The images of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin together at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin, China, were striking. For some observers, the photos seemed to symbolize a new great-power alignment. But such optics conceal as much as they reveal. The reality is more complex. While India has moved toward a tactical reset with China, its long-standing principle of strategic autonomy—the pursuit of maximum flexibility by avoiding formal alliances and diversifying partnerships—remains intact.
The images from the summit seemed especially significant against the backdrop of a sharp downturn in India’s relations with the United States. Washington’s decision to impose 50-per-cent tariffs on Indian exports has shaken the foundation of a partnership long described as central to the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy. New Delhi has been frustrated not only by these punitive tariffs, but also by American outreach to Pakistan, including new trade and energy agreements, and high-profile visits.
While India’s tentative thaw with Beijing began last year, it has gained pace in the context of U.S. tariffs and Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan. Recent agreements on flights, rare-earth exports, and tentative steps toward border disengagement point to a cautious improvement in ties.
But this reset is tactical, not strategic. India’s concerns about Chinese territorial ambitions, its support for Pakistan, and its trade imbalance remain unresolved. The rivalry in the Himalayas and across the Indian Ocean is structural and enduring. India may seek calm, but it is not about to embrace Beijing as a trusted partner.
Russia remains important, particularly as an energy supplier, but here, too, India is cautious. Even as it continues to purchase Russian oil and defence equipment, New Delhi has diversified its security partnerships with France, Israel, and the U.S. Its message is clear: no single power can be relied upon. Modi was in Japan right before travelling to China to expand co-operation with Tokyo, including in the defence and security spheres. That visit, which saw Japan pledge roughly US$68-billion in investment in India, attracted far less international attention than the optics of Modi’s meeting with Xi, yet it was arguably more substantive.
This op-ed was first published in The Hill Times on September 8, 2025
