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When North Korea signed a partnership agreement with Russia in June 2024, followed by its deployment of troops to aid Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, South Korea and its allies became alarmed by how this new phase of Pyongyang-Moscow security co-operation could augment the former’s military capabilities, to the detriment of South Korea’s security. A recent North Korean broadcast gave one important clue: freshly painted North Korean drones signalling that unmanned aircraft have become an important strategic factor in security on the Korean Peninsula.
Russia’s assault on Ukraine has demonstrated the effectiveness and versatility of drones. For example, cheap quadcopters — commercial four-rotor drones — and loitering munitions (also known as “suicide drones”) have shredded armoured columns, exposed air-defence gaps, and in some cases devastated entire city blocks. North Korean troops deployed alongside Russian forces have observed these tactics firsthand, and according to allied intelligence reports, have returned home with the expertise in low‑cost production, swarm tactics, and GPS jamming.
In response, South Korea — which North Korea took by surprise with its five-drone incursion in December 2022 — is rushing to enhance its own “drone-kill chains,” a layered sensor-to-shooter system that can detect, track, and neutralize hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in seconds, while also investing in artificial intelligence-enabled (AI) detection software and deploying battle-tested Warmate loitering drones from Poland.
This burgeoning drone rivalry adds a new asymmetric dimension to the military standoff between North and South Korea with implications for regional security. Both Koreas must now rethink their air-defence doctrines; unlike traditional air threats from manned jets or missiles, small drones fly low, evade radar, and strike with little warning, forcing militaries to transition from centralized missile interceptors to dispersed, rapid-response systems that can adapt in real time.
Developments in drone use and technology in North Korea
North Korea’s earliest drones — crude quadcopters that crash‑landed south of the DMZ in 2014 — have evolved into a far more diversified and capable fleet. This includes jet-powered Saetbyol‑class UAVs, alongside swarms of first‑person‑view (FPV) drones with a camera transmitting live video to the pilot’s goggles. The Saetbyol-4 is reportedly capable of cruising at high altitudes and loitering long enough to be able to sweep the DMZ for artillery and missile batteries. The Saetbyol-9, a slimmer cousin, appears to be able to carry precision-guided bombs or small cruise missiles against those same targets. Completing the triad are shoebox-sized FPV quadcopters whose live video feed lets an operator manoeuvre through valleys, avoid detection by existing radar networks, and dive-bomb targets with a one- to two-kilogram shaped charge.
Deployed in tandem, these drones can be especially lethal: a Saetbyol-4 can locate high-value assets, a Saetbyol-9 can strike from altitude, and FPV swarms can finish the job at treetop level. This strike combination heightens tension on the peninsula and raises the chance of a deadly miscalculation. Also worrisome is that North Korean media have presented these homebuilt Saetbyol drones as capable of being deployed, unhindered by UN sanctions.
Satellite images of North Korea’s Panghyon Airfield reveal seven new 40‑metre hangars and an extended runway suited to heavier, pilotless aircraft. Pyongyang has also unveiled AI‑guided suicide-attack drones that use onboard image‑recognition to steer into artillery without relying on GPS. Western intelligence sources, speaking to media, have attributed these gains to Russian technology transfers, including at least one Pantsir truck‑mounted air‑defence system — valuable not for its missiles, but for the radar software that tracks tiny quadcopters at short range.
Reportedly, North Korean troops have rapidly absorbed Russian instruction in electronic warfare and counter-UAV tactics; they are now able to lure hostile drones with a lone ‘bait’ soldier, detect them with portable scanners, and engage at close range with modified shotguns — all the while shifting in small, dispersed teams to avoid aerial tracking. This combat experience has sharpened North Korea’s ability to employ this new technology with greater accuracy and lethality.
South Korea’s response to North Korea’s advances in drone technology
South Korea’s progress in drone technology has taken a different path. Seoul has built its strategy around a ‘shield-and-spear’ model: establishing a dense air-defence lattice to blunt any first strike, while enabling retaliation using precision-strike UAVs and missiles capable of hitting launch sites and command nodes with at least double the firepower.
After North Korean drones breached Seoul’s airspace in December 2022, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, with the newly launched Drone Operations Command, fast‑tracked the making of a drone kill chain, a multi-layered web of defence that listens for drones, scrambles their signals, and zaps them out of the sky with powerful lasers. Seoul — and, on a smaller scale, the manufacturing cities of Gumi and Ulsan, which host some of South Korea’s largest electronics, defence, automobile, and shipbuilding complexes — are now fortifying their industrial and critical-infrastructure zones with South Korea’s first city-run, multi-layer anti-drone kill chains that pair sound-detection sensors with high-energy lasers.
South Korea’s Defence Acquisition Program Administration also ordered Polish Warmate loitering munitions — backpack-sized glide bombs guided by a tablet — that are being used by Ukrainian forces against Russian troops and that cost less than one-tenth the price of a standard guided missile, in addition to South Korea’s own loitering munitions. This decision to import Polish Warmate systems underscores that battlefield lessons from Ukraine are being internalized in East Asia. Guided by its prior use of Israeli‑built Heron reconnaissance drones, South Korea’s purchase creates opportunities to co-operate with Ukrainian and Israeli drone firms.
