumoured to have escaped to Cambodia after she too was deposed in 2014 and was found to have used a Cambodian passport to register as the director of a Guangdong, China-based port operator while in exile in Hong Kong. More recently, Thaksin used his connections in Myanmar to try to play a mediating role between the military and various ethnic armed organizations who have been engaged in a civil war since 2021. Malaysian Prime Minister and current ASEAN Chair Anwar Ibrahim, in a more official capacity, appointed Thaksin to serve as a personal advisor on ASEAN affairs.
Political Complexities and Concerns for Canada
On one hand, these inter-elite networks provide Canada and other countries engaged with Southeast Asia some assurances. Despite flare ups between the region’s countries and the occasional breakdown of personal relationships between leaders, Southeast Asian political elites’ willingness to co-operate with each other on matters of regional importance should signal that Southeast Asian states remain committed to deepening the economic and diplomatic links that will increase regional stability and create opportunities for both intra- and inter-regional trade.
On the other hand, there are some important caveats, especially when it comes to Cambodia and Thailand.
First, this most recent border dispute has increased the nationalist rhetoric in both countries, evident in demonstrations and on social media. This suggests that, despite the limited success of developing Southeast Asia as a “community” with a shared regional identity and sense of purpose among its peoples, ASEAN fundamentally remains an elite-led project. While there are some signs that intense nationalism is generally declining in Southeast Asia in response to social change and the emergence of new political forces, it nonetheless remains a force to be reckoned with, not least in Cambodia and Thailand.
Political elites in both countries have historically fostered nationalist sentiments as a means to increase their legitimacy, and such attitudes have become ingrained among a substantial proportion of Thais and Cambodians. At present, even progressive or pragmatic politicians cannot openly reject these sentiments for fear of losing popular support. In the near-to-medium term, the ebb and flow of these nationalist responses to regional tensions, including through wars of words, trade restrictions, and border closures, is something that countries like Canada will need to contend with as part of their engagement with the region.
The second caveat is Thailand’s perennial political crisis. Unlike Cambodia, whose state and political institutions have become fused with Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party, Thailand has been a fractured state and divided society for the last 20 years. Elite competition within Thailand, including between the Shinawatras and the royalist establishment, has often been fierce and has complicated the country’s relationships with other Southeast Asian leaders and governments further afield. For example, Thaksin’s historical relationships with leaders of neighbouring countries are not shared by the Thai military, as the recent tensions with Cambodia make clear.
Internally, the power of the prime minister and the cabinet has been constrained by the need to appease powerful unelected forces in Thai political life, not only the armed forces, but also bureaucrats whose loyalties lie with the palace. When pro-royalist interests have been threatened, there has been a tendency for open conflict to emerge, most dramatically in the form of coups, but also through the more subtle method of lawfare. While Thailand’s military coups get the most international attention, the Thai Constitutional Court has continuously ruled against prime ministers, opposition leaders, and parties that have challenged entrenched interests.
It has been during periods of civilian rule and political stability that democratic countries such as Canada have had the most success in building trade and people-to-people ties with Thailand. However, the necessary bargain between competing Thai elites and elements of the Thai state to ensure civilian rule and stability is not always in place like it has been since mid-2023. The unresolved political tensions between royalist conservatives, the pro-Thaksin camp, and more progressive forces make the current balance all the more delicate.
In the short term, if Paetongtarn is disqualified from office or resigns, or if her Pheu Thai Party loses in a snap election, the question will become whether a new version of the “grand reconciliation” can be manufactured to preserve stability and civilian rule. It is possible that the Paetongtarn-Hun Sen incident has caused the Shinawatra and Pheu Thai brands to lose their lustre. Any deal the Thai establishment strikes will need to be with the more progressive People’s Party, which replaced Move Forward after the latter was dissolved, and which is now surging in the polls. Due to their radically different views on the future of Thailand, this deal-making is unlikely, raising the prospect of instability. The direction this takes also partially depends on whether current tensions with Cambodia are reduced or enflamed. A quick return to the status quo ante with Cambodia could reduce pressure on the Pheu Thai-led coalition. However, increased tensions could provide the Thai armed forces with the necessary justification to depose a weak and embattled government.
In the long term, the ultimate question for Thailand is if and when the country will finally emerge from the divisions within state and society, and the power of the unelected, which have been stifling democracy and the country’s status as a reliable international partner. Until then, Canada will need to continue to manage the risks associated with Thailand’s turbulent politics.
