Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to China marks a significant milestone in this country’s relations with Beijing. It signals Ottawa’s intent to improve a strained relationship at a moment when Canada is also navigating threats from the Trump administration.
From Ottawa’s perspective, the objectives are clear and pragmatic: explore trade and investment opportunities, and ease trade frictions, especially China’s tariffs on Canadian canola, pork and seafood. While the trip could serve Canadian interests, its success should be judged not by the optics of a renewed “strategic partnership,” but by whether Mr. Carney can secure specific economic gains without weakening Canada’s long-term security and strategic autonomy. To do so, he will need to manage three things: resist Beijing’s pressure for political compliance, keep economic security and resilience front and centre, and strengthen national security guardrails.
Reducing Canada’s over-reliance on the U.S. and diversifying economic partnerships are strategic necessities. But diversification does not mean indiscriminate engagement, and nowhere is that distinction more important than in Canada’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China is not simply another market to be balanced against the United States; it is a one-party state whose leaders view economic relations as instruments of political leverage, and are pursuing a geopolitical agenda that is largely harmful to Canadian interests. Engagement with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), therefore, comes with conditions – sometimes explicit, often implicit – and with expectations of political compliance that Canada must be prepared to resist. Silence – or acquiescence – on what the CCP defines as “core interests,” including Taiwan and human rights issues, is often the price of greater economic co-operation.
Against this backdrop, Canada’s recent response to developments around Taiwan is concerning. Following large-scale PRC military drills around Taiwan in late December, Ottawa’s statement was both delayed and unusually muted, particularly when compared to responses from other democracies. At a moment when Beijing was clearly testing international resolve, Canada appeared hesitant. That hesitation risks being read not only in Beijing, but also in Taipei and among Canada’s democratic partners in the region, as uncertainty about where Ottawa draws its strategic lines.
The second challenge for the Carney visit is whether Canada can pursue economic opportunity with China without deepening strategic dependence. That requires a far more granular approach to economic co-operation – one that distinguishes between sectors where engagement is manageable, and those where the risks outweigh the rewards. Economic security and resilience – not simply an export upside – should be the guiding frame.
In practical terms, that means where reliance on the Chinese market is already high, the priority should be risk reduction, not expansion. Canola is the obvious case. Ottawa should absolutely seek tariff relief, and Mr. Carney’s visit should aim to deliver a deal. But the goal cannot be to “restore” the status quo; it should come with a clear plan to accelerate diversification to other markets beyond China.
At the same time, there are sectors where deeper engagement could serve Canadian interests. This is most obvious in energy, both conventional and renewables, where expanded commercial ties with China could create real economic opportunities.
Then there are domains where co-operation should not be pursued at all. Sensitive dual-use technologies, advanced AI applications, space and aerospace systems, critical infrastructure, and data-rich ecosystems are all areas where the downside risks overwhelm any commercial upside. These are not normal commercial arenas. These are sectors where the PRC’s state-driven industrial policy and security apparatus are deeply entwined with the economy, and co-operation carries economic and security risks for Canada.
Finally, any effort to deepen economic ties with China must run in parallel with national security vigilance. The mounting pressure Canada feels from the Trump administration should not obscure the fact that core PRC-related national security concerns have not gone away. Foreign interference, cyber intrusions, transnational repression, and risks tied to research partnerships and dual-use technologies remain real and persistent. Periods of expanded economic engagement are precisely when guardrails matter most. Mr. Carney’s trip should therefore be matched by more robust defences against espionage, transnational repression, and foreign interference, faster and transparent investment screening mechanisms, clearer rules for critical infrastructure protection, tighter research-security guidance, and export controls that reflect the realities of technology competition.
Mr. Carney is right to test whether pragmatic diplomacy with China can produce economic benefits for Canada. But we must not confuse dialogue with trust, or commercial opportunity with strategic alignment. The measure of success of this trip will not be a photo-op or a communiqué. It is whether Ottawa can secure tangible economic outcomes while reinforcing the guardrails that protect Canada’s sovereignty, resilience, and security.
This article first appeared in The Globe and Mail on January 12, 2026