Domestic companies such as Hanwha Aerospace have launched a full-rate production of its ‑Block-I‑ air-‑defence laser, which can disable low-f‑lying North Korean drones, while South Korea’s new Drone Operations Command now links reconnaissance drones with K2 battle tanks for real‑time targeting, while the South Korean Air Force has also abandoned its plan to purchase AH‑64E Apache helicopters, noting their vulnerability to drone strikes.
As drone warfare constitutes a grey zone that sits below traditional thresholds of conflict escalation, it blurs the boundary between routine drills and coercive acts, compelling Seoul to rewrite deterrence playbooks written for missiles and manned bombers, not buzzing quadcopters. Seoul’s planners are reshaping deterrence around speed, dispersion, and layered defence. Similarly, surveillance aircraft are being dispersed to multiple auxiliary airstrips, flight lines are divided into blast-walled ‘cells,’ and ammunition depots are draped with light netting so that a handful of quadcopters cannot trigger a chain reaction.
These steps build on the December 2022 decision to weave acoustic detectors, jammers, and lasers into a city-wide counter-drone grid after North Korean UAVs penetrated the capital’s airspace. The emerging playbook no longer relies on “absorb and retaliate”; instead, it aims to deny a first strike through dispersion and, if that fails, to respond within minutes with expendable swarms that strike launch sites before conventional fighters can get airborne. Airspace defence is thus becoming a rolling contest of moves and countermoves rather than a single decisive blow.
Drone technology and new security challenges in East Asia
Pyongyang’s truck-launched FPV quadcopter swarms — each costing only a few thousand dollars — can threaten South Korea’s billion-dollar air bases at minimal risk. Their small size and low radar profile let them slip past conventional sensors, while GPS-spoofing pods — tiny transmitters that feed false co-ordinates to navigation systems — help them evade the short-range interceptor missiles guarding South Korean bases.
At the regional level, drones have become powerful tools that can turn low-altitude band —formerly a blind spot for conventional air defences — into contested strategic real estate. A single swarm exercise near the Northern Limit Line — the disputed maritime boundary between the two Koreas — can force the U.S. and United Nations Command radar crews to recalibrate their early-‑warning thresholds. Meanwhile, Moscow’s recent transfer of a Pantsir air-‑defence system to Pyongyang underscores deepening Russia-North Korea military collaboration.
Global supply chains further complicate South Korea’s drone production. Despite the K-Drone Initiative to strengthen its domestic industry, Seoul faces supply‑chain vulnerability as a large share of South Korea’s drone parts originate in China or is built around Chinese civilian airframes. Beijing’s latest export licence regime has already doubled the price of key sensors and power modules for drones, driving up costs and lengthening delivery times. This arrangement raises wartime risks as maintenance lines could dry up overnight, and firmware backdoors leave systems exposed to remote hacking or GPS spoofing.
The drone contest unfolding between Seoul and Pyongyang has shifted Northeast Asia’s security dynamics to include batteries, algorithms, and counter-jammers. North Korea’s low-budget drone swarms with Russian expertise can probe South Korea’s air bases and saturate radar screens, but their success hinges on power, guidance, and payload limitations. South Korea’s use of lasers, hijacking software, and loitering munitions to counter North Korea proves that deterrence now depends on rapid tech cycles rather than traditional platforms. The lesson for every capital — Seoul, Pyongyang, Washington, Beijing, and Ottawa — is clear: unmanned systems cannot replace ground forces or strategic firepower due to battery limits, jamming, bureaucracy, and brittle logistics, but drones have already become indispensable military assets, and their disruptive power will grow exponentially as AI-driven navigation technology matures.
The potential for Canada–South Korea drone co-operation
As of mid-2025, Canada has not utilized drones in Operation NEON, the mission that monitors North Korean sanction violations at sea. Instead, it relies on CP-140 Aurora patrol planes and helicopter-equipped warships for surveillance. Canadian defence experts have urged the Royal Canadian Navy to adopt armed drones for maritime surveillance — an option that would benefit missions like NEON. Ottawa and Seoul share an interest in countering Pyongyang’s weapons programs and upholding UN sanctions, and they co-operate closely on maritime monitoring initiatives, which can be strengthened by drones.
Canada already uses drones for domestic border patrols and wildfire monitoring, proving their value in covering vast areas and reducing risk to personnel. If drones are applied to NEON, the same advantages could improve detection of North Korean illicit activity. The groundwork is laid for their future use as force multipliers in Canada’s sanctions-enforcement toolkit.
South Korea is a ready partner for Canada in the adoption of drone technology. The two countries signed a Defence Materiel Cooperation MOU in 2022 to explore joint research, development, and procurement opportunities. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that advanced drones depend on complex global supply chains for components — some sourced from Canada and South Korea — making technology partnerships among allies more vital than ever. By pairing Canada’s operational experience across vast expanses with South Korea’s manufacturing drive, the two countries can improve sanctions monitoring, accelerate innovation in drone technology, and reinforce the rules-based security framework that they both support.
• Edited by Erin Williams, Programs Director, and Jeehye Kim, Senior Program Manager, Northeast Asia
