Protecting Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic depends increasingly on secure access to supply chains, fabrication hubs, and software-control regimes beyond its borders.
The federal government’s recent Arctic investment—exceeding $40 billion across defence infrastructure, transportation, energy, and surveillance—signals a shift toward sustained northern capability. Yet this shift also highlights a structural reality: the platforms that underpin Arctic defence rely on globally concentrated production networks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
Canada’s recently released Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) provides a framework—build, partner, buy—for managing this reality. The central policy question is not whether Canada can eliminate dependence on external supply chains, but how it can structure that dependence to preserve operational control. Japan and South Korea are central to this effort.
Arctic–North Pacific Convergence
Receding sea ice in the Arctic has increased maritime access, making the Bering Strait a critical chokepoint linking Pacific trade routes to Arctic waters. As seasonal ice loss extends navigation windows, the Strait is emerging as a strategic gateway for commercial shipping and military transit between the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, giving it growing importance for both global trade flows and regional security.
China and Russia have responded by expanding coordinated naval and air activities in the North Pacific, particularly near this corridor. As emphasized by Elizabeth Wishnick, an expert on Sino-Russian cooperation who participated in an Arctic security conference in Vancouver earlier this year, this cooperation has been more visible in the North Pacific than in the European Arctic. These developments suggest that Arctic security can no longer be treated as distinct from wider strategic rivalry, requiring a defence posture that integrates Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific frameworks.
For Canada, this convergence has direct procurement implications. Advanced defence systems depend on supply chains concentrated outside North America. The F-35 fighter aircraft, for example, requires approximately 400 kg of rare earth materials, while uncrewed systems and surveillance platforms relay on semiconductors and critical minerals processed predominantly in East Asia.
Disruptions—whether geopolitical or industrial—would affect procurement, maintenance, and readiness. While the DIS acknowledges these vulnerabilities through the Canadian Defence Industry Resilience program, resilience requires actively managing supply concentration across trusted partners. Arctic sovereignty, therefore, must be understood not only in territorial terms, but also in terms of integration, sustainment, and data control across interconnected regions.
Build: Domestic Integration and Infrastructure
The “Build” pillar of the DIS should be understood as strengthening domestic authority over how systems are integrated, operated, and sustained, rather than attempting comprehensive domestic production. In the Arctic, where logistical constraints are acute, this distinction is critical.
Recent federal investments address longstanding infrastructure gaps. Northern Operational Support Hubs,expanded transportation corridors such as the Mackenzie Valley Highway, and proposed port infrastructure at Grays Bay improve the ability to sustain operations over distance. These investments also serve dual-use functions, linking critical mineral extraction to defence logistics and reducing vulnerability to supply disruptions.
Space-based capabilities—including satellite communications, Earth observation, and high-latitude ground stations—are similarly foundational. While many components are globally sourced, domestic control over integration and data provides operational flexibility. The BOREALIS initiative incorporates AI and quantum computing research into this framework, signalling that Canada views frontier technology as a sovereignty instrument alongside physical infrastructure.
Partner: Looking to the North Pacific
The “Partner” pillar provides the mechanism for reducing supply chain concentration through collaboration with trusted states. Japan and South Korea are particularly relevant, given their advanced industrial capacity, regulatory alignment, and shared strategic interests.
Both countries are leaders in sectors where Canada’s Arctic defence capabilities are most exposed, including shipbuilding, semiconductors, satellite systems, and advanced manufacturing. South Korea’s shipbuilding industry has demonstrated expertise in constructing complex, ice-capable vessels and supporting maritime systems. Japan’s satellite observation and defence electronics capabilities complement Canada’s requirements for domain awareness and communications.
Existing agreements provide a foundation for deeper integration. The Canada-Japan Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, signed in January 2026, establishes a framework for joint research and development and the transfer of defence-related intellectual property. The Canada-ROK Security and Defence Co-operation Partnership, launched in October 2025, sets out a roadmap for maritime and cyber collaboration.
These agreements move Canada beyond episodic procurement toward structured industrial alignment. Collaboration with firms such as Hanwha Ocean and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—alongside existing partnerships with MDA Space and Telesat— demonstrates how North Pacific industrial capacity can be incorporated into Arctic defence planning.
Canada’s defence procurement remains heavily concentrated in the U.S. Expanding structured partnerships with Japan and South Korea reduces exposure to single-source dependencies while maintaining alignment with allied systems. A more formalized Canada–North Pacific defence industrial framework, analogous to Canada’s growing engagement with Nordic partners, would further institutionalize this approach.
Buy: Focusing on Procurement and Software Governance
The “Buy” pillar addresses immediate capability requirements but must be assessed through a governance lens. The strategic value of modern defence platforms lies increasingly in their software and data rather than in their hardware alone. Mission data files and software architectures determine how systems operate; without access to them, platform ownership does not ensure autonomy.
Canada’s acquisition of F-35 fighter aircraft from U.S.-based Lockheed Martin, for example, illustrates this constraint whereby full source-code control remains with the U.S. In the Arctic, where conditions differ significantly from other operating environments, characterized by communication delays, extreme weather, and electromagnetic variability, limits on software modification reduce operational flexibility.
Procurement decisions should therefore incorporate lifecycle governance requirements. These include access to technical data packages, the ability to modify and adapt systems as conditions evolve, and domestic capacity to conduct maintenance and upgrades. This is particularly important for software-intensive systems such as radar networks and autonomous surveillance platforms, which require continuous recalibration.
Partnerships with Japan and South Korea provide an opportunity to negotiate governance arrangements that prioritize software access and data control. Embedding these conditions at the procurement stage is essential to avoiding long-term dependencies that are difficult to reverse.
The World Beyond Infrastructure
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is increasingly shaped by systems and supply chains that extend beyond its territory. The recent defence investment announcements mark significant steps toward strengthening northern capability, but infrastructure alone does not resolve the underlying dependence on external production networks.
The DIS provides an appropriate framework for managing this complexity. “Building” enhances sovereignty when it secures domestic authority over integration and sustainment. “Partnering” reduces vulnerability when it distributes supply chain exposure across trusted states. “Buying” addresses capability gaps only when procurement ensures control over software, data, and lifecycle maintenance.
Canada’s emerging partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, alongside its Nordic and Australian collaborations, provide a foundation for this approach. The next step is to consolidate these relationships into a coherent defence industrial architecture before future procurement decisions entrench existing vulnerabilities.
This article first appeared in Policy Magazine on March 24, 2026
